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When it comes, will it come without warning 
Just as I'm picking my nose? 
Will it knock on my door in the morning, 
Or tread in the bus on my toes? 
Will it come like a change in the weather? 
Will its greeting be courteous or rough? 
Will it alter my life altogether? 
 
― WH Auden, O Tell Me The Truth About Love,  
1932-1939 
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INTRODUCTION 
Love and Bail-in have little in common besides their largely 
unpredictable, incognizable, and ineffable nature captured by the 
unanswered questions raised by WH Auden in the last stanza of his poem 
transcribed in the epigram. For regulators, banks, investors, and 
practitioners—but more generally for society— however, a critical 
understanding of bail-in can be no less important, if less romantic, than of 
the causes and consequences of deep feelings. To recognize the risks and 
negative effects of unhealthy relationships might be particularly relevant 
both emotionally and practically, and their complexity and baffling 
mechanics should not impede an assessment of what does not work and 
should be changed. After all, in the same ballad, the poet also wonders 
whether Love "Has it views of its own about money?"; something bail-in 
certainly has, as thousands of investors have unexpectedly discovered to 
their chagrin in the last few years in Europe and elsewhere.  
While the parallel we draw might seem forced, we believe that 
legislators, regulators, and many scholars have fallen heads over heels 
with bail-in—with its possibly elegant, but surely highly theoretical 
framework—underestimating its practical implications, and what it needs 
to operate concretely and effectively. The reasons for this being enamored 
are different, more and less noble and pure, but, as with all love affairs, 
after the first idyllic moments the practicalities become as important as the 
initial passion. This is not to say that we are overly pessimistic about the 
future of bank resolution based on the rationale of bail-in, but simply to 
underscore how the hasty and critical conditions in which it has been 
developed might have hazed and dazed a deeper understanding of its actual 
workings. The first few cases where the new regime applied—in the final 
phases of the great financial crisis commenced in 2007-2008—clearly 
show the many shortcomings of the new rules and suggest an 
understandable “escape” from bail-in.  
In this perspective, the purpose of this Article is to analyze the 
functioning of the European regulatory framework for the crisis of credit 
institutions in the light of its early applications, and with a special focus 
on the bail-in tool. We investigate how the new resolution mechanisms—
rooted in the principle of private sector involvement in banking 
restructurings—have interplayed with (and tried to re-shape) legal and 
institutional contexts still characterized by an attitude to bail-out rescues 
and by non-harmonized national insolvency legislations.   
We find that, during the first years of application of the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), several "endogenous" and 
"exogenous" factors have eroded the foundations of the abstract legal 
framework and altered the functioning of the bail-in. By endogenous 
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factors, we mean intrinsic flaws or shortcomings of the resolution rules, 
which end up weakening (if not contradicting) its policy ends. By 
exogenous factors, we mean other sets of rules (such as the EU State aid 
rules, or the national rules on the liquidation of insolvent banks), or factual 
and economic circumstances (such as the health of the banking industry) 
that have critically interplayed with the introduction of the BRRD. 
Among the endogenous shortcomings of the resolution 
framework, we include: (a) The hardly acceptable levels of uncertainty 
and resolution authorities’ ample discretion in the assessment of the 
triggers of a resolution procedure; (b) The unpredictability in the selection 
of liabilities to be possibly written off in the context of resolution; (c) The 
shaking and somewhat contradictory grounds on which the "no creditor 
worse off" principle (NCWO) rests. 
Among the exogenous factors, we count: (i) The inconsistency 
between the requirements for entering into resolution and those for the 
granting of State aids in the context of banking restructurings—a key 
distorting element in the decision-making processes of the EU and national 
authorities; (ii) The lack of harmonization in the national rules governing 
the ordinary liquidation of failed banks, which may severely affect the 
NCWO; (iii) The untimely introduction of the bail-in tool before a 
sufficient cushion of eligible liabilities was available to the banking sector; 
(iv) The insufficient coordination between the resolution rules and the 
issue of the mis selling of banks’ capital instruments—a phenomenon 
observed in several European countries. 
The problems we tackle are too heterogeneous and multi-layered 
to be summed up in a formula or slogan for the improvement of the system. 
However, we suggest some corrections to the EU resolution framework.  
In a nutshell, the core of our proposal revolves around four ideas: (1) a 
clarification and harmonization of the “public interest” concept relevant 
for both the adoption of resolution tools and State aid; (2) harmonization 
of national insolvency and liquidation rules or, more precisely (and 
realistically), of those aspects that might facilitate the adoption of the 
resolution decisions and a level playing field; (3) a more flexible write-
down requirement than the current eight percent, in light of the completion 
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of the MREL cushion; (4) greater transparency and better timing for 
resolution decisions.1,2  
I. THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION AND THE SINGLE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISM 
A. The Banking Union and the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
The crisis of 2007-2008 dramatically exposed how financial 
supervision is seriously impaired by lack of cross-border coordination—
international banking activity requires, clearly, transnational controls and 
 
*  For comments and observations, we wish to thank Filippo Annunziata, 
Angelo Baglioni, Sabino Cassese, Luca Enriques, Pierre de Gioia Carabellese, 
Christos Gortsos, Andrea Resti, and Lorenzo Stanghellini. We are particularly 
grateful to Brando Maria Cremona for excellent research assistance. Mr. 
Ventoruzzo is a Professor of Law, Bocconi University School of Law (Milan, 
Italy), External Scientific Member, Max Planck Institute (Luxembourg). Research 
Associate, ECGI (Brussels, Belgium). Mr. Sandrelli is a Lecturer, Bocconi 
University School of Law (Milan, Italy). 
1 The Authors of this Article have been professionally involved, directly 
or indirectly and in different capacities, with some of the intermediaries whose 
cases are discussed briefly below. We disclose this in the interest of full 
transparency. However, in light of the circumstances of those activities and the 
approach of this Article, we believe that no conflict of interest or other possible 
bias has affected our analysis; and, on the contrary, that those activities have 
improved our understanding of the law in action and its practical implications. 
2 While this Article was being submitted for publication, the European 
Parliament and the Council enacted the so-called “Banking Package”, including a 
number of amendments to the BRRD, in an effort to progress in the post-crisis 
regulatory of the banking sector and comply with the updated standards agreed at 
the G20. See, in particular, Directive (EU) 2019/879 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards 
the loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity of credit institutions and 
investment firms and Directive 98/26/EC [2019] L150/296. A comprehensive 
analysis of these amendments would not have been possible at this stage, we 
highlighted however the main areas affected by the “Banking Package.” The new 
rules are not particularly innovative and in any case they do not affect our 
conclusions. If anything, they confirm the need to correct some of the 
imperfections demonstrated by the first applications of the BRRD. For a summary 
of the “Banking Package,” see European Commission, Adoption of the Banking 
Package: revised Rules on Capital Requirements (CRR II/CRD V) and Resolution 
(BRRD/SRM) (Apr. 16, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/det
ail/en/MEMO_19_2129. See also Pierre de Gioia Carabellese, Bail-In: Directive 
2019/879 (TLAC/MREL) and Amendments to the BRRD, 12 I.C.C.L.R. 669 
(2019). The new rules will be applicable as from December 28, 2020. 
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crisis management.3 The problem is not only one of effectiveness and 
resources, but also of incentives: national authorities incur in conflicts of 
interest—primarily pursuing the protection of local businesses, markets, 
and constituencies, and sub-optimal results.4 The problem was particularly 
acute in the European Union, where national divergences in terms of 
supervision of banks (and other financial intermediaries)5 and crisis 
management might hinder the development of a single market for financial 
activities and hamper the transmission mechanisms of, now unitary, 
monetary policy.6  
The crisis was the perfect catalyst to accelerate a centralization 
process, whose rationale and desirability, if not necessarily political 
consensus, were already discernible. The EU Member States reached the 
agreement on the creation of a Banking Union (BU) in the late spring of 
2012.7 It comprises three major “pillars.”8  
 
3 High Level Grp. on Fin. Supervision in the EU, de Larosière Report 
(Feb. 25, 2009), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf; Rosa M. Lastra 
& Geoffrey E. Wood, The Crisis of 2007-09: Nature, Causes, and Reactions, 13 
J. INT. ECON. L. 531, 537-45 (2010). 
4 ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 
THE RESPONSE AND THE WORK AHEAD, 210ff. (Penguin Press 2013); Viral V. 
Acharya ET AL., Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis 
of 2007–2009, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS IN FIN. 247ff. (2009). 
5 In this Article we will focus on banks, also considering the prevalence, 
in Europe, of the “universal bank” model, whereby credit institutions provide to 
clients, in addition to deposit and lending services, a variety of financial services, 
including investment and advisory services. 
6 Mario Draghi, President, Eur. Cent. Bank, Benefits of European 
Supervision, Speech at the ACPR Conference on Banking Supervision (Sept. 18, 
2018) (transcript available in Bank for International Settlements archive); 
Communication for the Spring European Council: Driving European recovery, at 
4, COM (2009) 114 final (Mar. 4, 2009); Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council: A Roadmap towards a Banking 
Union, at 3, COM (2012) 510 final (Sept. 12, 2012); Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A reformed financial 
sector for Europe, at 3, COM (2014) 279 final (May 15, 2014). 
7 See, e.g., Christos V. Gortsos, Institutional and Legal Aspects of the 
European Banking Union: Status Quo and the Way Forward 11 (Dec. 27, 2017) 
(unpublished paper) (on file with the National and Kapodistrian University of 
Athens School of Law), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=3093830. 
8 Id. 
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The first one is the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), under 
which the European Central Bank (ECB) is the primary authority 
responsible for prudential supervision of banks, in cooperation with the 
National Central Banks (NCBs); it became effective in November 2014.9 
The ECB directly oversees significant banks—roughly 119 entities 
holding over eight-two percent of the assets of the European banking 
sector10—while control over less significant ones is attributed to NCBs, 
under the ECB indirect supervision.11 The second pillar is the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which entrusts the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB)—an independent, self-financed agency, whose members are 
appointed by the EU Council—with the task of managing resolutions of 
banks according to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD 
or Directive).12 The SRB, which opened its doors in 2015 but became fully 
responsible for resolutions only at the beginning of 2016, works closely 
with the ECB (for example, the competence to declare if a bank is Failing 
or Likely to Fail —or, FOLTF—is of the latter),13 the National Resolution 
 
9 See Council Regulation 1024/2013 of Oct. 15, 2013, Conferring 
Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the 
Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions, 2013 O.J. (L 287) 63, 66 [hereinafter 
SSM Regulation]; see also Regulation 468/2014, of the European Central Bank 
of 16 April 2014 Establishing the Framework for Cooperation within the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and National 
Competent Authorities and with National Designated Authorities, 2014 O.J. (L 
141) 1, 1 [hereinafter SSM Framework Regulation]. 
10 See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, BANKING SUPERVISION, Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/thess
m/html/index.en.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
11 Id. 
12 Directive 2014/59/EU, of the European Parliament and the Council of 
15 May 2014 Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of 
Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Council Directive 
82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) 
No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 
190, 193;  see also Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure 
for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the 
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and 
Amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, 2014 O.J. (L 225) 1, 3 [hereinafter 
SRMR].  
13 If the Member State so provides, the resolution authority may be 
vested with the power to declare the FOLTF status.  See Directive 2014/59, supra 
note 9, art. 32(2). In order to ease the coordination between supervisory and 
resolution authorities, the EBA has issued guidelines on the FOLTF. See 
European Banking Authority [EBA], Guidelines on the interpretation of the 
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Authorities (NRAs, which are often, but not always, NCBs), and with the 
other authorities that might be involved in a resolution procedure. Finally, 
the BU will be completed with the erection of a third pillar—a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)—which is currently under construction 
amongst political and economic tensions.14  
In terms of scope of application, it is worth noting that the SSM, 
SRM, and EDIS apply (or will apply) to the nineteen countries of the 
Eurozone, while the underlying legislation—i.e. the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR),15 the Capital Regulation Directive (CRD IV),16 the 
 
different circumstances when an institution shall be considered as failing or likely 
to fail under Article 32(6) of Directive 2014/59/EU, EBA/GL/2015/07 (May 26, 
2015). 
14 See discussion infra Paragraph II.D. The main goal of the EDIS is 
reducing the vulnerability of national deposit guarantee schemes to large local 
shocks, whilst offering a uniform insurance coverage notwithstanding the relevant 
geographical location of the deposits within the Banking Union.  See 
Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards the completion of the 
Banking Union", at 3, COM (2015) 587 final (Nov. 24, 2015); Jim Brunsden, 
Germany Stands Firm Against EU Bank 
Deposit Guarantee Plan, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.ft.com/conten
t/58c9a172-ae7d-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4; Dirk Schoenmaker & Guntram B. 
Wolff, What Options for European Deposit Insurance?, BRUEGEL BLOG (Oct. 8, 
2015), http://bruegel.org/2015/10/what-options-for-european-deposit-insurance. 
For a recent discussion of EDIS, Christos V. Gortsos, The European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS), in European Economic Law (Federico Fabbrini & 
Marco Ventoruzzo eds., forthcoming 2019). 
15 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and 
investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 2013 O.J. (L 
176) [hereinafter CRR]. 
16 Directive 2013/36/EU, of the European Parliament and the Council of 
26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 
176) (implementing Basel III capital requirements for banks) [hereinafter CRD 
IV]. Both the CRR and the CRD IV have been subject to amendments by the 
“Banking Package” referred to supra, note 2. See Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Regulation 
(EU) No 575/2013 as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, 
requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, 
market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective 
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BRRD, and the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD),17 
constituting the so-called “Single Rulebook”—applies to all the twenty-
eight members of the European Union, including the ones that have not 
adopted the single currency. EU countries that do not join the Euro can 
voluntarily participate in the SSM and the SRM (however, participation in 
the former is a pre-condition to participate in the latter). At the time of this 
writing, no non-Euro jurisdiction has made this option, even though some 
studies advocate its desirability.18 The ECB enters in memoranda of 
understanding on how to cooperate on supervisory matters with the 
national supervisors of non-participating countries.19 
Before diving specifically into the BRRD and the regulation of the 
bank crisis, it is useful to offer a few additional observations on the 
structure and functioning of the BU.  
The legal framework of the SSM is established by the SSM 
Framework Regulation, a complex piece of legislation that sets forth the 
criteria and procedures to determine: (1) the significance of financial 
institutions directly supervised by the ECB, (2) the rules governing 
common procedures and cooperation between the ECB and the NCBs 
(and, in particular, the establishment of joint supervisory teams composed 
of ECB and NCBs personnel to oversee significant banks), (3) 
relationships with supervised entities and due process principles, (4) 
authorization and withdrawal of banking licenses, (5) acquisition of 
qualifying holdings, (6) control over fit and proper requirements for board 
members and managers, (7) procedural provisions concerning supervision 
of macro-prudential requirements (capital and liquidity requirements 
under CRD IV), (8) sanctions, and (9) many other issues.20  
 
investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements, 
and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 2019 O.J. (L 150), 1. See also Directive (EU) 
2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 
amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding 
companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory 
measures and powers and capital conservation measures, 2019 O.J. (L 150), 253.  
17 Directive 2014/49/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (harmonizing 
deposit insurance in case of a bank’s need of financial assistant to pay its 
creditors).  
18 See, e.g., Zsolt Darvas & Guntram B. Wolff, Should Non-Euro Area 
Countries Join the Single Supervisory Mechanism?, BRUEGEL POLICY 
CONTRIBUTION (Mar. 
2013), available at http://bruegel.org/wpcontent/uploads/imported/publications/p
c_2013_06__.pdf. 
19 Id. 
20 See SSM Regulation, supra note 9. 
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In general, it is worth mentioning, first of all, that a financial 
institution is significant—and therefore, directly supervised by the ECB—
if one of the following four criteria defined by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), is met: (i) size, i.e. if the total value of its assets (on a 
consolidated basis, if applicable) exceeds €30 billion;21 (ii) economic 
importance for the EU economy as a whole or the specific country (more 
specifically, if a bank qualifies as one of the three largest banks of its 
Member State, or its assets exceed €5 billion and twenty percent of the 
GDP of the Eurozone country where it is established); (iii) cross-border 
activities, if the total assets exceed €5 billion and the ratio of cross-border 
assets or liabilities in more than one other participating Member State to 
its total assets or liabilities is above twenty percent;22 (iv) public financial 
assistance, if the bank has requested or received funding from the 
European Stability Mechanism or the European Financial Stability 
Facility.23 The ECB, however, retains a discretionary power to consider 
other financial institutions significant and overstepping national 
authorities directly exercising control thereon.24 Each year the ECB 
reviews the list of significant institutions.25  Changes of status from less 
significant to significant and vice versa can clearly occur: if a less 
significant institution meets one of the aforementioned criteria, it is 
immediately reclassified as a significant one; on the other hand, a 
significant institution must fail to meet all the criteria for three consecutive 
 
21 Id. art. 6. 
22 Id.. 
23 Id. The criteria succinctly identified in the text are, in reality, quite 
complex and detailed; see also Benoit Mesnard ET AL., Global Systemically 
Important Banks in Europe, European Parliament Briefing (May 23, 2017), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg-
Data/etudes/BRIE/2016/574406/IPOL_BRI%282016%29574406_EN.pdf. A 
small set of significant bank are also considered Globally Systemically Important 
Banks (“G-SIBs”) according to the definition adopted in 2011 by the G20 and the 
Financial Stability Board, which considers size, interconnectedness, 
substitutability, complexity, and cross-jurisdictional activity.  Under EU law, art. 
131 CRD IV defines Global Systemically Important Institutions (“G-SIIs”). These 
entities are subject to additional and stricter capital requirements and prudential 
measures. As of November 2016, there are 30 G-SIBs institutions world-wide, of 
which 13 located in the EU and 8 in the US (although the three biggest ones are 
in this country: Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America), 4 in China, 
3 in Japan and 2 in Switzerland. Of the European ones, 4 are in the UK, one in 
Germany (Deutsche Bank), 4 in France, and one in Italy (Unicredit). 
24 SSM Framework Regulation, supra note 9, art. 6, art. 43. 
25 Id. art. 47. 
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years in order to be downgraded to less significant and to be placed under 
direct supervision by a national authority.26  
It is noteworthy to point out that certain competencies are 
attributed to the ECB irrespective of the dimensions and significance of 
the entity. An important example of an area in which the ECB is the sole 
competent authority concerns authorizations for new banks and financial 
institutions, as well as the authorization to acquiring qualifying holdings 
or control in such entities.27  
From the numerous and articulated competences and powers of 
the ECB within the SSM—which would be impossible and not useful to 
discuss here in general—it is necessary to provide a brief focus on 
requirements for capital, liquidity, and credit risk as the CRR and CRD IV 
set forth in light of their relevance for resolution decisions.  
 
B. Capital & Liquidity Requirements: A Bird’s Eye View of Basel 
III, CRR, and CRD IV 
The CRR and CRD IV introduced new capital, liquidity, and 
leverage requirements for banks closely following the Basel III approach, 
 
26 The three-year rule aims at avoiding a scenario of repeated and 
inefficient alternations of supervisory responsibilities between the NCAs and the 
ECB. SSM Supervisory Manual, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, BANKING 
SUPERVISION 1, 59–
60 (Mar. 2018) https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.sup
ervisorymanual201803.en.pdf.  Nonetheless, there are some exceptions. See SSM 
Framework Regulation supra note 9, art. 47. For example, under art. 70 of the 
SSM Framework Regulation, if “particular circumstances” occur, which would 
make the classification of a supervised entity as significant inappropriate, the 
supervisory powers remain with the NCA. Id. art. 70.  The issue of “particular 
circumstances” has laid the ground for an important judicial case. In 2014 a 
German Landesbank (to be classified as significant institution) claimed that 
“particular circumstances” according to art. 70 were present, so that it should be 
requalified as less significant and, thus, be exempt from ECB supervision).  The 
European General Court dismissed the claim on first degree, but the case is now 
pending before the ECJ.  See Case T-122/15, Landeskreditbank Baden-
Württemberg v. ECB, 2017 E.C.R. 337. For a comprehensive analysis see also 
Filippo Annunziata, European Banking Supervision in the Age of the ECB. 
Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg ‒ Förderbank v. ECB, BOCCONI LEGAL 
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 3139567 (2018), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3139567. 
27 SSM Regulation, supra note 9, art. 4, 14, 15. See Steven Schwarcz, 
The Banking Union: A General Perspective, in 1 EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: 
THE NEW REGIME, 4 (Luis Hinojosa-Martinez & Jose Beneyto eds., 2015). 
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but also adopted additional and specific measures aimed at ensuring 
financial stability—in particular in the area of governance and 
remuneration of managers.28 By way of introduction, it is almost 
superfluous to underline what a constraint such (strengthened) 
requirements represent for the financial structure of credit institutions and 
their business model. This regulatory approach has contributed to the 
flourishment of a (lightly regulated) “shadow banking” system dominated 
by hedge funds and private equity players, which not only relieve banks 
from their illiquid assets (NPLs), but also increase their indirect lending 
activities—competing with credit institution on their core playing field.  
The overall framework is based on three concepts: minimum 
capital requirements, private and public assessment of prescribed 
requirements—i.e. an annual self-assessment by individual institutions, 
the “Individual Capital Adequacy Assessment Process” or “ICAAP,” and 
a “Supervisory Review Evaluation Process” or “SREP,” conducted by the 
regulators, which is also a possible basis to impose additional capital 
requirements on single firms.29 Several of these requirements have been or 
will be phased in over a few years, becoming more stringent each year.30  
The specific requirements we will briefly illustrate are: (i) capital 
requirements (CET 1, Tier 1 and Total Capital); (ii) capital buffers (capital 
conservation, countercyclical, important institutions, and systemic risk 
buffers); (iii) liquidity requirements (Liquidity Coverage Requirement or 
LCR, and Net Stable Funding Requirement or NSFR).31 The implications 
 
28 Secondary sources issued in this respect also include technical 
standards released by the EBA. See discussion infra Paragraph IIE. 
29 SSM SREP Methodology Booklet, 2017, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, 
BANKING 
SUPERVISION (2017), available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ec
b/pub/pdf/ssm.srep_methodology_booklet_2017.en.pdf?508ca0e386f9b9136982
0bc927863456. These are the so-called “Pillar 2 capital requirements”. More 
specifically, Pillar 2 includes by two main elements:  the institution’s assessment 
of its capital needs (through the ICAAP) and the regulator’s review and evaluation 
(through the SREP). Following completion of the SREP, regulators may 
discretionally impose additional CET1 ratio add-ons, tailored to the relevant 
individual bank.  In this regard, the current ECB practice splits possible Pillar 2 
capital additions into the following components:  a first Pillar 2 requirement (P2R) 
which is primarily aimed at addressing risks not fully covered by Pillar 1 capital; 
and a Pillar 2 guidance element (P2G), which serves as guide to the additional 
appropriate level of capital needed to withstand future stress scenarios.  See  Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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and consequences of not meeting these requirements can be different, 
according to their different functions and rationales.32  
Capital requirements are the first relevant set of rules.33 They 
mandate a minimum amount of capital and quasi-capital concerning the 
quality of assets in terms of risk. In short, different categories of capital 
must represent at least a set percentage of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA).34 
The three relevant categories—Core Equity Tier 1 capital or “CET 1,” 
“Tier 1,” and “Total Capital”—are ranked based on their characteristics in 
terms of permanence (obligation of the bank to redeem), flexibility of 
distribution (discretion as to the payment of dividends or other forms of 
remuneration), and subordination (protection of creditors in case of 
winding up).35 Clearly enough, ordinary shares—which provide for no 
redemption obligation—discretionary and non-cumulative dividends, and 
deep subordination are at one end of the spectrum and constitute CET 1. 
Senior debt lies at the opposite end because it usually provides for a 
maturity date, has mandatory payments (and possible default or 
acceleration in case of non-payment), and subordinates counterparties 
only to secured creditors in case of liquidation.  
Based on these principles, the major capital requirements can be 
represented as follows.  
 
 
CET 1 includes ordinary shares, retained earnings, and certain 
reserves, and as mentioned, is the highest quality item in terms of 
 
32 See ANGELO BAGLIONI, THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT 46 (Palgrave Macmillan, 1st ed. 2016). 
33 See CRR, supra note 23. 
34 Id. art 92 ff. 
35 Id. art. 25 ff. 
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permanence, distribution flexibility, and subordination.36 Additional tier 1 
items that, together with CET 1 comprise Tier 1, include perpetual 
instruments that have no fixed maturity—distribution must, in any case, 
be discretionary and non-cumulative.37 An example might be a call option 
exercisable at the sole discretion of the bank (but regulatory approval is 
required).38 Tier 1 must also be convertible in ordinary shares or written 
down in case CET 1 is lower than a certain percentage—higher than the 
minimum (5.125%).39  
Tier 2 capital, which adds to Tier 1 to determine Total Capital, 
includes hybrid instruments that fall somewhere in between ordinary 
equity and debt—such as certain bonds and preferred shares.40 While 
generally, those are securities, regular loans might qualify as well.41 These 
instruments must have a maturity of over five years and maybe callable by 
the bank after this period (but there must be no incentives to redeem).42 In 
the case of winding up, Tier 2 instruments rank above Tier 1 claimants, 
and distributions might be cumulative and non-deferrable.43 Specific 
limitations to holders’ rights in case of default or non-payment are 
necessary.44 It shall be noted that EU and Basel III rules require a 
“regulatory amortization” of Tier 2 in the last five years to maturity on a 
straight-line basis: for example, the value of bonds expiring in 2025 will 
be reduced by 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100% starting in 2020.45 For this 
reason, as a practical matter, Tier 2 instruments generally have a duration 
well-exceeding the minimum five-year requirement.  
The determination of a bank’s capital—the numerator of the 
fraction used to calculate minimum capitalization, CET 1 in particular—
is subject to certain reductions aimed at limiting uncertainties due to 
discretionary evaluations.46 For example, and without going into more 
technical details, deferred tax assets that require future earnings to be 
enjoyed are deducted. Similar deductions apply for treasury stock, 
goodwill, and other intangibles, or specific investments in other financial 
 
36 Id. art. 26 ff. 
37 Id. art. 51 ff. 
38 Id. art. 52.1(j). 
39 Id. art. 54. 
40 Id. art. 62 ff. 
41 Id. art. 62. 
42 Id. art. 63. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. art. 64. 
46 Id. art. 36 ff. (for CET1 deductions). 
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institutions (this last deduction is also inspired by the goal of reducing 
interconnectedness).  
Coming now to the denominator of the capital requirement 
fraction, RWA, the basic idea is to value less risky assets comparatively 
more: greater risks imply a deterioration of the stability of the bank and its 
ratios. Banks can adopt one of three methodologies to weight their 
exposures: the Standardized Approach (SA), based on credit rating by 
recognized external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs);47 and the 
Internal Ratings Based approach or “IRB,” which can either be the 
“Foundation” approach (FIRB), or the “Advanced” one (AIRB). As the 
name suggests, the last two methodologies rely on internal procedures of 
the financial institutions that identify specific default probabilities, 
consider different risk factors, and apply them to classes of assets. The 
minimum regulations necessary to accede to these two options require 
very significant resources: they are therefore limited to the biggest banks.48   
As for the SA, exposures must be divided into classes based on 
either the counterparty (e.g., from central governments and banks to 
corporations and retail clients), type of asset (e.g., covered bonds, 
collective investments undertakings, gold bullion), or situation (exposures 
in default). For each exposure class, a weight must be applied based on the 
quality of the credit that an external agency determines (for instance 
varying from Standard & Poor AAA to CCC+ and below): the better the 
rating, the lower the reduction of the value. To offer a few examples, 
treasury bonds issued by a central government with a S&P rating from 
AAA to AA- have a weight of 0%; with a rating from A+ to A-, have a 
weight of twenty percent; with a rating of BB+ or lower, or unrated, have 
a weight of 100%.  Retail exposures, on the other hand, always call for a 
risk weight of seventy-five percent. In certain cases of particularly risky 
or poorly rated exposures, their weight can even exceed 100%: this is the 
case of exposures in default that can be discounted at 150%.  Risk-
mitigating factors are considered after applying these percentages: in 
particular, collaterals might improve the risk profile of an exposure. 
Clearly enough, the lower the denominator due to a smaller risk weight, 
the higher the capital ratio measured.  
 
47 Financial institutions may use assessments by such external 
institutions in order to determine the risk weights in the standardized approach for 
capital purposes.  Only ECAIs that have been previously determined eligible by 
national supervisors may be appointed to perform the above-mentioned tasks.  In 
order to ensure a comparable approach across ECAIs and promote a consistent 
implementation of European rules, the joint committee of the ESAs, led by the 
EBA, specifies the necessary correspondence between the credit assessments 
issued by an ECAI and the credit quality steps set forth in the CRR. 
48 See Baglioni, supra note 32, at 73. 
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The calculation of RWA also includes off-balance sheet assets, 
with a further credit conversion factor considering the lower probability of 
benefits. Finally, derivatives, stock lending, and repurchase agreements 
are subject to specific evaluation rules and procedures outlined in arts. 192 
ff. and 271 ff. CRR.49 
Failure to meet the above-mentioned evaluation rules and 
procedures may lead to the ECB activating its broad early intervention 
powers,50 as well as to the infliction of administrative sanctions under art. 
18 of the SSM Regulation. In this regard, the ECB’s sanctioning power is 
confined to those significant institutions that fall under its direct 
supervision.51 Consequently, if violations of CRR provisions have been 
performed by banks classified as less significant, then the competent 
 
49 Since its entry on the scene, the SSM has also made great efforts to 
strengthen the supervisory tools used to assess the quality of the loan portfolios 
and, in particular, to manage the issue of non-performing loans (“NPLs”); the 
progress achieved so far is remarkable, and has stimulated a large reduction of 
NPL ratios, thus improving the strength of Euro-area banks. In addition to NPLs, 
sound management of derivatives is important for the stability of a financial 
institution. Indeed, derivative instruments share several common features with 
NPLs: they are highly heterogeneous; many of them are opaque and illiquid, 
lacking an efficient secondary market, and hence subject to relevant downside 
valuation risk. Therefore, a closer scrutiny of these complex financial products is 
desirable.  In this regard, within the European Union, banks from northern 
Member States display the largest exposure to this kind of instruments, whereas 
banks from southern Member States, often deemed more unstable, are 
characterized by limited exposure. Moreover, while great efforts are deployed into 
reducing the overall NPL stock, it may be interesting to note that derivatives 
exposures of banks from northern European countries still remain visibly high, 
and should thus be reserved closer scrutiny by competent European Authorities: 
indeed, according to a recent study by the Bank of Italy, in 2016 the amount of 
financial derivatives reported in the assets of monetary financial institutions was 
4% of the total financial assets in Italy, a much lower value than in the UK (27%), 
Germany (8%) or France (6%). See Banca d’Italia, The derivatives through the 
lens of the financial accounts: measurement and analysis (Occasional Papers No. 
389) (2017), available at http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2017-
0389/index.html?com.dotmarketing.htmlpage.language=1; see also Baglioni, 
supra note 32, at 75. 
50 See discussion infra Paragraph II.B. As mentioned, the ECB is also 
vested with the authority of releasing banking authorisations in the Euro area, in 
accordance with art. 4 of the SSM Regulation: failure to meet prudential 
requirements may thus lead, in a worst-case scenario, to the withdrawal of the 
relevant banking license from the concerned institution. 
51 See SSM Framework Regulation, supra note 9, art. 122. 
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national supervisory authorities are vested with the power to sanction such 
breaches. 
Since 2016, specific financial institutions must also meet 
additional requirements called “buffers.”52 Buffers have a partial 
functional similarity with statutory reserves mandated in certain 
jurisdictions for all corporations; in the sense that they are part of the net 
worth of a bank designed as a protective cushion for capital: their breach 
does not affect the operational capacity of a bank, but it limits the ability 
of the regulated entity to make distributions to shareholders. Four buffers 
are provided for in the Basel III agreement and transposed in EU rules (art. 
136 of CRD IV)—phased in from 2014 through 2019. The “Capital 
Conservation Buffer” requires an additional amount of CET 1 equal to 
2.5% of a bank’s total risk-weighted exposures.53 The “Countercyclical 
Capital Buffer” is a macro-prudential tool designed as an extension of the 
Capital Conservation Buffer aimed at countering pro-cyclicality. It must 
be accumulated in periods of economic expansion to be available as 
protection, during downturns. It is periodically calculated by the local 
regulatory authorities based on the credit-to-GDP ratio in the regions 
where the bank operates, applied to the bank’s exposures: indicating the 
additional CET 1 that must be retained. For example, for the first quarter 
of 2019, the Bank of Italy set the buffer at 0%.  Systemically important 
institutions must also have a specific “SII Buffer” consisting of Tier 1 
capital calculated as a percentage of exposures—depending on the 
category of the institution—roughly varying from 1% to 3.5%. Finally, the 
“Systemic Risk Buffer” is applied to the entire sector rather than being 
calculated on an individual firm basis, therefore tackling general systemic 
risks. The Member States, through a procedure that might require approval 
by the European Commission, have a certain discretion in imposing this 
prudential tool, which might require an additional CET 1 of over five 
percent. It is noteworthy that the Systemic Risk Buffer might cancel off 
with the SII Buffer since when they are both applied to a bank, only the 
higher one will need to be maintained.54  
 
52 These requirements do not apply to investment firms that do not 
underwrite securities or deal on their own accounts, and Member States can 
exonerate smaller firms from certain buffers.  
53 See CRD IV, supra note 16, art. 129. 
54 Failure to comply with the capital buffer requirements set forth above 
may result in restrictions affecting dividend pay-outs and remuneration bonuses 
to management. See Directive 2013/36/EU, supra note 16, art. 141. Moreover, the 
institution concerned, must urgently prepare a capital conservation plan 
containing measures aimed at restoring the capital requirements and submit it 
without delay to the competent authority.  Non-approval of the plan may lead to 
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In terms of liquidity, the “Liquidity Coverage Ratio” (LCR) aims 
at ensuring the financial viability of a bank under a stress-scenario, for a 
minimum of thirty days. It is determined by comparing High Quality 
Liquid Assets” (HQLA)—meaning unencumbered and easy-to-liquidate 
(or liquid) assets with the cash outflows required over thirty days in—as 
mentioned, a stress scenario. This measure is also phased in: the LCR was 
set at 60% in 2015, 70% in 2016, 80% in 2017, and 100% in 2018—
meaning that from this year a bank must always be able to “survive” 
financially for at least thirty days in adverse conditions. In case of non-
compliance with such thresholds, the abovementioned sanctioning powers 
vested with the ECB under art. 18 of the SSM Regulation may be 
triggered.55 
Art. 510 CRR, following the Basel III Agreement, also considers 
financial resilience over a medium-term horizon of one year with the “Net 
Stable Funding Requirement” (NSFR). Another difference between the 
LCR and the NSFR is that while the former is calculated under a stress 
scenario based on general market risks, the latter considers firm-specific 
liquidity risks—limiting over-reliance on short-term funds.   
The index is determined comparing financial sources weighted in 
terms of their stability (in light of type of counterparty and contractual 
terms: for example, capital and borrowing with a maturity exceeding 
twelve months has a coefficient of 100%, retail deposits of 90%, and 
corporate deposits with a maturity of fewer than twelve months of 50%), 
and assets weighted in terms of their liquidity (e.g. net derivatives 
receivables weight 100%, while cash, central bank reserves, and interbank 
lending with less than six-month duration, weight 0%). It is easy to see 
that, if a bank is financed with very stable funds (in theory, exclusively 
capital) and has assets that present very little risk (short-term interbank 
landing), there are no stable funding needs and vice versa. To improve the 
NSFR, in other terms, borrowing long and lending short is necessary (so-
called “reverse maturity transformation”). The CRR regulates reporting on 
stable funding but does not provide for specific substantive consequences 
that might be triggered by a deterioration of the index.  
The risk-based calculation of capital requirements showed its 
limitations during the global financial crisis.56 The discretionary element 
 
even more stringent distribution restrictions as well as to the need of increasing 
own funds ratios. See Directive 2013/36/EU, supra note 12, art. 142. 
55 See discussion infra Paragraph III.B; see also SSM Regulation, supra 
note 9, art. 18.  
56 See Baglioni, supra note 32, 36–72. 
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that might affect the calculation of these ratios, in fact, might allow a bank 
to comply with the requirements while exploiting excessive leverage. 
When things go south, massive deleverage can cause vicious circles and 
turbulences for both the individual firm and the financial sector as a whole. 
To curb this possible distortion, Basel III supplemented capital ratios with 
a simple, non-risk-based measure—the “Leverage Ratio” (“LR”). LR is a 
fraction whose numerator is Tier 1 capital, and whose denominator is the 
sum of on-balance sheet exposures, derivatives, exposures, securities 
financing transaction exposures, and off-balance sheet items. The ratio 
must be at least 3%: from 2013-2015 the measure had only to be reported 
to the supervisors; from 2015-2018 public disclosure was necessary; and 
finally, starting with January 1, 2018, the ratio has a Pillar 1 treatment 
analogous to the one reserved for risk-weighted capital requirements. 
After the “Banking Package”’s enactement, the CRR also mandates 
European banks to comply with the minimum LR above, effective from 
December 28, 2020.57 
 
C. Impact of Basel III on the Banking Business and                  
Economic Performance 
After this necessary, but technical and rather dry description of the 
capital and liquidity requirements imposed on banks, two broader and 
complex issues must be mentioned to consider the actual impacts of Basel 
III. What have been or might be the effects of these rules in terms of (a) 
economic performance and therefore business models of banks, and (b) 
propensity to extend credit (can they concur to cause a credit crunch)? In 
other words: Are high capital requirements socially sub-optimal, and how 
do they affect economic growth?  
Numerous studies have tackled these questions; and it would be 
impossible, and beyond the point, to extensively discuss them here. 
Evidently, the two questions are intertwined, and in fact, might just be two 
ways to express the same question. In addition, it is extremely difficult to 
isolate the effects of Basel III rules from other economic and institutional 
variables affecting the banking sector: rules on resolution—the key topic 
of this Article—are a perfect example, but consider also monetary policy 
or limitations to proprietary trading such as the ones imposed by the so-
called Volcker Rule or ring-fencing of banking activities.58 
 
57 See supra notes 2 and 16.  
58 Charles Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial 
Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV., 39 (2011); Darrell Duffie, Market Making Under 
the Proposed Volcker Rule (Rock Ctr. Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series 
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Notwithstanding these limitations, it is useful to address briefly these 
issues. 
A relatively recent qualitative study of the EBA discusses the 
possible effects of the new regulatory framework on the banking 
business.59 With respect to the capital requirements set forth in the CCR 
and CRD IV, this study indicates a possible reduction of proprietary 
trading and market-making activities; an increase of retail banking and 
hedging activities; greater geographic diversification both in terms of 
exposures and funding to minimize risk and capital requirements; a 
tendency to deleverage and reduce size in terms of RWA; more limited 
incentives to participate in securitization transactions; and an overall 
increase of regulatory and compliance costs.60 Interestingly enough, 
however, at least some of these effects might be countered by other 
regulatory requirements. For example, according to the EBA, the LCR and 
NSFR could determine disincentives to retain retail assets, since they are 
not HQLA, which might result in even more constraining of capital ratios. 
Similarly, these requirements might push a more intense investment 
banking activity to hold liquid securities.61   
In terms of the geographic scope of banking activities, the LCR 
favors holding sovereign debt denominated in the same currency of the 
assets. This incentive might limit international expansion; for similar 
reasons, to comply with liquidity requirements, securitizations might 
become more critical. The need to hold liquid positions might also alter 
the structure of the income statement, reducing the relevance of interest 
rate income, and augmenting the commissions and fees.62  
Even these few remarks indicate how the effects of Basel III might 
be difficult to assess and might vary profoundly depending on the single 
financial institution. It seems clear, however, that traditional banks will 
 
No. 
106, 2012), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=19
90472; Matthias Lehmann, Volcker rule, ring-fencing or separation of bank 
activities – Comparison of structural reform acts around the world, 17 J. OF 
BANKING REG. 176–187 (2016). 
59 EBA, Overview of the Potential Implications of Regulatory Measures 
for 
Banks’ Business Models, (Feb. 9, 2015), www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/
974844/Report++Overview+of+the+potential+implications+of+regulatory+mea
sures+for+business+models.pdf.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
2019                O TELL ME THE TRUTH ABOUT BAIL-IN 207 
probably retract from certain areas of lending and financing due to lower 
profitability or costs. The void, as already visible, might be quickly filled 
by the so-called “shadow banking sector,” considering the role of private 
equity in financing certain businesses, such as real estate.63  
A 2010 Mckinsey Study offers predictions on the business 
impacts of Basel III.64 This analysis estimates that by 2019 the new rules 
will require an injection of roughly €1.1 trillion of additional Tier 1 capital 
(approximately sixty percent of all European and U.S. Tier 1 capital 
existing in 2010), €1.3 trillion of short-term liquidity (fifty percent of the 
outstanding figure in 2010 in the same regions), and €2.3 trillion of long-
term funding.65 The need to comply with these requirements might reduce 
the return on equity, on average, by four percent in Europe and three 
percent in the U.S. The higher costs in terms of capital, liquidity, and 
funding will concern short-term retail loans (70 basis points (“bps”)), 
specialized lending (60 bps), trading books and specifically lower-rated or 
unrated corporate bonds (70 bps) and bonds issued by other financial 
institutions (80 bps), and several off-balance-sheet transactions, 
particularly OTC derivatives (85 bps) and corporate and financial 
institutions liquidity lines (in between 75 and 85 bps).66 Consequently, the 
study argues that the new rules will be less significant for well-capitalized 
retail banks and more relevant for investment banking activities.67 In fact, 
trading books, OTC derivatives, cash trading and market making, and 
securitizations will call for higher capital. Banks might respond by either 
abandoning certain activities or transferring costs to their counterparties, 
for example, by increasing bid-ask spreads or requiring more collateral.68  
Mixed results characterize the studies on the impacts of the macro-
prudential tools on cost and volume of lending and GDP growth, also 
depending on the situation of the country or geographical area considered. 
Several empirical studies suggest that stronger capital and liquidity 
requirements would reduce credit, the return on equity of banks, and GDP 
growth. Greater stability of banks might also reduce the cost of funding 
and indirectly favor credit. The net effect should take into account other 
 
63 Id. 
64 Philipp Härle ET AL., Basel III and European Banking: Its Impact, How 
Banks Might Respond, and the Challenges of Implementation, MCKINSEY 
WORKING 
PAPER ON RISK NO.26, (Nov. 2010), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckin
sey/dotcom/client_service/Risk/Working%20papers/26_Basel_III_and_Europea
n_banking.ashx. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. 
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variables often assumed equal in these studies, such as monetary policy. 
Other research results point to the beneficial effects of stricter 
requirements. 
Both the OECD and the Macroeconomic Assessment Group of the 
Financial Stability Board and Basel Committee on Bank Supervision have 
published empirical analysis concluding that the Basel III capital 
requirements will negatively affect GDP. For example, a 2011 study by 
OECD predicts that the full implementation of the requirements, effective 
in 2019, will determine a reduction in GDP growth over a five-year period 
of -0.12% in the U.S., -0.23% in the Euro Area, and of -0.09% in Japan, 
with a weighted average in these areas of -0.16%.69 Similarly, in 2010, the 
Macroeconomic Assessment Group calculated that a one percentage point 
increase in capital to RWA would negatively impact GDP by -0.19% over 
four and a half years after implementation (even if the two studies yield 
different results depending on different hypothesis on whether 
discretionary buffers will be maintained by banks).70 Work by researchers 
at the IMF indicates that Basel III will, on average, increase lending rates 
at the largest banks in the world by roughly sixteen basis points.71 Under 
a given set of hypotheses concerning the elasticity of loan demand, the 
consequence might be a long-term loan growth decline of 1.3%.72 The 
average might, however, be misleading since, as the Authors note, 
variations among single countries would be significant, from an estimated 
minimal effect in Canada to an increase of lending rates of twenty-six basis 
points in Japan.73 More nuanced results are, however, offered by a cross-
country empirical analysis conducted by researchers at the Bank of 
International Settlements.   
A 2017 paper indicates beneficial effects of a more active use of 
macroprudential measures on economic performance, and particularly 
higher and less volatile per capita GDP growth, but only when the 
 
69 Patrick Slovik & Boris Courède, Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III, 
OECD ECONS.’ DEP’T WORKING PAPERS NO. 844(Feb. 14, 2011), www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/macroeconomic-impact-of-basel-iii_5kghwnhkkjs8-en. 
70 Leonardo Gambacorta & Adrian van Rixtel, Structural Bank 
Regulation Initiatives: Approaches and Implications, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS (Apr. 2010), https://www.bis.org/publ/work412.pdf. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Thomas F. Cosimano & Dalia S. Hakura, Bank Behavior in Response 
to Basel III: A Cross-Country Analysis, INT’L MONETARY FUND (May 2011), 
www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Bank-Behavior-in-
Response-to-Basel-Iii-A-Cross-Country-Analysis-24870. 
2019                O TELL ME THE TRUTH ABOUT BAIL-IN 209 
economy considered is very open and financially developed.74  In 
countries where these two conditions do not hold together, the impact of 
capital requirements might be negative, at least in terms of GDP 
volatility.75 In short, empirical analysis offer—as it is often the case—a 
mixed bag. While it seems to confirm the intuitive notion that stricter 
capital and liquidity requirements might be disastrous for credit and 
investment by affecting economic growth, the overall relevance of these 
effects is uncertain. Most importantly, it is extraordinarily difficult to 
compare these possible social costs—often concerning a sub-set of 
constituencies, such as borrowers or bank’s shareholders—with the ones 
of financial crises that might be avoided.  
An interesting theoretical paper authored by scholars from 
Stanford University and the Max Plank Institute attempts at debunking all 
significant arguments raised against stricter capital requirements.76 To 
simplify to the extreme an analytical discussion that ponders all major 
recurring issues, the authors argue that, while stronger capital 
requirements might be objectionable to banks’ managers and shareholders 
(for example, because they lower return on equity or indirectly limit tax 
benefits), they are socially desirable.77  Capital requirements curb 
excessive leverage where the cost of debt is unnaturally low, due to the 
existence of explicit or implicit public guarantees in case of a bank’s 
default. 
D. The Uncertain Future of the European Deposit Scheme 
A common deposit insurance scheme is the third pillar of the BU. 
Currently, based on a 1994 directive, EU Member States have harmonized 
rules on deposit insurance, and all of them protect depositors up to 
€100,000 in case of crisis.78 The national deposits are, however, separate 
and country specific. Since their solidity depends on the contributions of 
national banks or the ability of local governments to intervene, the risk 
faced by depositors—and the interest rates they demand, which represent 
an important component of funding risk for banks—vary in different 
 
74 Codruta Boar ET AL., What are the Effects of Macroprudential Policies 
on Macroeconomic Performance? BIS QUARTERLY REV. (Sept. 17, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3042014. 
75 Id. 
76 Anat R. Admati ET AL., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the 
Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive, 
ROCK CTR. CORP. GOVERNANCE AT STAN. UNIV. WORKING PAPER NO. 161(Nov. 
4, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349739. 
77 Id. 
78 Directive (EC) 94/19 of the European Parliament and the Council of 
30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes, 1994 O.J. (L 135).  
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jurisdictions.79 The standard deviation of interest rates on deposits from 
non-financial corporations and households in the different EU States 
reflects this notion. This measure has increased from the end of 2008 due 
to the financial crisis and, although decreasing in 2013, remains quite 
significant (in particular for households, since corporate depositors can 
more easily distribute their deposits in different countries).80   
Similarly, the differences in the number of deposits as a 
percentage of GDP in the different countries also confirm the non-
harmonized risk profiles of banks in various jurisdictions.81 In a banking 
union, deposit insurance must be unified and centralized, for at least three 
sets of reasons. First, the larger size increases the efficiency and fairness 
of deposit insurance as, in fact, with any insurance system in which 
spreading risk and economies of scale favor large dimensions. Second, 
centralized insurance decouples sovereign and banking risk.82 Third, a 
European deposit insurance scheme is consistent with centralized 
supervision and resolution powers attributed to the SSM and SRM.83   
However, approving a common, centralized, European deposit 
insurance system has proven extremely difficult. The impasse is rooted in 
the opposition of certain governments, and specifically of Germany, to the 
possible mutualization of risk.84 The idea is that certain risks—such as 
government bonds on the balance sheets of banks and NPLs—must be 
addressed and resolved before shared deposit insurance is created to avoid 
an unfair transfer of resources from low-risk countries and banking sectors 
to high-risk ones.85 This principle, in itself, is correct; however, the 
 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 For a comment on this data see Dirk Schoenmaker & Guntram Wolff, 
Options 
for European Deposit Insurance, VOX (Oct. 30, 2015), www.voxeu.org/article/
options-european-deposit-insurance. 
82 Id. 
83 Daniel Gros & Dirk Schoenmaker, European Deposit Insurance and 
Resolution in the Banking Union, 52 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 529 (2014). 
84 Id. 
85 Non-Paper, The EMU needs a stronger Banking Union, but must get 
it right (Sept. 8, 2015), http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/files/2015/09/Nonpaperf
inal_20150910091345.pdf; Jim Brunsden, Berlin fights Brussels push for deeper 
financial integration, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/d
f1cf84a-57be-11e5-a28b-50226830d644?siteedition=intl#axzz3lP8EvWOC. 
(reflecting on German views concerning the European monetary and banking 
unions.). 
2019                O TELL ME THE TRUTH ABOUT BAIL-IN 211 
problem is not so much one of principle, but rather of evaluation of the 
existing conditions.86 In this perspective, this issue has become a political 
question, bargaining leverage to negotiate on different tables.87 The 
absence of standard insurance undermines the strength of single 
supervision and resolution because local authorities, directly or indirectly, 
shoulder a significant part of the risk of local banks and resist power 
transfers to Frankfurt or Brussels.88 However, weaker centralized 
supervision and resolution powers negatively affect the willingness of 
some countries to embrace a single deposit insurance scheme.89  
The situation has had concrete effects on legislation. A 2015 
proposal of the EU Commission,90 which called for a period of re-
insurance of national deposit insurance schemes by an EU-wide fund and 
then a real common European fund, has been stifled.91 Very recently, in 
the beginning of October 2017, the EU issued a new legislative proposal.92 
According to some commentators, however, this proposal is a worrisome 
retreat from a necessary step toward the banking union and signals a 
passive acceptance of the German position.93 The new rules, if approved, 
would require the European fund to lend money to national funds when 
they run out of financial resources, with no real re-insurance, 
notwithstanding the label attached (and let alone co-insurance).94 Only a 
second phase, within 2022, might lead to co-insurance, but only if banks 
pass an “Asset Quality Review” test, aiming at verifying the existence of 
the conditions advocated by the German government and, specifically, 
levels of NPLs and exposure to national sovereign debt.95 
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Daniel Gros, Deposit Insurance: How to deal with the Missing Pillar 
of the Banking Union, in EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: THE NEW REGIME 139–52 
(Luis Hinojosa Martinez & Jose Beneyto eds., 2015). 
89 Id. 
90 Eurpoean Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, (Nov. 24, 2015) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0586&from=EN 
91 Daniel Gros, supra 88. 
92 Angelo Baglioni, Assicurazione europea dei depositi: indietro tutta, 
LAVOCE.INFO (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.lavoce.info/archives/49034/assicuraz
ione-europea-dei-depositi-indietro-tutta. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 See European Central Bank, Addendum to the ECB Guidance to banks 
on non-performing loans: supervisory expectations for prudential provisioning of 
non-
performing exposures, (Mar. 2018), https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/
ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.npl_addendum_201803.en.pdf. The updated addendum 
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Accomplishing this crucial component of the Banking Union 
within a useful timeframe shall be seen in the near future. A European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme remains one of the toughest and most delicate 
battles on the EU chessboard, one that might cast a dark shadow on the 
future of the Union.96 
 
E. Broadening our Visual: Framework of the European Financial 
System of Supervision  
The ECB and the SRB are part of a complex system of financial 
oversight in which different authorities with different capabilities and 
geographical scope are intertwined, not always in an optimal way. We will 
discuss the specific issues concerning the resolution and banking crisis in 
the following Part. In this Paragraph, we sketch the overall institutional 
design and essential capabilities of different bodies interacting with the 
ECB.  
The first essential authority is the European Banking Authority 
(“EBA”), which was established in 2011 and is led by the heads of the 
national banking supervisors of the twenty-eight EU Member States.97 
One of the main abilities of EBA is to contribute to the development of 
harmonized—or, identical—applicable rules in the banking and financial 
sectors and to the establishment of the European Single Rulebook 
governing this area of the law.98  
 
provides for an ECB assessment, inter alia, of the overall time a loan is non-
performing. 
96 A recent ECB study assessed the potential exposure of a fully 
mutualized EDIS with a target level of 0.8% of covered deposits of the 
participating banking systems to bank failures under different stress and bail-in 
scenarios.  The study suggests that the EDIS would be able to honor its required 
pay-outs, with low risk of being written-down or eroded in the event of loss rates 
of 20% in a resolution scenario and 30% in an insolvency scenario.  See European 
Central Bank, Completing the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme: who is afraid of cross-subsidisation? OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES NO. 
208, (Apr. 2018), available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op208.en.pdf. 
97 World Bank Group, Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in 
the EU: A Guidebook to the BRRD, FIN. SECTOR ADVISORY CTR. (Apr. 2017) 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/609571482207234996/FinSAC-BRRD-
Guidebook.pdf. 
98 Id. 
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It is interesting to take a closer look at the major regulatory acts 
through which EBA pursues this goal. First of all, EBA enacts Technical 
Standards (“TS’s”), which are secondary rules specifying or regulating 
issues delegated by EU legislation.99  Compared to what happens in most 
jurisdictions, TS’s are not immediately binding. The European 
Commission must endorse and grant the TS’s (unless deemed contrary or 
disproportionate to EU law), and publish them in the Official Journal of 
the European Union (the EU Parliament and Council have limited review 
powers on EBA’s acts).100 This undeniably convoluted procedure is 
suggested by the prevailing interpretation, at least by the European 
Commission, of the so-called Meroni doctrine, a case law principle 
derived from a leading 1956 decision of the European Court of Justice.101 
In brief, this doctrine states that EU institutions cannot delegate 
discretionary powers to agencies.102 Tossing the ball back to the 
Commission, therefore, serves the purpose of avoiding doubts on the 
legitimacy of EBA’s rules. There is however disagreement among scholars 
concerning the correctness of this rigid interpretation of Meroni, especially 
in light of the evolution of the jurisprudence of the Luxembourg court.103  
EBA also issues Guidelines and Recommendations addressed to national 
and EU supervisors, banks, and investment firms to guide and harmonize 
supervisory practices.104 A “comply or explain” principle applies to these 
 
99 See Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
(European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and 
repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331), 12, art. 10. 
100 Id. 
101 See European Court of Justice [ECJ], Case C-9/56, Meroni & Co. v 
High Authority of the Eur. Coal and Steel Cmty., 1958 E.C.R. 00133; Merijn 
Chamon, EU Agencies: Does the Meroni Doctrine Make Sense?, 17 MAASTRICHT 
J. EUR. & COMP. L. 281 (2010); Jens-Peter Schneider, A common framework for 
decentralized EU agencies and the Meroni doctrine, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 29 
(2009).  
102 The doctrine does not apply to the ECB, which is not an agency but 
an “institution” of the EU and listed in its founding treaty.  The same rationale 
indicated in the text explains, however, why the SRB—which is also an “agency,” 
not an “institution” of the EU—only has the power to recommend and execute 
resolution decisions, which are formally taken by the Commission. 
103 Phedon Nicolaides & Nadir Preziosi, Discretion and Accountability: 
The ESMA Judgment and the Meroni Doctrine,BRUGES EUR. ECON. RES. PAPERS 
NO. 
30, EUR. ECON. STUD. DEP’T, C. OF EUR. (2014), https://ideas.repec.org/p/coe/w
pbeer/30.html. 
104 Joint European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) and 
EBA, Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the 
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acts: competent authorities and regulated entities must notify EBA of their 
intention to follow Guidelines or Recommendations or explain the reasons 
for non-compliance.105 EBA also publishes opinions on supervisory or 
regulatory matters and reports, as an advisor to the European legislature.106   
EBA is also responsible for periodically evaluating the stability, 
risks, and vulnerabilities of the banking sector, carrying on stress-tests in 
cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”) through 
the above-mentioned SREP exercise.107 EBA can also investigate the 
incorrect application of EU law by national authorities, mediate cross-
border conflicts of attributions between authorities, and in certain 
emergency situations take direct decisions aimed at national authorities or 
financial institutions.108 
One distinctive feature of the institutional design of this 
arrangement is the distinction (with some overlap) between strictly 
regulatory functions, entrusted to EBA, and supervisory powers, exercised 
by the SSM (and the SRB). The latter has intuitive pros and cons but quite 
differs from what generally happens at the national level, where the 
 
management body and key function holders under Directive 2013/36/EU and 
Directive 2014/65/EU, EBA/GL/2017/12/ESMA71-99-598 (Sept. 26 2017) 
https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1972984/Joint+ESMA+and+EBA+Guid
elines+on+the+assessment+of+suitability+of+members+of+the+management+b
ody+and+key+function+holders+%28EBA-GL-2017-12%29.pdf 
105 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, supra note 99, art. 16. 
106 Id. 
107 The EU‐wide stress tests are part of the supervisory toolkit used to 
assess banks’ resilience to adversity, identify residual areas of uncertainties, and 
determine appropriate mitigation actions.  In addition, the exercise aims to 
strengthen market discipline through the publication of consistent and granular 
data on a bank‐by‐bank level.  In this respect, the EBA is responsible for 
developing a common methodology and coordinating the exercise.  The 2018 EU-
wide stress test involved forty-eight banks from fifteen EU and EEA countries, 
covering broadly 70% of total EU banking sector assets.  The adverse scenario 
factored in the 2018 EU‐wide stress test presented a deviation of EU GDP from 
its baseline level by 8.3% in 2020, an increase in the unemployment of about 3.3% 
by 2020, a fall of the inflation by 1.9% below the baseline and a fall of residential 
and commercial real estate prices by 27.7% and 27.1% respectively below the 
baseline level by 2020.  In terms of results, the scenario mentioned above would 
yield an impact of -395 bps on banks' CET1 capital ratio, leading to a 10.1% CET1 
capital ratio at the end of 2020. See EBA, 2018 EU-Wide Stress Test Results (Nov. 
2, 2018), https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2419200/2018-EU-wide-stress-
test-Results.pdf. 
108 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, supra note 99, art. 17 ff. 
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supervisory authority is in charge of enacting secondary regulation and 
enforcement.  
The EBA is one of the three financial industry regulators 
(“European Financial Authorities” or “ESAs”), together with ESMA, 
primarily responsible for capital markets, trading facilities, financial 
services, listed corporations and related issues (for example, it has direct 
supervisory powers on rating agencies), and EIOPA, the insurance sector 
supervisor. These authorities have both regulatory and supervisory 
powers. It follows that while macroprudential supervision is attributed, 
with the division of tasks mentioned, to the ECB and the EBA, micro 
prudential supervision is entrusted with the three ESAs.109   
In fact, the institutional model followed at the European level 
appears to follow the industry silos model in which different authorities 
oversee the three industries: banking, securities, and insurance.110 This 
model is more distant from either the single supervisor model (followed in 
the UK until recently) or the twin-peaks approach, in which a prudential 
supervisor, responsible for monitoring financial stability, is coupled with 
a conduct supervisor, dealing with transparency and investors and clients 
protection. No system in the world falls squarely in one of these three 
abstract models, and contaminations are possible. In the same token, all 
three models present lights and shadows and have their fans and detractors. 
The blurring of the lines among the banking, securities, and insurance 
industries and their products and services, raises profound questions on the 
effectiveness of the industry silos model. Thus, many scholars, 
commentators, and industry experts—including the authors of this 
Article—favor the twin-peaks approach.111  
Another complication with the European financial infrastructure 
is that European authorities interact with twenty-eight different national 
 
109 See generally Emilios Avgouleas, Banking Supervision and the 
Special Resolution Regime of the Banking Act 2009: The Unfinished Reform, 4 
CAP. MKTS. L. J. 201, 201–35 (Apr. 1, 2009); Andrew Godwin ET AL., Twin Peaks 
and Financial Regulation: The Challenges of Increasing Regulatory Overlap and 
Expanding Responsibilities, 49 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER (Dec. 24, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2889536; Eugenia 
Macchiavello, Microfinance Regulation and Supervision: A Multi-Faced Prism 
of Structures, Levels and Issues, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 125, 125–97 (Nov. 15, 
2012);. Donato Masciandaro, Politicians and financial supervision unification 
outside the central bank: Why do they do it?, 5 J. FIN. STAB. 124, 124–46 (2009; 
Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About 
Single, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 
237, 237–306 (2007). 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW  VOL. XIII:I 
 
216 
models with an array of different institutional designs, thus creating 
coordination problems.112 This institutional disconnect is sometimes 
exacerbated by cultural and linguistic issues, as suggested by the European 
Commission regarding the effectiveness of the so-called “Joint 
Supervisory Teams” composed by representatives of the ECB and the 
NCBs.113 The road to a more streamlined and coherent approach is long 
and winding, but there has been greater integration and centralization of 
functions. At the time of this writing, for example, a proposal for a new 
regulation attributing more direct supervisory powers to the ESA’s has 
been submitted by the European Commission.114 
The European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”) and the European 
Stability Mechanism (“ESM”), are two other essential bodies within the 
European System of Financial Supervision.115 The former, established in 
2010 after the 2008 crisis, is hosted within the ECB and chaired by the 
 
112 Christopher P. Buttigieg, An Evaluation of the Theories and 
Objectives of Financial Regulation Post the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis: A 
European Perspective, 2 ELSA MALTA L. REV. 122 (Aug. 1, 2012), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2121334; Christopher P. 
Buttigieg, The Institutional Models for Financial Supervision: An Analysis, THE 
ACCOUNTANT 12, 12–16 (Dec. 17, 2012), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2190501. 
113 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document 
accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on the Single Supervisory Mechanism established pursuant to 
Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 (Oct. 11, 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017SC0336&from=EN. 
114 See European Commission, Amended Proposal for a Regulation of 
the 
European Parliament and the Council, (Sept. 12, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/co
mmission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-supervisory-authorities-regulation-
646_en.pdf. 
115 See Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential 
oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk 
Board, 2010 O.J. (L 331), 1. See also European Commission, Post-Programme 
Surveillance 
Report, INSTITUTIONAL PAPER 091 (Nov. 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/i
nfo/files/economy-finance/ip091_en.pdf; European Stability Mechanism 
(“ESM”), Conclusion of ESM financial assistance programme for Spain: an 
overview (Dec. 31, 2013), available at https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/f
iles/spanish_exit.pdf. 
2019                O TELL ME THE TRUTH ABOUT BAIL-IN 217 
President of the same institution.116 It includes representatives of the 
ESCBs and the European Commission, and it is responsible for the macro-
prudential oversight of the EU financial system and the prevention and 
mitigation of systemic risk.117 It has a primarily advisory role rather than 
direct supervisory functions, and in light of its monitoring of systemic risk, 
it issues warnings and recommendations.118   
The ESM, on the other hand, is an intergovernmental organization 
whose creation is authorized by art. 136 TFEU119 and was established with 
a 2012 Treaty (supplementing a 2011 version).120 It is somehow akin, in 
terms of functions, to the IMF. ESM’s primary responsibilities are loans 
to Member States coupled with macroeconomic adjustment programs 
aimed at bailing out governments in severe financial distress (a function 
indirectly relevant to the stability of the banking industry, in light of the 
exposure of banks to sovereign risk),121 and banks recapitalizations, a tool 
that has been used so far only in favor of Spanish banks.122 
 
II. EARLY INTERVENTION, RESOLUTION, AND LIQUIDATION 
A. Pre-Crisis Precautions 
In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, an international agreement 
emerged on the idea that banks should not face a stressful situation 
unprepared. Preparation of recovery and resolution plans that—at least in 
theory—could be promptly applied in case of trouble, has been given great 
emphasis. The G20 took this position in 2009,123 and subsequently, both 
 
116 See Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, supra note 115, arts. 4-6. 
117 Id. 
118  See Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, supra note 115, arts. 15-18. 
119 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (EU), available at 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN. 
120 See European Parliament, The European Stability Mechanism: Main 
Features, 
Instruments and Accountability, (June 14, 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/497755/IPOL-ECON_NT(2014)497755_EN.pdf   
121 At the time of this writing, the ESM provided financial assistance to 
Ireland, Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus. See European Parliament, supra note 120.  
122 Id. 
123 G20, Leaders’ Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, (Sept. 24–25, 
2009). 
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the BRRD in Europe and the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. adopted this 
approach.124 
As the name suggests, recovery plans—drawn up and maintained 
by the banks—concern fewer problematic situations. Essentially, they are 
an information and guidance tool consisting in six parts: (i) a general 
description of the group and business model; (ii) an analysis of critical 
functions and core business lines; (iii) the identification of appropriate 
indicators of patrimonial or liquidity deterioration also in light of (iv) 
specific adverse scenarios. The bank must additionally describe its (v) 
recovery options and prepare a (vi) communication plan.125  Some 
institutions have decided to conduct crisis simulation exercises that, 
similar to fire drills, allow their personnel to be ready to react in a stressful 
situation.126 
This particular tool has an “educational” aim, fostering the 
management’s knowledge and awareness, in addition to helping 
authorities become more familiar with the needs and weaknesses of 
supervised entities. In this perspective, the underlying philosophy aligns 
with the growing attention for “alert procedures” also adopted by national 
legislatures for non-financial institutions, to prevent insolvency.127 
Recovery plans cannot be considered binding: of course, in a real crisis, 
flexibility must be maintained to take into account the specific situations. 
The legal relevance of these documents and information raises interesting 
questions. While a departure from the envisioned reaction in a real pre-
crisis situation, per se, could not be considered a source of liability, the 
very existence of detailed plans may, de facto, raise the standard of 
diligence of directors and managers if they ignore or do not adequately 
consider the pre-determined indicators and mitigating actions.  
 
124 With one key difference: under the BRRD, resolution plans are 
adopted by the competent financial supervisor based on information provided by 
financial institutions, while in the U.S., financial institutions prepare  resolution 
plans that are assessed by the supervisors.  
125 See, e.g, BRRD, arts. 5-9. 
126 At least annually, institutions must submit their recovery plans to their 
supervisor, who performs a complete assessment of the usability of their plans 
and provides them with feedback. While the ECB qualifies as the supervisory 
authority of significant institutions, less-significant banks are subject to the 
supervision of the competent NCB. See BRRD, arts 6 and 8.  
127 Concerning Italy and France, see Federico Pernazza, The Legal 
Transplant into Italian Law of the Procédure d’Alerte. Duties and 
Responsibilities of the Companies’ Bodies, 3 ITALIAN L. J. 553 (2017). 
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Recovery plans, subject to an annual update, are submitted to 
competent authorities (including resolution authorities) that asses their 
completeness, quality, and credibility. Resolution authorities, under the 
BRRD, have more direct involvement in the preparation of resolution 
plans. In consultation with supervisory authorities, they must draw up 
these plans together with a resolvability assessment that might be applied 
when the conditions for resolution are triggered.128 
“Intra-Group Financial Support Agreements” (“IGFSAs”) is 
another interesting preparatory and preventive tool regulated by the 
BRRD.129 These are essentially private contracts regulating ex ante the 
possibility, when early intervention is necessary, to provide cross-border 
financial assistance to group entities in distress. Groups are not obliged to 
stipulate IGFSAs, but they might facilitate difficult decisions in a crisis 
scenario; before the BRRD, in fact, there was no possible framework that 
national authorities could adopt, and they faced difficulties in coordinating 
their efforts. IGFSAs can provide such a framework: the authorities are 
subject to a complex review and approval process, and the actual granting 
of support is in any case subject to authorization by the competent 
authority of the entity that provides financial assistance.130 The existence 
of these agreements, however, can contribute to an orderly and prompt 
reaction in the interest of financial stability.  
 
B. Early Intervention on a Troubled Going Concern 
Early intervention powers (also, “EIPs”), aimed at preventing a 
crisis, lay in a theoretically clear but practically gray area between going 
concern and resolution in which supervisors—note, not the resolution 
authorities—have significant discretion. In terms of the application’s 
scope, it is probably easier to define the scope of EIPs by considering the 
outer limits of these tools. Deteriorating financial conditions or specific 
infringements of EU capital rules trigger EIPs, provided however that 
failure does not seem inevitable and resolution would not be in the public 
interest: if these further conditions would be met, the baton would be 
 
128 Disclosure to the market of the elements of resolution plans is a 
delicate issue of concern..  On the one hand, the transparency of a resolution path 
is key to the credibility of the restructuring strategy, as well as to alert investors 
that they are at risk if the bank fails.  On the other hand, certain forecasts and 
evaluations contained in the plans require confidentiality to avoid panic reaction 
or misunderstandings by the market.  See Thomas Huertas, European Bank 
Resolution: Making it Work!, CEPS TASK FORCE REP. (Jan. 26, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2723220.  
129 BRRD, supra note 12, arts. 19-26. 
130 Id. 
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handed over to the resolution authority.131 In other words, these are 
preventive measures intended to prevent, not resolve, a crisis.    
Consistently with this approach, the trigger of EIPs is a 
deterioration of the economic situation of the supervised entity, e.g. in 
terms of liquidity, non-performing loans, leverage or capital requirements, 
as well as other possible infringements of the CRR or CRD IV.132 These 
measures are not automatic, and the discretion of supervisors, which 
remains significant, is only partially curbed by EBA guidelines attempting 
to ensure a certain degree of consistency among possible different 
approaches of supervisors, including a minimum trigger based on a 1.5% 
buffer above the institution’s funds, essentially relevant only for smaller 
banks.133 Practically, the adoption of early intervention measures relies 
significantly on the results of SREPs or material events, such as a 
downgrade in rating or other increased risks.  
EIPs include a panoply of tools, further broadening regulatory 
discretion. These tools range from a simple forced implementation of a 
recovery plan (see above); to the removal of directors or managers and 
appointment of a temporary administrator; to mandatory changes in the 
strategy or operations (e.g. liability management transactions); to specific 
initiatives on the corporate or financial structure, such as the calling of a 
shareholders’ meeting to adopt proper measures (e.g. issuing new 
shares).134  
Art. 32(4) BRRD governs another important measure that can be 
adopted in the absence of the requirements for resolution, i.e. for solvent 
banks that are not likely to fail: public support in the form of either state 
guarantees for new liabilities, purchase of impaired assets or extraordinary 
public recapitalization (public support in case of resolution is, on the other 
hand, regulated by arts. 56-58 BRRD).135 The use of public funds as an 
 
131 Further discussion in Andrea Guaccero, Global Crisis, Globalization 
of Remedies. Comparative Remarks on the Approach to Banking and Financial 
Crises in the US and the EU, SSRN (Sept. 2, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106653. 
132 BRRD, supra note 12, art. 27. 
133 Id. See EBA, Guidelines on triggers for use of early intervention 
measures pursuant to Article 27(4) of Directive 2014/59/EU (May 8, 2015), 
https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/1067473/f6
234078-a8cb-40a1-88f1-f22d446ca394/EBA-GL-2015-
03%20Guidelines%20on%20Early%20Intervention%20Triggers.pdf, 11. 
134 BRRD, supra note 12, art. 27. 
135 BRRD, supra note 13, art. 32.4(d). 
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early intervention tool is only allowed as a last resource and must, in any 
case, comply with State aid rules.  
Art. 32(4) BRRD contains a long and complex list of conditions 
that must be met to access public support. A detailed discussion of these 
conditions is not necessary here; we will just briefly refer to the major ones 
to provide a general understanding of the system.136 First, the aid must be 
necessary to avoid a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State 
and preserve financial stability, but also represent a proportional response 
to the risk posed.137 As mentioned, the affected bank must not only be in a 
situation in which no other measures, and in particular an early 
intervention tool, would be able to address the situation, but also not have 
reached the conditions triggering resolution (a sort of “extrema ratio” 
before resolution). Further, the economic terms of public support cannot 
confer an “advantage” upon the beneficiary and must be precautionary and 
temporary.138 A set of additional rules partially clarify such requirements; 
in brief, the rules require the absence of elements suggesting that the bank 
might encounter a liquidity or economic crisis in the near future, or that 
the funds cannot be used to offset current losses or losses likely to emerge 
in the near future.139 Additionally—and this is one of the most crucial and 
delicate issues—the EU Commission will consider acceptable only 
support that is necessary to cover a shortfall emerging under the adverse 
scenario of a stress test or similar evaluations; on the contrary, only private 
funds can cover shortfalls emerging under the baseline scenario.140  
Finally, public support must comply with State aid rules at both 
the EU and national levels.141 Concerning the former, the EC Commission 
must evaluate whether the measure is compatible with art. 107 TFEU.142 
 
136 For a comprehensive discussion, see, e.g., Christos V. Gortsos, A 
Poisonous (?) Mix: Bail-Out of Credit Institutions Combined with Bail-In of Their 
Liabilities Under the BRRD – The Use of ‘Government Financial Stabilisation 
Tools’ (GFSTs), (Nov. 28, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2876508; Martin Hellwig, 
Precautionary Recapitalisations: Time for a Review, EUR. PARLIAMENT, 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, ECON. GOVERNANCE AND 
SUPPORT UNIT (July 2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDA
N/2017/602089/IPOL_IDA(2017)602089_EN.pdf. 
137 BRRD, supra note 12, art. 32.4(d).138 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Such requirement has been decisive in the Commission’s two most 
important decisions on precautionary recapitalization so far, in the Italian Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) and “Banche Venete” cases.  See infra Part IV. 
141 Id. 
142 See infra Paragraph III.F. 
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In this respect, a very important condition concerns the so-called “burden-
sharing,” i.e. the necessity to access public resources that existing eligible 
shareholders or creditors contribute to the financial effort to redress the 
bank. For our purposes here, it is necessary to underline that the BRRD 
conditions recourse to public funds on burden-sharing. More specifically, 
resolution funds can be accessed only after an amount equal to eight 
percent of liabilities has been covered through write-downs or conversions 
of liabilities and, in any case, remaining losses can be covered only to a 
maximum of five percent of the bank’s liabilities.143 Outside a bail-in 
situation, the BRRD does not require any specific burden-sharing for 
public support in the context of early intervention. The EU Commission, 
however, de facto requires burden-sharing by the shareholder and junior 
creditors in case of extraordinary public support, as do the internal 
legislations of some Member States. We will further discuss this aspect 
below.144  
A few general points emerge from this quick discussion of 
extraordinary public support outside of a resolution scenario. The first one 
is, once again, the great latitude and discretion that the broad and often 
generic provisions attribute to the competent authorities. When combined 
with the necessity to coordinate different authorities and private parties at 
both the EU and local levels in situations with serious time constraints, it 
is not surprising that the necessary evaluations are hard to make and 
possibly subject to varying standards and approaches. 
It is also worthwhile to underscore that public support outside of 
resolution is only permissible in a very narrow, but not very clearly defined 
and identifiable, set of circumstances—circumstances that only, in theory, 
cannot be considered in tension if not in contradiction. For example, 
support must be necessary to avoid negative effects on the economy or 
financial stability, but at the same time, it shall not confer a competitive 
advantage to the supported institution—something that sounds on the edge 
of an oxymoron since financial aid, almost by definition, makes the 
recipient more robust and competitive. In addition, while functionally 
aimed at avoiding negative economic effects, public support is only 
permissible to face losses emerging from a stress test under a hypothetical 
adverse scenario in a situation where many other financial indicators 
suggest the absence of a crisis that might further deteriorate. The funds 
come, however, with several strings attached, e.g. concerning the funds’ 
possible use to offset losses. Once again, a certain degree of fantasy is 
 
143 Id. 
144 See infra Paragraph III.F. 
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required to imagine a situation with possible negative effects for the 
Member State economy, serious enough that other interventions short of 
resolution are not sufficient, but also not serious enough that it would not 
deteriorate further.  
One additional potential contradiction that can be found in the 
regulatory framework concerns the competence of the different public 
institutions involved. As we have seen and as it should be obvious, the 
decision to introduce a certain separation between the resolution authority 
and the banking supervisor is due to the concern that the potentially 
conflicting goals of resolution in a crisis scenario and supervision might 
hamper the effectiveness of the agencies involved.145 On the other hand, 
the EU Commission (primarily responsible for competition) is attributed 
the power to evaluate both the compatibility of public intervention with 
State aid rules, avoiding competitive distortions, and the respect of BRRD 
requirements that refer to financial stability and avoidance of economic 
disturbances at both a macro- and micro-level.146 To the extent a tension 
exists between these purposes, it is questionable how the Commission will 
balance the different goals. Tension can also develop, if nothing else in the 
interpretation of broad and vague provisions, between Member States’ 
governments, which might be inclined to provide public support to local 
banks for several legitimate reasons, and the compliance with State aid 
rules determined at the EU level.147 
 
145 See supra Paragraph II.A. 
146 See infra Paragraph III.F. 
147 For further discussion, see infra, Paragraph III.F and Part V.148 On the 
fundamental assertion that government subsidies to banks encourages banks keep 
the cost of capital artificially low and encourage excessive risk-taking and moral 
hazard, see John C. Coffee, Bail-Ins versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital 
to Mitigate Systemic Risk (Colum. L. & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 380, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1675
015; Thomas F. Huertas, The Case for Bail-ins, in THE BANK RECOVERY AND 
RESOLUTION DIRECTIVE: EUROPE’S SOLUTION FOR “TOO BIG TO FAIL”? 167, 167–
68 (Andreas Dombret & Patrick S. Kenadjian eds., 2013); Tobias H. Tröger, Too 
Complex to Work: A Critical Assessment of the Bail-In Tool under the European 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime 5–9 (European Banking Institute (“EBI”), 
Working Paper No. 12, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3023184. See Paragraph II.C. above. While the above constitutes, now, a sort 
of conventional wisdom, there was a time when savings protection (calling for 
public support to ailing banks) was perceived to be a politically sensitive issue 
more than excessive risk-taking and moral hazard by banks and investors. 
Especially in those European countries not entirely open to market economy, the 
banking activity itself was conceived as a public function, thus naturally subject 
to State control (and potential bail-out, when needed). In Italy, for example, the 
private nature of the banking activity was sanctioned as late as 1993. Interestingly, 
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C. Resolution of a Failing or Likely to Fail Concern: Triggers and 
Tools, with a Focus on Bail-in 
(a) Triggers for Resolution 
The introduction of a comprehensive resolution regime pursues 
two primary policy goals. The first is the adoption of an alternative to 
normal insolvency procedures and bankruptcy laws better suited to 
address failing financial institutions. A second and related objective is to 
limit, if not exclude, the use of taxpayers’ money to bail out insolvent 
banks while still allowing an orderly solution without causing financial 
instability. The financial crisis has required an unprecedented support of 
banks through the use of public funds, something that has been considered 
not only unfair and leading to moral hazard,148 but also potentially 
 
though, some courageous voices had expressed their criticism. For example, in 
the aftermath of the famous “Sindona crack” (see infra note 258), a prominent 
Italian jurist wondered why poor Southern Italy’s peasant—who would normally 
not even have, at the time, a bank account—should bear the public costs of a 
rescuing a failed credit institution in the rich and industrialized Northern Italy. See 
Giuseppe Minervini, Note sull’assicurazione dei depositi bancari, in BANCHE IN 
CRISI: 1960–1985 181 (Franco Belli et al. eds., 1987). 
148 On the fundamental assertion that government subsidies to banks 
encourages banks keep the cost of capital artificially low and encourage excessive 
risk-taking and moral hazard, see John C. Coffee, Bail-Ins versus Bail-Outs: 
Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate Systemic Risk (Colum. L. & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 380, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1675
015; Thomas F. Huertas, The Case for Bail-ins, in THE BANK RECOVERY AND 
RESOLUTION DIRECTIVE: EUROPE’S SOLUTION FOR “TOO BIG TO FAIL”? 167, 167–
68 (Andreas Dombret & Patrick S. Kenadjian eds., 2013); Tobias H. Tröger, Too 
Complex to Work: A Critical Assessment of the Bail-In Tool under the European 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime 5–9 (European Banking Institute (“EBI”), 
Working Paper No. 12, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3023184. See Paragraph II.C. above. While the above constitutes, now, a sort 
of conventional wisdom, there was a time when savings protection (calling for 
public support to ailing banks) was perceived to be a politically sensitive issue 
more than excessive risk-taking and moral hazard by banks and investors. 
Especially in those European countries not entirely open to market economy, the 
banking activity itself was conceived as a public function, thus naturally subject 
to State control (and potential bail-out, when needed). In Italy, for example, the 
private nature of the banking activity was sanctioned as late as 1993. Interestingly, 
though, some courageous voices had expressed their criticism. For example, in 
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unsustainable for public finances, especially with respect to so-called “too 
big to fail” intermediaries.149 Particularly in Europe, and in some EU 
countries, the use of public funds to support ailing banks has proven even 
more problematic due to the potential vicious circle that the large amount 
of investment in T-bonds has determined, often with a significant home 
bias, a phenomenon incentivized by Basel rules attributing zero risk to 
sovereign debt issued by OECD countries.150  
 
As a 2014 Memo of the European Commission surmises,  
 
[i]n normal insolvency procedures, the primary 
objective is to [maximize] the value of assets of the failed 
firm in the interest of creditors. However, these may take 
many years, in particular for complex institutions leading to 
uncertainty with a knock-on effect on confidence.  In 
contrast, the primary objective of bank resolution is to 
respond in a rapid and decisive manner to a bank in financial 
 
the aftermath of the famous “Sindona crack” (see infra note 258), a prominent 
Italian jurist wondered why poor Southern Italy’s peasant—who would normally 
not even have, at the time, a bank account—should bear the public costs of a 
rescuing a failed credit institution in the rich and industrialized Northern Italy. See 
Giuseppe Minervini, Note sull’assicurazione dei depositi bancari, in BANCHE IN 
CRISI: 1960–1985 181 (Franco Belli et al. eds., 1987). 
149 According to the ECB, in the 2008-2014 period, EU Member States 
injected into troubled banks roughly 8% of the area’s GDP, raising to 10% if 
State’s guarantees for liabilities are computed. See European Central Bank, The 
Fiscal Impact of Financial Sector Support during the Crisis, 6 ECB ECON. BULL. 
74 (2015). Of these resources, only 3.3% of GDP has been recovered according 
to other studies. See Guillaume Adamczyk & Bernhard Windisch, Competition 
State Aid Brief: State Aid to European Banks—Return to Viability, EUR. 
COMMISSION 
(Feb. 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/csb/csb2015_001_en.p
df. The US has done better in this respect. Indeed, most of the amount of resources 
that the federal government has used in the context of bail-out programs for 
troubled banks under the umbrella of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”) has been repaid, while also providing a profit of approximately $30 
billion to the US government. See TARP Tracker from November 2008 to July 
2019, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (July 2, 2019, 9:43 A.M.), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/TARP-
Tracker.aspx#Bank. 
150 On the “bank-sovereign” feedback loop, see, e.g., Jianping Zhou ET 
AL., From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic 
Financial Institutions (IMF Staff Discussion Note No. SDN/12/03, 2012, at 4), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1203.pdf. 
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distress to maintain financial stability and [minimize] losses 
for society, in particular in relation to taxpayers, while 
ensuring similar results to those of normal insolvency 
proceedings in terms of allocation of losses to shareholders 
and creditors.151   
 
To put it simply, resolution attributes broad and incisive 
discretionary powers to public authorities, powers that at least in theory 
can be exercised in a timely fashion and with limited judicial review in 
order to facilitate a solution considered preferable vis-à-vis certain—
vaguely defined—“public interests” when compared to the normal aims of 
a regular insolvency procedure. Of course, the idea is not new: several 
jurisdictions already provided for alternative procedures granting broader 
powers to supervisors to manage crises in an orderly way.152 As Sabino 
Cassese, a scholar of administrative law and former justice of the Italian 
 
151 See EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) Memo: 
Frequently Asked Questions 2 (Apr. 15, 2014), europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-297_en.pdf. On the inadequacy of bankruptcy procedures to 
handle the crisis of a systemic failing bank, see, in the economic literature, John 
Armour, Making Bank Resolution Credible, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 454 (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2014); Andrei Shleifer 
& Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, 25(a) J. ECON. 
PERSP. 29 (2011). See also, among legal scholars, Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts 
Inevitable?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 137 (2012); Wolf G. Ringe, Bail-In between 
Liquidity and Solvency, 
AM. BANKR. L. J. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2782457.   
152 For example, in Italy, the special administration procedure 
(amministrazione straordinaria) has played and still plays an important role in the 
early management of banking crises. It applies to solvent banks in case of serious 
capital deficiencies or violations of law. It contemplates the appointment of one 
or more commissioners designated by the Bank of Italy, who replace the board of 
directors and the supervisory board and may adopt redress and restructuring 
measures, with wide powers including a moratorium on the bank’s payment to 
face a liquidity crisis. Interestingly, the ECB—in its capacity as the supervisory 
authority competent for early intervention measures—has recently resorted to the 
special administration in the case of Banca Carige S.p.A. (“Carige”), an Italian 
bank classified as a significant institution. The decision to apply this measure 
followed the shareholder meeting’s rejection to approve a capital increase to cure 
capital shortfalls.  See also infra note 313. 
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Constitutional Court, puts it, the resolution has essentially substituted a 
judicial procedure with an administrative one.153  
The conditions triggering resolution under the BRRD somehow 
illuminate these goals. A financial institution enters resolution if three 
conditions are met: (a) the institution must be “failing or likely to fail” 
(“FOLTF”); (b) no reasonable alternative solution must be available, 
including private-sector solutions, early intervention measures or the 
write-down or conversion of capital instruments;154 and (c) resolution must 
be in the public interest.155  
The first prong of the test requires a bank to either be insolvent or 
about to become insolvent based on a balance sheet (liabilities exceeding 
assets) or cash flow, or lack the conditions for authorization, particularly 
with respect to capital requirements and own funds (this element should 
allow intervention at an early stage of distress, well before financial 
insolvency).156 Also significant, irregularities in regulatory or financial 
reporting or governance deficiencies might be weaknesses that, preventing 
continuing authorization, lead to resolution.157 These elements cannot be 
 
153 See Sabino Cassese, A new framework of administrative 
arrangements for the protection of individual rights (ECB Legal Conference 
2017: Shaping a New Legal Order for Europe: A Tale of Crises and 
Opportunities), at 239, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecblegalconferenceproceedings201712
.en.pdf. 
154 See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 32(1).  
155 As a matter of principle, the resolution decision is adopted with 
respect (and having regard to satisfaction of requirements relating) to a single 
credit institution. A complex set of provisions regulates the possibility that the 
failure of a bank being part of a group spreads over the other entities of the group 
so that the resolution of the parent company and other subsidiaries (in addition to 
the resolution of the failed institution) becomes functional in the interest of the 
group. See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 33. 
156 On the rationale of this provision, note that, if a bank fails to comply 
with the conditions for authorization, it cannot continue to operate as a going 
concern. Therefore, the value of its assets immediately impairs and falls below 
the value of liabilities, leading to a situation comparable to that of an insolvent 
institution. 
157 On the FOLTF test and the underlying criteria, see, e.g., Jens-Hinrich 
Binder, Proportionality at the Resolution Stage: Calibration of Resolution 
Measures and the Public Interest Test, (2017), 18–19, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2990379; Seraina Grünewa
ld, Legal Challenges of Bail-in (ECB Legal Conference 2017: Shaping a New 
Legal Order for Europe: A Tale of Crises and Opportunities), 
https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/144029/1/Gruenewald_ECB_Legal_Conferen
ce_Eproceedings_2017_12.pdf; Tröger, supra note 148, at 13–15. Yet, while one 
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unequivocally determined, especially under serious time constraints. The 
judgment on no-viability is extremely difficult to render in a timely fashion 
because it is very discretionary and largely based on data provided by the 
distressed institution. The absence of possible alternative solutions 
(namely, a private-sector solution), the second element for resolution, is 
not more straightforward to determine in an objective and quick way. How 
should the market be canvassed to ascertain that no competitor is interested 
in a buyout?   
Even more slippery is the reference to “public interest.” Whether 
the resolution is in the public interest can be expressed with the idea that 
winding up the distressed institution under normal insolvency rules would 
not be preferable in light of the goals of the BRRD. These goals, however, 
are once again extremely broad, generic, and not ranked in any specific 
hierarchy,158 and are even more problematic to balance due to their 
contradictory nature. These goals include: (1) ensuring the continuity of 
critical functions; (2) avoiding significant adverse effects on financial 
stability; (3) avoiding or minimizing recourse to public funds and 
taxpayers’ money; and (4) protecting deposits, investments, and other 
clients’ funds.159 As we extensively discuss below, the balancing of such 
conflictual objectives lies at the very heart of the criticism surrounding the 
resolutions implemented under BRRD thus far.160  
In terms of institutional competences, the scheme of the BRRD is 
also quite complicated. In short, if the management body of an institution 
realizes that the conditions for resolution are met, it must notify the 
supervisory authority (essentially, either the ECB or the National 
authority), which in turn informs the SRB (which can also act motu 
 
may question that “likely to fail” involves a difficult ex ante prognosis, it should 
be noted that the effectiveness and credibility of a resolution (and especially the 
bail-in tool: see below in the following Paragraphs) depends on the possibility that 
it is triggered before insolvency, while the bank is not facing a liquidity outflow. 
See Ringe, supra note 151, at 26–28. 
158 Michael Schillig, Bank Resolution Regimes in Europe – Part II: 
Resolution Tools and Powers, 25 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 67 (2014). 
159 See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 31.  Examples of resolution authorities’ 
evaluations with respect to the general resolution’s objectives are provided below, 
in Part IV: as we will show, face to real cases, the various decision-makers have 
interpreted the meaning of these objectives in different ways, generating multiple 
and conflicting outcomes. Also, the application of art. 31 has evolved over time. 
160 See infra Part IV. 
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proprio).161 Following the decision to initiate resolution, the SRB notifies 
all competent authorities—ECB, EU Commission, ESAs, ESRB—and 
informs the public.162 The resolution authorities will, therefore, draft a 
resolution plan including the possible use of the Single Resolution Fund 
or State aid, which will be effective if neither the Commission nor the 
Council object within twenty-four hours. The actual carrying out of the 
resolution plan will be entrusted in the national resolution authorities, also 
through the appointment of a special administrator.163  
 
(b) Resolution Tools – Bail-in 
Resolution authorities do also enjoy a significant level of 
flexibility with respect to the specific tools that can be used, ranging from 
the sale of the business to a private buyer, to the transfer of the business to 
a bridge bank publicly managed, from the separation of assets through the 
creation of a “bad bank” managing troubled assets, to bail-in. It is 
important to point out that these “tools” are not mutually exclusive, and in 
fact can be and are combined. 
While the sale of business, the use of a bridge institution, or a bad 
bank, can present specific features in the context of resolution, they are 
relatively tried-and-true transactions to address financial distress and do 
not require a specific analysis for our purposes.164 We will, on the contrary, 
briefly discuss the major issues of the bail-in tool.   
Essentially, bail-in (as well as the other “burden sharing” 
mechanisms that the BRRD set forth)165 is the statutory imposition of 
losses on liabilities not designed by their original terms. It is a forced, 
partial alteration and anticipation of priority rules that are applicable in 
case of insolvency. According to the bail-in principle, shareholders and 
unsecured creditors bear the insitution’s losses to the extent necessary to 
preserve financial stability and ensure a continuation of critical functions, 
allowing a so-called internal recapitalization.166   
 
161 BRRD, supra note 12, arts. 81-83. See also SRMR, supra note 12, art. 
18. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 As we discuss below, most banking crises are resolved through the 
use of such “traditional” tools, occasionally coupled with a bail-in.  See infra Part 
IV. 
165 See BRRD arts. 59–62. 
166 As noted by Ringe, supra note 151, at 3, bail-in is a “third way” 
between the two opposite tools historically adopted in a bank crisis, i.e. “to 
provide central bank liquidity for banks that are illiquid, and to wind down 
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More specifically, on one hand, consistent with a policy attitude 
affirmed in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the bail-in tool “restores” 
the basic insolvency principle whereby shareholders and creditors must 
bear the institution’s losses, according to the statutory and contractual 
order of priority, before any public funds are used.167 On the other hand, 
as continuity in the critical functions of relevant banks needs to be 
prioritized (due to their systemic role in the financial system), the 
shareholders’ and creditors’ sacrifice cannot be enforced at the end of a 
bankruptcy procedure, where creditors satisfy themselves, pro rata, on 
what is left after liquidation of the debtor’s assets; it must be enforced ex 
ante.   
In its essence, the concept is straightforward and similar results 
can be and have been achieved through private agreements or mandatory 
and occasionally ad hoc legislative measures in specific jurisdictions. The 
following scheme represents in a simplified way the balance-sheet effects 
of bail-in. 
 
insolvent ones” (of course, the Author cites WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD 
STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 1 (1873)). 
167 See, e.g., Emilios Avgouleas & Charles A. Goodhart, Critical 
Reflections on Bank Bail-ins, in 1 J. FIN. REG. 3, 3 (2015); Marco Bodellini, To 
Bail-In, or to Bail-Out, that is the Question, 19 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. [EBOR] 
365, 372 (2018). 
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Imagine that the deterioration of certain assets, for example, non-
performing loans, determines a loss of 25 of the original book value of the 
assets (200), with the consequent erosion of own funds. Bail-in allows the 
recapitalization of the bank as follows: old shareholders are wiped out, and 
unsecured liabilities are also written down for the remaining 5; in addition, 
an amount of unsecured liabilities equal to 20 is converted into shares on 
a pro-rata basis. In this particular example, other “bail-inable” liabilities, 
such as deposits over €100,000, are unaffected. Bail-in can lead to a 
change in control over the distressed bank, in which case the financial 
supervisor will also need to verify whether the new shareholders (former 
creditors) are fit and proper, and will need to authorize them. Needless to 
say, under these circumstances, the issuance of new shares does not require 
a vote of the shareholders or action by the board of directors.  
What liabilities are eligible for bail-in? The BRRD takes a 
comprehensive approach providing that all liabilities are in principle 
subject to bail-in, with both statutory exemptions and ad hoc exemptions 
that resolution authorites can grant.168 In the first group, we find: secured 
liabilities up to the value of the collateral; deposits up to the amount 
 
168 BRRD, supra note 12, art. 44(2). 
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guaranteed by a deposit guarantee scheme (“DGS”, generally €100,000) 
that will contribute the guaranteed funds, and liabilities for contributions 
to DGSs; clients’ assets and funds held as a separate asset protected by the 
law (e.g. in case of portfolio management services); liabilities arising from 
a fiduciary relationship (a rather ambiguous concept); liabilities toward 
third party financial institutions and payment or settlement systems with a 
maturity of less than seven days (for obvious financial stability reasons 
and to avoid contagion); liabilities to commercial creditors that provide 
critical goods or services (also a rather fuzzy distinction); liabilities toward 
employees for remuneration and benefits (excluding however variable 
remuneration); and to tax and social security authorities preferred by 
law.169  
In addition, the BRRD also allows resolution authorities to grant 
specific exemptions from bail-in on a discretionary basis; for example if 
the exclusion is necessary and proportionate for continuity of critical 
functions or to avoid contagion, if the costs of bail-in would exceed the 
benefits for other creditors, or if it is impossible to bail-in the liability in a 
reasonable timeframe (e.g. with respect to derivative instruments).170 
Discretionary exemptions must, however, comply with the NCWO 
principle since any exemption of certain liabilities from possible haircuts 
might worsen the position of other bail-inable creditors.171 
In terms of order of priority, equity instruments—if they have not 
been already written down or converted before resolution—are affected 
first (Common Equity Tier 1; Additional Tier 1; Tier 2), essentially 
followed by: (1) subordinated junior liabilities; (2) uncovered senior 
liabilities; (3) uncovered deposits; and (4) the DGS the bank is affiliated 
 
169 Id. 
170 See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 44(3).  
171 Id. Debate has sparked over the issue of recognizing in favor of retail 
holders of bail-in able debt a general exclusion from write-down and conversion 
events.  EBA and ESMA, while adopting the view of providing retail investors 
proper and specific consideration in bail-in scenarios, highlighted that protection 
should still follow a case-by-case approach: exemptions acording to art. 44(3) of 
the BRRD should, therefore, continue to be regarded as exceptional, and shall be 
granted only following a though evaluation of the specific circumstances of the 
particular case at hand. See EBA & ESMA, Statement of the EBA and ESMA on 
the treatment of retail holdings of debt financial instruments subject to the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive, EBA/Op/2018/03 (May 30, 2018), 
https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2137845/EBA+ESMA+Statement+on+r
etail+holdings+of+bail-inable+debt+%28EBA-Op-2018-03%29.pdf. See also 
infra note 326. 
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to for the covered deposits. Each class has to be affected before the 
following class can be impacted, and within each class, creditors are 
subject to pro-rata.172  
This approach is intended to mimic the effects of normal 
insolvency procedures in observance of the NCWO principle, which is the 
North Star of resolution procedures: no creditor shall incur greater losses 
in resolution than it would have incurred in a liquidation scenario.173 It is 
worth immediately pointing out, as we will discuss more extensively 
assessing the BRRD, that actual compliance with this principle can be 
extremely difficult to achieve and, especially, to determine ex ante.174 This 
is particularly true and problematic in the fairly common situation in which 
bail-inable liabilities governed by the laws of different jurisdictions exist 
since insolvency laws are not harmonized.175 Also from an international 
private law perspective, while within the EU the effects of bail-in should 
be recognized and enforced—even though reluctance is possible176—it is 
 
172 See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 48. 
173 See more extensively infra Paragraph II.E. 
174 Id. 
175 For example, art. 108 BRRD, as recently amended by Directive (EU) 
2017/2399, has sanctioned the priority of uncovered deposits (i.e. exceeding 
€100,000) from natural persons and SMEs over other uncovered deposits (as well 
as the priority for the subrogation rights of deposit guarantee schemes that have 
reimbursed depositors). Such rule does not, however, introduce a general 
depositor preference.  Nonetheless, Member States are not prevented by the 
applicable BRRD framework to establish a such a preference in their respective 
national jurisdictions (see, in this regard, art. 91 of Legislative Decree No. 385 of 
1 September 1993, G. U. Sept. 30 1993, n. 230 (It.) [hereinafter Italian Banking 
Act]). While this choice of the European legislator may be appreciated from a 
theoretical policy standpoint, it adds to the dis-homogeneity of the European 
market consequently shaping different regimes. 
176 It should be noted that the BRRD creates a minimum harmonization 
regime: consequently, national super-equivalent implementation activity adding 
on to the requirements imposed by EU legislation is allowed. Member States are 
thus granted the option to maintain national recovery and resolution instruments, 
as long as these do not breach the provisions of the BRRD. In a cross-border 
scenario, however, a super-equivalent implementation by a Member State where 
a financial institution under resolution is located is not exempt from potential legal 
challenges. Indeed, courts of another Member State whose national laws apply to 
instruments issued by the abovementioned institution may determine that such 
super-equivalent implementation is not covered within the mutual recognition 
provisions of the BRRD and is, as such, unenforceable. See Bank Resolution and 
“Bail-in” in the EU: Selected Case Studies Pre and Post BRRD, WORLD BANK 
(2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/731351485375133455/pdf/1
12265-REVISED-PUBLIC-FinSAC-BRRD-CaseStudies.pdf; Matthias 
Lehmann, Bail-In and Private International Law: How to Make Bank Resolution 
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questionable what might happen with liabilities governed by the laws of a 
non-EU country. In an effort to mitigate this potential problem, the BRRD 
requires the terms of these liabilities include provisions clarifying the 
possibility of bail-in.177   
To summarize, the bail-in is an unprecedented mix between a 
“Chapter 7-like” procedure and a “Chapter 11-like” restructuring. Like in 
a corporate restructuring, the business of the insolvent institution is never 
discontinued, and liabilities are written off based on an ex ante assessment 
of the bank’s assets, which, however, are not actually disposed. Unlike a 
corporate restructuring, creditors do not vote on their write-off, as the bail-
in is an authoritative mechanism: the bail-in operates by order (and 
discretion) of supervisory authorities. Furthermore, as certain classes of 
creditors need to be protected (depositors, but also creditors that are 
critical to the continuity in the institution’s functioning), the relevant 
liabilities are ring-fenced from the bail-in’s ax and are exempted from 
write-off (or conversion).  
Bail-in can limit panic, bank runs, and contagion only if it is a 
credible and final solution to the crisis of the resolved financial institution; 
otherwise, it can easily turn into a fire alarm worsening the downward 
spiral. For this reason, it is obviously necessary to ensure that banks have 
a sufficient amount of bail-in able liabilities to achieve the internal 
recapitalization in an orderly, effective, and timely manner. The BRRD, 
therefore, mandates a Minimum Requirement of Own Funds and Eligible 
Liabilities (“MREL”) on EU banks, precisely in order to allow bail-in.178 
Financial authorities set and verify on an on-going basis specific levels of 
MRELs depending on the size, complexity, interconnectedness, and risk 
profile of each supervised entity, according to harmonizing guidelines by 
the EU Commission and the EBA.179 MREL is calculated based on the 
 
Measures Effective Across Borders (Apr. 7, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2759763. 
177 See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 55, recently amended and reinforced 
by the “Banking Package”. 
178 See BRRD, supra note 12, arts. 45—45m. The “Banking Package” 
has revised this MREL provisions in the BRRD, in order to aling those to the 
TLAC (see below). The analysis of such technical amendments is beyond the 
scope of this Article. For a summary a first comment, see de Gioia Carabellese, 
supra note 2. 
179 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1450 of the European 
Commission of 23 May 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards specifying the criteria relating to the methodology for setting the 
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total amount of liabilities and equity through complex evaluations, 
formulas, and calculations beyond the scope of this analysis. A similar tool 
is the so-called “TLAC” (Total Loss Absorbing Capacity), established by 
the Financial Stability Board and applicable to global systemically 
important financial institutions (“G-SIFIs”), which will come into effect 
in 2019. As technical differences exist between the two measures, the 
recent EU “Banking Package” (still to come into force) has introduced 
amendments to the BRRD in an effort to coordinate the different 
requirements.180 
MREL and similar instruments add yet another constraint on the 
banking business; they represent, so to speak, a side effect of bail-in that 
further limits the flexibility of the financial structure of a bank and, more 
generally, its business model, strategies, and options. They also impose 
the creation and distribution of certain bail-in able liabilities thus making 
even more delicate the balance between rules designed to protect investors 
and incentives of banks to sell more risky instruments to their clients.181  
The issue of sufficient loss-absorption capacity through the 
issuance of bail-inable liabilities parallels the debate over two different 
resolution approaches: Single Point of Entry (“SPE”) versus Multiple 
Point of Entry (“MPE”). The problem is well known in the context of 
insolvency of international groups and is determined by the necessity to 
coordinate the goals and tools of these procedures with the existence of an 
economically integrated business operating through several formally 
separate legal entities subject to the laws of different jurisdictions.182 The 
 
minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities, 2016/450 (2016); 
Final Report on MREL: Report on Implementation and Design of the MREL 
Framework, EUR. BANKING AUTHORITY (Dec. 14, 2016), www.eba.europa.eu/d
ocuments/10180/1695288/EBA+Final+MREL+Report+%28EBA-Op-2016-
21%29.pdf. 
180 See supra notes 2 and 178. 
181 A further issue concerns the pricing of the newly-issued bail-inable 
instruments. The high degree of discretion afforded to the various institutions 
having a voice in the resolution decision-making process renders the risk level 
associated with such instruments (and the relevant pricing) quite unpredictable.  
Also, changes and adjustments of the MREL framework are possible along the 
way, so affecting the price of already issued securities and adding to the 
complexity of this piece of regulation. On this issue, see also for further reference, 
Tobias H. Tröger, Why MREL Won’t Help Much (EBI, Working Paper No. 13, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023185. 
182 Past experience demonstrates that the reorganization of international 
corporate groups is likely to be more successful if the group is regarded as a single 
entity. The ideal way to pursue such goal would be by means of single and 
centralized insolvency proceedings: in this regard, the competent venue could be 
chosen based on the jurisdiction where the involved corporate group has its center 
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complexity of the BRRD and the specificity of the banking activity 
exacerbate this problem. In fact, resolution can be very disruptive for the 
continuity of a cross-border group, limiting the possibility of intra-group 
transactions and the continuity of centralized functions at the holding 
level.  
Stripped to its essential elements, SPE requires the adoption of a 
bank-holding structure and resolution to focus at the level of the entity at 
the top of the group rather than the single operating banks in distress. The 
holding corporation would be primarily required to hold bail-inable 
liabilities thus mitigating cross-border recognition of resolution decisions. 
Pursuant to the MPE approach, on the other hand, national authorities and 
differences in local laws might hinder an orderly and coordinated 
resolution and single companies comprising the group might ring-fence 
their liabilities. SPE was developed in the U.S. with the Dodd-Frank Act 
because, due to historical regulatory limits, banking groups were already 
organized with holding corporations. In Europe, where the universal bank 
model is the norm and holding banks do not necessarily raise significant 
bail-inable debt, a transaction structured in line with the SPE approach 
would be complicated, costly, and would require time, even assuming it 
would be preferable in theory.183 
 
of main interests. A centralized proceeding may, however, be difficult to achieve, 
considering that all States in which group companies are incorporated should 
agree to transfer their jurisdiction in favor of the courts of the State where the 
group has its main center of interests. In this regard, applicable U.S. legislation is 
open to group reorganizations being performed through a single insolvency venue 
(28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2006)). In relation to the European Union, Regulation (EU) 
2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
insolvency proceedings, 2015 O.J. (L 141), does not contemplate single group 
proceedings. Nonetheless, it encourages the opening of group coordination 
proceedings on a voluntary basis. These are primarily aimed at facilitating the 
effective administration of the insolvency proceedings of group companies while 
fostering at the same time stronger communication ties between the national 
courts involved. For a comprehensive analysis, see Samuel L. Bufford, 
International Insolvency Case Venue in the European Union: The Parmalat and 
Daisytek Controversies, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 429, 434 (2006); Nora Wouters & 
Alla Raykin, Corporate Group Cross-Border Insolvencies Between the United 
States & the European Union: Legal and Economic Developments, 29 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 387, 388–408 (2013). 
183 Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bank Resolution in the 
Europe Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would Take, 
COLUM. L. & ECON. WORKING PAPER No. 465, (Nov. 30, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361347. The BRRD 
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(c) Bail-in, Compared to (and in Combination with) Other 
Resolution and Insolvency Tools 
While we have focused on the mechanics of the bail-in, it is worth 
noting that recapitalization is instrumental to the turnaround of a failing 
institution. One may ask what is the bail-in’s advantage when compared 
to other ‘traditional’ restructuring tools, such as the separation of the 
bank’s profitable assets and client relationships—to be put together into a 
good bank and sold to a third-party purchaser—and a residual bad bank to 
be liquidated. In fact, when it comes to large credit institutions, an accurate 
division of banking businesses into their good and bad parts may prove 
almost impossible in a few hours. The bail-in, used in combination with 
(or in preparation for) another resolution tool, prompts an immediate 
restoration of capital requirements, thus helping avoid a sudden 
interruption of strategic functions, preserving its going concern, buying 
time to identify good business, and negotiating a transaction with an 
interested purchaser.184   
Yet, the bail-in mechanism can work provided that sufficient 
liquidity is available or accessible to the failing bank.185 In such a case, 
 
continues to recognize both (SPE and MPE) resolution strategies. The “Banking 
Package” has clarified that the opportunity of a “group resolution” (SPE) is left to 
a case-by-case feasibility assessment by the resolution authorities (BRRD, supra 
note 12, art. 16, as amended).   
184 Moreover, to the extent bail-in prompts the conversion of certain debt 
into equity, bailed-in creditors may gain governance powers that may be used, for 
example, to start lawsuits and enforce the liability of the incumbent management. 
See, e.g., 2014/59, art. 37(3), 2014 O.J. (L 173) (EU) (describing the functions of 
bail-in in combination with other resolution tools). According to Simon Gleeson, 
Legal Aspects of Bank Bail-Ins (FMG Special Papers, Financial Markets Group, 
2012), at 16, a bail-in may also offer an alternative to the traditional partitioning 
into a good or bad bank, arranging for the entire bank to remain solvent (thanks 
to the liabilities’ write-off) and being sold to an interested purchaser, without 
putting the latter’s stability at risk. In the light of the BRRD experience so far—
where almost no “stand-alone” bail-ins took place—this proves to be a rather 
theoretical alternative. See also Chris Bates & Simon Gleeson, Legal aspects of 
bank bail-ins, 5 L. & FIN. MKT. REV. 264 (2011); infra, Part IV. 
185 In case of liquidity shortages, the Euro-area financial institutions may 
rely on the ECB’s support through the emergency liquidity assistance tool 
(“ELA”). The ELA aims to provide central bank money to solvent financial 
institutions that are facing temporary liquidity problems, and is operated 
independently of normal monetary policy operations. Moreover, ELA is exempt 
from being subject to bail-in provisions. 
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while the bank continues its activity, liabilities are canceled or converted 
into equity, and capital requirements are restored. If the bank operates in 
the context of generalized distress of the financial system or if the 
resolution tools are activated too late in the process, a deposit outflow may 
occur, and the bail-in—which realizes a purely accounting or cleansing of 
an ailing institution’s balance sheet—will be of little help and may 
accelerate the flight of creditors who are at risk.186   
Another reason why the competitiveness of the bail-in tool should 
not be overemphasized is that, in several jurisdictions, measures aimed at 
reducing the risk of value disruption are already in place and may operate 
outside the context of a resolution. For example, while a statutory 
automatic stay is often triggered upon the declaration of insolvency of a 
bank (which in Europe implies the revocation of the banking license under 
CRD IV), in some jurisdictions the supervisory authority may consent to 
a temporary continuation of the banking services. Alternatively, pre-
insolvency procedures are sometimes set forth, whereby the bank’s board 
of directors is removed and the state-appoints a commissioners’ office to 
guide the ailing bank towards an orderly dismissal of non-strategic assets 
and a restructuring.187   
Finally, we mentioned the MREL/TLAC is complementary to the 
bail-in and make it function properly. The bail-in became immediately 
operative regardless of the completion of the MREL process when the 
 
186 On the relationship between bail-in and bank liquidity, see, e.g., 
Gleeson, supra note 184, at 16–17; Ringe, supra note 187, at 4. As the latter author 
illustrates at 20–23 (and see also here above)—if and only if activated in a timely 
manner, the bail-in may also act as a stabilizing tool and prevent the risk of a bank 
run.   
187 Italy, having a significant past experience in banking rescues, offers 
interesting examples of both tools.  Art. 70 of the Italian Banking Act provides 
for the (pre-insolvency) special administration procedure, supra note 152. Indeed, 
even in an insolvency context, the bank under “administrative compulsory 
liquidation” (liquidazione coatta amministrativa, the special insolvency 
procedure applicable to Italian banks and financial institutions) may be authorized 
to temporarily continue its essential operations (such as payment services), “if 
necessary and with the purpose of increasing the value of the assets to be 
dismissed.” Italian Banking Act art. 90.3. See Raffaele Lener, The Implementation 
of BRRD and the Banking Crisis in Italy, RIV. DIR. SOC., at 703, 722 (2017); see 
also Lorenzo Stanghellini, La disciplina delle crisi bancarie: la prospettiva 
europea, BANCA D'ITALIA: QUADERNI DI RICERCA GIURIDICA NO. 75 147, 174–
76 (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/quaderni-
giuridici/2014-0075/Quaderno_n-75.pdf (analyzing the complex interplay 
between these tools and the BRRD tools). 
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BRRD came into force and was implemented in the jurisdictions of the 
Member States. Thus, a bail-in could be triggered by the supervisory 
authorities’ order, even if a cushion of bail-inable liabilities was not 
available to the concerned bank.188 The unavailability of eligible liabilities 
added to the issue of “legacy” liabilities. Private investors that had lent 
money (namely subscribing to subordinated bonds) to a bank in a time 
where the bail-in did not exist in their legal system were not excluded from 
the scope of application of the new rules—a problem that, in some 
jurisdictions, is referred to as “retroactivity of the bail-in.”189 As we will 
 
188 It is noteworthy that, in the public debate that preceded the enactment 
of the BRRD, the idea of a contractual bail-in was defended as preferable to the 
authoritative bail-in eventually implemented. In 2010, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision introduced the concept of contingent capital instrument 
(“CoCos”), meaning hybrid financial instruments that may converted into capital 
upon occurrence of certain liquidity events. Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Proposal to ensure loss absorbency of regulatory capital at the point 
of non-viability, Bank for Int’l Settlements (2010), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf. Clearly, both types of bail-in bring to a 
similar outcome (the recapitalization of the institution), but only in the contractual 
bail-in the creditor’s consent is obtained (ex ante), and only in respect of pre-
determined trigger events. On this matter, see Coffee Jr., supra note 148; Andreas 
Cahn & Patrick Kenadjian, Contingent Convertible  Securities: From Theory to 
CRD IV, EUROPEAN BANKING UNION 270 (Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini eds., 
2015); Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, Why and How to Design a 
Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement (Apr. 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/s
ol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1815406. Eventually, a solution of compromise 
prevailed in the legislative process for the BRRD: statutory bail-in was adopted 
but, at the same time, the issuing of CoCos (or other “contractual bail-in 
instruments”) was expressly recognized for the purposes of meeting the MREL 
threshold. Under BRRD 2014/59, art. 45(13) 2014 O.J. (L 173) (EU), the 
decisions taken by the resolution authorities on the MREL of each institution (or 
group) “may provide that the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible 
liabilities is partially met at consolidated or individual level through contractual 
bail-in instruments.” See also Tröger, supra note 148, at 21–22. 
189 Conversely to the CoCos idea (where a contractual bail-in may 
prevent the authoritative bail-in), BRRD art. 55 mandates Member States to 
require institutions to include in bail-inable liabilities “a contractual term by 
which the creditor or party to the agreement creating the liability . . . may be 
subject to the write-down and conversion powers and agrees to be bound by any 
reduction of the principal or outstanding amount due . . . .” BRRD, supra note 12, 
art. 55. In this way, the statutory (authoritative) bail-in is factored into the 
contractual terms, in an attempt to overcome the complex international private 
law issues stemming from application of bail-in to an institution that has issued 
financial instruments regulated under the law of third party countries.  But, 
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see, this “transitional” issue has played a decisive role in the way banking 
restructuring have been crafted in the pre- and post-BRRD era. 
 
D. Judicial Review of Resolution Actions 
As we already mentioned, recovery and resolution in the BRRD is 
an administrative procedure, as opposed to traditional insolvency 
procedures that are either judicial or conducted under the control of a 
court, in which authorities have broad and sweeping powers and judicial 
review is limited to not hinder the effectiveness of the adoptable measures. 
In fact, resolution, and particularly the bail-in tool, can infringe upon 
fundamental rights set forth by either the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of 2000, or the European Convention on Human 
Rights, such as the right to property, the freedom to conduct a business, 
and—due also to the urgency with which these measures are adopted—the 
right to a fair trial.190 
An analysis of these rights would be utterly outside the scope of this 
Article: our goal here is simply to offer a general understanding of the 
major judicial review issues arising out of the BRRD. Considering the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ, we 
can observe that interferences with individual rights in the context of 
procedures aimed at addressing the crisis of a financial institution are 
allowed if they are in the public interest, are proportionate and—in case of 
takings of property—fair compensation is provided. Public interest and 
proportionality, while elusive concepts in their practical applications, are 
obviously pursued by the BRRD and resolution authorities. The existence 
of fair compensation, for example for a bondholder whose credit is 
canceled off, is more questionable. However, the NCWO principle 
provides a basis to argue that affected parties do not receive less than the 
 
needless to say, bail-in cannot be easily “contractualized” (retroactively) in 
financial instruments issued before its statutory introduction. 
190 See Paul Artemou, Rights of European Union Depositors Under 
Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights After the Cyprus Bail-Out, 28 
PACE INTL. L. REV. 205 (2016); WILLIAM B.T. MOCK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
EUROPE: COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, 108 (William B.T. Mock et al. eds., 2010); Michael W. Müller, 
Creditor protection in bank resolution: a case for international investment 
arbitration?, 10 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 276 (2015). 
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actual value of their rights or claims.191 As we will see, this seems to be a 
very questionable conclusion. 
 
More broadly, Michael Schilling might have effectively 
summarized the case law in this area:  
 
ex ante judicial review is not required, and the 
requirements for a prior notice and hearing may be dispensed 
with in the interest of safeguarding financial stability and the 
rights of depositors and creditors.  Ex post judicial review is a 
necessity, with one level of jurisdiction being sufficient. 
Procedures may be expedited and confidential.  The scope of 
review must, however, be comprehensive.  The standard of 
review may be limited to an arbitrariness assessment, owing 
to the wide margin of discretion afforded to public authorities 
in delicate economic areas such as banking and financial 
regulation.192 
 
To be a little more specific, while talking about judicial review we 
need to distinguish at least three issues: jurisdiction (in the sense of power 
to adjudicate), standing, and standard of review. 
Considering jurisdiction, a first issue is that resolution under the 
BRRD requires both acts of European bodies, specifically the SRB, and of 
the national resolution authorities. The general principle here is a formal 
one pursuant to which acts adopted by the European authorities can be 
challenged in front of the ECJ, and acts adopted by the national authorities 
can be challenged in national courts. This feature obviously raises a first 
delicate question in terms of harmonization and equal treatment, 
considering that national judicial systems present a common core of 
general principles but also significantly different approaches, rules and 
standards (just consider the existence of special administrative courts), 
which can determine differences in available remedies. Additionally, the 
distinction between the jurisdiction of the ECJ and national courts is far 
from clear-cut. In principle, for example, the SRB adopts the general 
resolution scheme, but to the extent that the scheme simply provides a 
blueprint for resolution, and delegates its enforcement to national 
authorities, it is questionable whether European courts might challenge it 
 
191 See MICHAEL SCHILLIG, RESOLUTION AND INSOLVENCY OF BANKS 
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 113 (Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (arguing that 
affected creditors should also have a right to effective judicial review, which shall 
be unhindered by “practical impediments.”). 
192 Id. at 115. 
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(at least concretely). The answer probably depends on the degree of 
discretion granted to national authorities, in the sense that the greater the 
discretion, the more solid is the ground for jurisdiction of national courts. 
This extremely important issue, however, is neither settled in the 
applicable legislation, nor cleared by case law or scholarly interpretations. 
On the other hand, national courts faced with litigation based on the 
activity of national authorities in furtherance of a SRB’s resolution scheme 
might be required to refer questions to the ECJ by way of a preliminary 
ruling (pursuant to art. 267 TFEU). Applicants have however limited and 
uncertain protections against the decision of a local court not to refer a 
question to the Luxembourg Court.  
Also, in terms of standing to sue, we find a not entirely 
straightforward picture. Decisions of the Commission concerning State 
Aid or Fund Aid, as well as objections to the resolution scheme adopted 
by the SRB, are subject to judicial review under art. 263 TFEU. Therefore, 
they can be challenged by Union Institutions and Member States 
(privileged applicants) and by natural and legal persons. The latter two, 
however, only if the decision is “addressed to them” or is “of direct and 
individual concern to them,” a notoriously vague standard. In fact, since 
the resolution scheme is addressed to national resolution authorities, it is 
questionable whether the financial institution, its managers, shareholders 
and creditors have standing to challenge it directly. The Plaumann test, 
named after a 1963 ECJ decision,193 should apply, but it offers only limited 
guidance on their right to sue in the ECJ. 
Finally, also review standards are far from being entirely clear and 
predictable.  While, in theory, lack of competence, violations of the 
Treaties, applicable laws, general principles of law or procedural 
requirements, and misuse of powers are grounds for a challenge, the 
precise scope of these boundaries is complex at best and confusing at 
worst. The significant discretion granted to public authorities in economic 
matters further complicates the picture, as it emerges both from case law194 
and is made explicit by Recital (89) of the BRRD. One of the possible 
grounds for review is whether the evidence used is factually accurate, 
reliable, and consistent; and whether it contains all the relevant 
information and substantiates the conclusions reached; however, these 
elements can be very slippery in the highly technical field we are 
discussing.  
 
193 [ECJ], Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co. v Comm’n, 1963 E.C.R. 95. 
194 See, e.g., [ECJ] Case C-12/03 P Comm’n v Tetra Laval, 2005 E.C.R. 
I-987 par. 39. 
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Arts. 85 and 86 BRRD require Member States to ensure judicial 
review at the national level, but with significant limitations justified by the 
urgency of the procedures and the need for effective resolution. The 
directive distinguishes between judicial review of “Crisis Prevention 
Measures” (essentially, measures dealing with recoverability and early 
intervention preceding resolution) and “Crisis Management Measures” 
(resolution decisions and powers). Ex-ante judicial review or approval is 
possible, but not required. States can adopt it, but courts are subject to a 
very strict deadline: the courts must issue a decision within twenty-four 
hours, and the competent authority must act immediately after the court’s 
response. Ex-post judicial review must be provided for, but subject to 
several limitations: the lodging of an appeal (the term is used in the 
Directive in the sense of any judicial challenge) does not suspend the 
effects of the decision, which becomes immediately effective with a 
presumption that its suspension would be against public interest. In 
addition, the eventual annulment of a resolution authority’s decision does 
not affect any consequent decision or act based on the challenged decision, 
and the only possible remedy is monetary damages.  
In short, judicial review of resolution decisions (and early 
intervention measures) is possible, but it is significantly limited coherently 
with the overriding necessity of swift action. Even more troubling, the 
essential pillars of judicial review in terms of jurisdiction, standing and 
applicable standards are uncertain and unsettled. While this is partially 
inevitable in a relatively new regime, it seems particularly problematic in 
an area in which the relevant authorities have very broad, incisive and 
discretionary powers that might infringe on fundamental rights of 
individuals and legal entities.  
 
E. Liquidation and NCWO Principle 
When the conditions for resolution are not met, an insolvent or 
otherwise compromised entity can be liquidated according to national law. 
Insolvency procedures vary significantly among different Member States 
but, as we have discussed, their premises and goals are different from 
resolution. Simplifying, the latter aims at preserving and enhancing what 
could be saved of an ailing going concern, ensuring the continuity of 
essential functions, and providing for an orderly liquidation of the rest. 
Winding up and liquidation, on the other hand, are aimed at selling all the 
assets of the debtor and satisfying its creditors pro-rata and pari passu 
according to their order of priority, eventually eliminating from the market 
the failed intermediary. In this case the goal is to maximize the value of 
the assets and protect, over other interests, the ones of creditors. In 
addition, while national laws differ in this respect, liquidation is generally 
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a judicial procedure or, more precisely, is conducted under the strict 
control of a court; resolution is on the other hand essentially an 
administrative procedure in which, as we have discussed, the relevant 
authorities enjoy extensive and discretionary powers.  
Liquidation and resolution, however, are not entirely incompatible 
and alternative. In fact, resolution can and often includes “elements” of 
liquidation, for example, when a “bad bank” (typically, the insolvent bank, 
the “good business” of which has been transferred to a third-party 
acquirer) is put under liquidation. Similarly, outside of the scope of the 
BRRD national procedures can present elements of both resolution and 
liquidation: consider the case of the “Banche Venete” in Italy (see below, 
subparagraph V.D(c)), in which a good bank was sold to a large banking 
group, and the residual bad banks were put under receivership.  
One issue that has not received a lot of attention, either in EU law 
or in scholarly comments, is whether during resolution it might become 
apparent that the requirements for resolution no longer exist, and 
liquidation should be initiated. For example, during resolution it might 
become clear that avoiding liquidation is not, or no longer, in the public 
interest. Can resolution be transformed into liquidation under these 
circumstances? The BRRD does not offer a clear answer, but—as we will 
see—resolution authorities have frequently faced a “failure” of the 
resolution attempt, and a consequent need to resort to either a “phase 2 
resolution” or a “post-resolution” liquidation of bad banks or asset 
management companies.195 
One of the most important connections between resolution and 
liquidation is, of course, the no-creditor-worse-off (“NCWO”) principle, 
which requires an evaluation of the hypothetical effects of liquidation. The 
BRRD requires a first evaluation of the possible effects of liquidation 
before resolution, which is relevant also to define a resolution strategy that 
would respect the NCWO principle (so-called “ex-ante valuation”). 
However, as soon as resolution starts, an “ex-post valuation” should also 
be initiated with the aim of determining the hypothetical liquidation value 
of the different positions and claims: if this exceeds what creditors have 
received in case of bail-in, they can obtain monetary compensation. There 
is no specific deadline for either resolution or this evaluation. This is 
probably inevitable since the purpose is to compare the hypothetical 
results of liquidation with the actual ones of resolution, but it might 
 
195 The Novo Banco case (in Portugal) and the HETA case (in Austria) 
are just two examples, with radically different solutions provided by the national 
authorities.  See infra Part IV. 
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postpone significantly the protection of creditors, with little consideration 
for the time-value of money. 
The NCWO assessment poses a series of critical issues, some of 
which already “materialized” in the experience of the first BRRD cases.196 
First, it appears that the calculation of the outcomes of liquidation should 
be based on the information reasonably available to the authorities at the 
time of resolution197—and not on the basis of the information available 
when the ex post evaluation is finalized—and this result has to be 
compared with the actual results of resolution. This option is questionable. 
In fact, it does not ensure that creditors will not be treated worse than how 
they would have been treated in liquidation, but rather than how they 
would have been treated based on an ex ante, theoretical assessment of the 
consequences of liquidation. It might happen that during resolution 
information is acquired or events occur that suggest that, in fact, the 
outcome of liquidation might have been significantly better than what was 
originally imagined.  
The problem is potentially compounded by the fact that, while the 
evaluation is entrusted with an independent expert, the expert can be the 
same individual or entity who conducted the ex ante evaluation, with the 
obvious consequence of a possible (at least “intellectual”) conflict of 
interest. Finding that resolution in fact was worse than liquidation for some 
creditors suggests an erroneous ex ante valuation or decision to proceed 
with resolution. Of course, the ex post evaluation can be challenged in 
court, but that is obviously not a perfect protection.198  
Further, one should consider that the decision to resolve a credit 
institution might be taken even when it is not financially insolvent.199 This 
might determine what we will call the NCWO paradox: the regulatory 
 
196 See infra Paragraph IV.D, especially with respect to the Banco 
Popular resolution. 
197 See Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A 
Guidebook to 
the BRRD, WORLD BANK GROUP (Apr. 2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/100781485375368909/pdf/112266-REVISED-PUBLIC-0317-
FinSAC-BRRD-Guidebook.pdf. 
198 Interestingly, a similar issue arises in (Chapter 11-like) restructuring 
proceedings of “normal” corporations.  A restructuring plan (involving sacrifice 
of creditors) may be upheld to the extent the creditors’ position is not sacrificed 
more than under a bankruptcy scenario. For a comprehensive analysis, see, e.g., 
Arturo Bris ET AL., The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus 
Chapter 11 Reorganization, 3 J. FIN. 1253 (2006).  However, a “normal” 
restructuring is subject to approval of (at least) a majority of the affected classes 
of creditors, while resolution is enforced regardless of any creditor’s approval. 
199 See supra Paragraph C. 
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approach requires a comparison between the results of a procedure 
applicable before insolvency, with the ones that would emerge from 
liquidation after insolvency has occurred. This seems a bit similar to a 
situation in which a physician decides to amputate the broken finger of a 
patient even in the absence of gangrene, because this will allow him more 
time to treat other patients (the “public interest” requirement of 
resolution). NCWO evokes the idea that the doctor might justify the 
decision arguing that the patient is not worse off than in case of gangrene. 
The patient might object, but, gangrene had not set in yet…200 
As a further problematic issue—especially for institutions that 
operate cross border—the liquidation scenario, on which the NCWO test 
is based, inevitably refers to national legislations, as bank insolvency rules 
are not harmonized through the EU.201 For example, rules governing the 
creditors’ hierarchy in insolvency may significantly differ among member 
States, so that a creditor might “pass” or “fail” the NCWO test depending 
on the jurisdiction where the failed bank would be declared insolvent: 
uninsured depositors and intragroup claims are just two examples of 
liabilities that are often treated differently in national insolvency 
procedures.202 
 
200 To be sure, one might argue that the decision to enter into resolution 
is taken once it is ascertained that there is no reasonable prospect that any 
alternative measure would prevent the failure within a reasonable timeframe: 
BRRD, supra note 12, art. 32(1)(b). Using the same surgery simile, the physician 
amputates the finger because she is sure that gangrene will set.  Yet, the unsettling 
thing is that a private creditor—that has no voice in the resolution process—
suffers a certain loss in light of (and to prevent) an estimated non-viability of the 
bank.  And, in addition, the amount of such (certain) loss is determined on an a 
(further) estimate of a liquidation scenario that will never occur. 
201 Directive 2001/24, 2001 O.J. (L 125) (EC) on the reorganization and 
winding up of credit institutions does not serve this purpose, as its limited function 
is to ensure that the principle of home-country control (of supervisory authorities 
and courts) operates also in case of insolvency, and that all assets and claims 
(including those involving foreign subsidiaries of the insolvent bank) are treated 
equally regardless of their location.  For a thorough discussion, see Jens-Hinrich 
Binder ET AL., The Choice between Judicial and Administrative Sanctioned 
Procedures to Manage Liquidation of Banks: A Transatlantic Perspective (Sept. 
28, 2018) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244334. See also 
infra Paragraph IV.B. 
202 As mentioned, BRRD, supra note 12, art. 108 (as recently amended 
by Directive 2017/2399, 2017 O.J. (L 345) (EU)) only ensures a partial 
harmonization of certain substantive rules governing the ranking of deposits in 
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Last, but not least, the NCWO test (which focuses on the position 
of individual creditors) critically interferes with the public interest 
assessment (see above). In fact, the recovery chances of a creditor of a 
wound-up bank and one of a resolved bank depend on the side effects of 
insolvency in both scenarios. In a liquidation scenario, the creditor’s 
expectations attach to the value at which the failed bank’s assets may to 
be sold to competitors; such value, in turn, depends on the impact that the 
winding up of the distressed institution may have on the market where 
such competitors operate. On the other hand, a creditor in a resolution 
scenario relies on the long-term viability of the redressed institution (i.e. 
the objective of the bail-in) which, in turn, depends on the possible chain 
(contagion?) effects triggered by the bail-in. As we analyze below, the 
assessment of such side market effects played a crucial role in the first 
BRRD experiments, leading in some cases to short circuits and 
paradoxical outcomes. 
 
F. State Aids 
As we mentioned, EU Treaties attribute to the European 
Commission the supervisory and decisional powers on the matter of State 
aids.  When the financial crisis destabilized the banking sector across 
Europe and an era of bail-outs began, a harmonized resolution framework 
had not even been conceived as a bill and the Commission was the only 
European institution withy authority to interfere with the rescue decisions 
by the national governments. 
The approach of the Commission underwent a real metamorphosis 
over time. At the early stage of the crisis, the authority followed a lenient 
approach. In a Communication of 2008, it indulgently included several 
aids (both to the generality of the banks in a Member States and to 
individual failing institutions) within the category of “aid[s) . . . to remedy 
a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” that, as such, 
may be compatible with the internal market pursuant to art. 107(3)(b) of 
TFEU.203 Yet, the 2008 Communication set forth a few conditionalities to 
 
insolvency procedures. See Directive 2017/2399, 2017 O.J. (L 345) (EU) at 
Recital (16); see also supra note 175. 
203 See Communication from the Commission (EC), 2008 O.J. (C 270) 
02 [hereinafter “EC”]. In particular, “any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible 
with the internal market.” TFEU art. 107. However, aids primarily aimed at 
remedying serious threats to the economy of a Member State constitute an 
exception, and can thus be deemed compatible with the internal market. 
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the aids. For example, it distinguished between aids to “fundamentally 
sound” banks facing a liquidity crisis and to institutions affected by 
inefficiencies, poor management or risky strategy: as, in the latter case, a 
public financial support may significantly alter competition within the 
relevant markets, the aids were allowed only subject to “far-reaching 
restructuring” and compensatory measures to mitigate market 
distortions.204 Even with these caveats, the framework that the 
Commission set out was extremely flexible and, de facto, inaugurated a 
sort of “run on the aids” with generally negative effects on the competition 
in the banking industry across the EU.205 
The Commission followed up with six further communications, 
whereby it strengthened the conditions for the granting of aids.206 The 
arrival point—reached in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis of 2011 
and the launch of the Banking Union project in 2012—is the well-known 
“2013 Banking Communication.”207 A screw-turn with respect to the 
initial benevolent approach is evident, also from a procedural standpoint. 
For example, Member States must now pre-notify the Commission of their 
intention to grant financial support to an ailing institution and to start a 
“negotiation” process where the EU institution is actively involved.208 
More importantly, the Commission introduced new substantive conditions 
for aid granting. Some look quite obvious, such as requiring a change of 
 
204 See EC, supra note 203, § 14. 
205 At an EU level, competition suffered distortions because not all States 
were equally engaged in rescuing their banking sector.  For example (and 
somewhat paradoxically), the Italian banks did not benefit from significant State 
aids during the 2007-2013 period (the opposite took place in Germany, Spain, 
Ireland and the UK, not to mention other smaller countries). In part, this was due 
to the apparent solidity of the Italian institutions during this period, thanks to a 
lesser exposure to the international markets, but also to a delayed discovery of 
their real NPL stock. 
206 For a summary, see Stefano Micossi ET AL., Bail-in Provisions in 
State Aid and Resolution Procedures: Are they consistent with systemic stability? 
318 CEPS POL’Y BRIEF (May 21, 2014), 3–4, 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PB%20318%20SM%20et%20al%20Bail-
in%20Provisions%20in%20State%20Aid%20and%20Resolution%20Procedures
%20final_0.pdf.  
207 See Communication from the Commission (EC) 2013 O.J. (C 216) 01 
[hereinafter “2013 Commission Banking Communication”]. 
208 See Id. § 32. Note that the dialogue between the Commission and the 
Member State “applying” for the granting of State aids is based on a “capital 
raising plan established by the Member State and the bank and endorsed by the 
competent supervisory authority. . . .” 
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the beneficiary bank’s management and the adoption of strict 
remuneration policies until completion of the restructuring process, as well 
as policies restricting the distribution of dividends, buybacks, and other 
outflows of own funds.209   
Two other (less obvious) conditions cut the raw flesh of any 
restructuring supported by public funds. First, the emergency approval of 
“blind” recapitalizations or bailouts is no longer allowed. The granting of 
aids is subject to the prior approval of a credible restructuring plan.210 The 
function of this requirement is to ensure that aids are directed only to 
institutions committed to restore their long-term viability. Alternatively, if 
a growing concern may not be preserved, States may grant aids in the 
context of (and to safeguard) an orderly wind-down of the failed 
institution. There is a way out for States willing to overcome the 
restructuring plan requirement, but only if the competent supervisory 
authority confirms the “blind” aid is necessary to preserve financial 
stability.211 
Second, the restructuring process must ensure adequate burden-
sharing, i.e. “all capital generating measures including the conversion of 
junior debt […] be exhausted.”212  In practice, the “burden sharing” 
principle enshrined in par. 19 of the second listed Communication 
mandates the “reduction” of all the equity and the conversion (and possible 
write down) of the junior debt. Burden-sharing, however, must comply 
with the NCWO rule.213 Comparing the Commission’s burden-sharing 
requirement with the BRRD’s (and SRMR’s) bail-in tool, one immediately 
notes two material discrepancies. To begin with, while the bail-in 
contemplates the sacrifice of shareholders and all creditors of the failed 
bank (excluding insured depositors and other creditors exempted from the 
bail-in), under the 2013 Commission Banking Communication only 
shareholders and junior creditors are affected. In addition, unlike the bail-
 
209 Id. §§ 37–39, 47–48. 
210 Id. § 50: “a Member State will have to notify a restructuring plan to 
the Commission and obtain State aid before any recapitalisation or impaired asset 
measures are taken. . . .” 
211 Id. § 50. 
212 See Id. § 19. The Commission explains: “In the first phases of the 
crisis, Member States did not generally go beyond the minimum requirements set 
by State aid rules . . . and creditors were not required to contribute to rescuing 
credit institutions for reasons of financial stability. The sovereign debt crisis has . 
. . made clear that such a policy could not ensure financial stability in the long 
term, in particular for Member States in which the cost of bank bail-outs 
significantly weakened their fiscal position . . ..” Id. §§ 17–18. 
213 Id. § 46. 
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in within the resolution framework, States may avoid the Commission’s 
burden-sharing if the financial stability is not put at risk.214 
As already noted, there are several intersections between the 
resolution framework and the State aid regulation. Ideally, the BRRD 
attempted to “factor” into its comprehensive system the principles that also 
justify the restrictions to the granting of public support to credit 
institutions. Still, the State aid rules maintain their autonomy, and their 
interplay with the resolution mechanism is not always linear. One example 
has to do with precautionary recapitalizations, i.e. the most critical terrain 
of clash between the resolution principles and the Member States’ 
prerogatives to support (not failing, but . . . ailing) financial institutions.215 
As noted above, under the BRRD/SRMR, one of the requirements for a 
precautionary recapitalization (or other extraordinary public financial 
support) to be authorized is that the Union State aid framework must 
approve the public financial support.216 Here, by definition, no bail-in 
applies (as the recapitalization occurs out of a resolution scheme), but the 
Commission’s burden-sharing requirement does apply, although it is in its 
“smoother” form that preserves senior creditors and uninsured depositors 
from write-down.   
Another example of interplay between the two sets of rules 
concerns the adoption of resolution actions involving the granting of 
public aids, where the SRB must refrain from approving such actions until 
the Commission has positively assessed the use of public support under 
art. 107 TFEU.217 As noted (Paragraph II.B above), such interplay requires 
the Commission to separate, from an organizational standpoint, its 
function as a decision-maker for the State aids and as an institution vetting 
the SRB resolution proposal, which may generate potential conflicts of 
interest and purposes.218 
A third area of overlap concerns the alternative between resolution 
and liquidation under the BRRD framework. As discussed above, if there 
is not a public interest for resolution, a failing institution will normally 
face liquidation, according to national insolvency rules, thus, “escaping” 
the bail-in trap.219 If, however, State aids are granted to support the orderly 
liquidation process, then the burden-sharing shall kick in again, leaving 
 
214 Id. § 45. 
215 See supra Paragraph B. 
216 See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 32.4(d). 
217 See SRMR, supra note 12, art. 19. 
218 Micossi ET AL., supra note 206, at 7. 
219 See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 32(1), (2), (5). 
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senior creditors untouched. It is quite easy to guess that national policy-
makers, worried about senior creditors’ protests following a bail-in, may 
push towards a liquidation solution and possibly grant public aids. 
More generally, in all of these cases, the simultaneous operation 
of the two regulatory frameworks has proven to be a difficult playground 
for policy—and decision-makers— highlighting a source of possible 
short-circuit in the European regulation of the banking crises. We provide 
and analyze examples in Part V below. 
 
III. A BRIEF COMPARISON WITH THE U.S. 
The American and European credit institutions share common 
foundations on which their respective regulatory frameworks are built. 
Basel III provides the same capital requirements to banks that operate on 
both sides of the Atlantic, although the international parameters interplay 
with different accounting and prudential rules. Likewise, the pre-crisis and 
insolvency measures in the two continents draw from the Financial 
Stability Board impulse after the 2007-2008 financial crisis and have 
comparable features.220 Even so, remarkable differences exist, less due to 
the obviously diverging legal traditions than to lawmakers’ and regulators’ 
strategic choices. 221  The latter type of differences is the most interesting 
for the purposes of the critical analysis that follows. 
 
A. The U.S. Rules: A Summary of the Existing Framework 
To summarize the U.S. framework in a sketchy (and inevitably 
incomplete) way, it is useful to recall that, until 2010, insolvent depository 
banks (i.e. those whose clients benefit from the insured deposits coverage 
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)) were—and 
are—subject to a special federal administrative procedure regulated by the 
 
220 See supra Part II(B). See generally, Binder ET AL., supra note 201, at 
1. 
221 Needless to say, the U.S. boasts a uniform bankruptcy law system, 
which (without prejudice to the operation of state rules covering certain matters 
of creditor protection) provides a uniform ground for the resolution and 
liquidation of credit institutions. To the contrary, the European Member States 
have not harmonized their national insolvency rules (apart from limited aspects 
aimed at fostering the mutual recognition across the EU of administrative and 
court decisions), nor does a system of federal courts exist to enforce such rules. 
Therefore, as mentioned, the EU harmonized resolution framework is subject to 
national implementation and adaptation. Due to the many inconsistencies 
stemming from the relationship with profoundly different national insolvency 
rules, the “level playing field” is sometimes illusory.  See infra Part V.D, VI. 
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Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”).222 Non-bank (and non-
insurance) financial companies, namely including bank holding 
companies, were subject to ordinary (court-based) corporate insolvency 
proceedings under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In practice, before and 
during the 2007-2008 crisis, the insolvency regime applicable to holding 
companies was all but “ordinary,” as demonstrated by the massive 
recourse to bailouts in the Bear Sterns, Bank of America, and AIG cases—
just by way of example. Yet, in September 2008, in an awkward attempt 
to stop bankers’ and shareholders’ moral hazard, the U.S. authorities 
adopted a peculiar “hands-off” approach with Lehman Brothers. Thus, one 
of the top five investment banks worldwide, uniquely interconnected with 
the global derivatives market, was stuck in “normal” Chapter 11 
proceedings, causing the abrupt collapse of its international activities and 
contributing significantly to the aggravation of the global crisis.223 
In 2010, consistent with the FSB guidelines, Title II of the Dodd-
Frank Act224 introduced a new “administrative option” (called “orderly 
liquidation authority” or “OLA”) for handling non-bank financial 
companies that pose systemic risks, such as broker dealers and financial 
institutions supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System and recognized as systemically important financial institutions 
(“SIFIs”).225 As with depository banks, the Dodd-Frank Act grants the 
FDIC special powers to assist a failing institution. The FDIC may exercise 
its powers if three cumulative conditions are met. First, the restructuring 
of the institution through contractual arrangements is not possible, that is, 
no private sector solution is available.226 Second, the application of 
 
222 Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1835 (2018).  For 
an effective summary of the functioning of the FDIA mechanisms, see Binder et 
al., supra note 201, at 20–24. 
223 HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2010); Rosalind Z. Wiggins ET 
AL., Case Study: The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview, Yale Sch. of 
Mgmt. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2588
531. 
224 Dodd-Frank Act Title II, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–94 (2018). 
225 More specifically, the applicability of the OLA regime extends to 
companies (whether holding or subsidiaries) for which profit deriving “financial 
activities” (as defined under 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2018)) account for 85% or 
more of the total profits. 
226 See Thomas Philippon & Aude Salord, Bail-ins and Bank Resolution 
in Europe: A Progress Report, Int’l Ctr. for Monetary & Banking Stud. and Ctr. 
for 
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ordinary liquidation (i.e. under Chapters 7 or 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code) would lead to economic inefficiencies. Third, the bankruptcy of the 
institution could endanger financial stability. In addition, the institution 
must be failing or likely to fail, according to net asset, financial, and 
regulatory parameters referring to (i) the possible commencement of a 
procedure under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, (ii) the material erosion of the 
institution’s capital, (iii) negative net assets, or (iv) the institution’s 
inability to pay its obligations in the normal course of business.227 
Once the procedure opens, the FDIC acts as a receiver vested with 
management powers in lieu of the removed directors of the failing 
institution. The authority exercises its powers with the goal of maximizing 
the value of the institution’s assets “within the context of the ordinary 
liquidation.”228 Thus, the purpose of the U.S. resolution model is 
exclusively a liquidation of the insolvent entity. The regulatory framework 
does not contemplate an “open bank” restructuring.229 The FDIC has the 
typical powers of a European resolution authority, including the sale of 
assets to a third party,230 the transfer of assets to a bridge financial 
company,231 the transfer of assets or liabilities to a third party (such as a 
“bad bank”),232 and the bail-in.233   
As to the latter tool, the FDIC may write off equity and debt to 
cover existing losses of the failed institution. However, such a write-off is 
only functional to a liquidation of the insolvent entity’s activities and 
cannot be used to enhance the long-term viability of a restructured 
institution. In other words, the resolution authority may only resort to the 
 
Econ. Pol’y Res., at 10 (Mar. 2017), https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/news/Gen
evaSpecialReport4.pdf, (discussing the issuance of CoCo bonds as private sector 
solution in the U.S. system). 
227 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b) (2018). 
228 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(B) (2018) (emphasis added). 
229 Of course, this does not mean that the failing institution’s activities 
are necessarily interrupted or wound down. To the contrary, the FDIC may spin 
off one or more profitable businesses from the insolvent entity and sell those to a 
third party (e.g. through a sale of assets: see infra), so to safeguard its value. In 
practice, the main difference between the U.S. and the EU model concerns the 
viability of the bail-in of an operating financial companies (“open-bank bail-in”): 
see infra Part IV.C(iv). 
230 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(D) (2018). The institution’s merger with a 
third party is also contemplated (12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(G) (2018)), an outcome 
that may be reached also in Europe, through a combination of the sale of the 
institution’s shares to a third-party purchaser (see BRRD, supra note 12, art. 38) 
and a subsequent “ordinary” merger with such purchaser. See infra Part IV. 
231 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(F) (2018). 
232 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(G) (2018). 
233 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(M) (2018). 
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bail-in to allow a continuation of activities to the extent it increases the 
chances of a value maximization in liquidation. The NCWO principle 
governs the application of the bail-in. Therefore, no claim may be written 
off if the creditor would suffer a loss greater than at the outcome of the 
liquidation process.234 
Like in Europe, the resolution authority enjoys a significant 
amount of discretion in the application of the general principles 
concerning the equal treatment of creditors and the pecking order, in the 
event of both a bail-in and other resolution tools.235 
We highlight that the resolution procedure envisaged under the 
Dodd-Frank Act does not replace the Bankruptcy Code procedures 
ordinarily applicable to non-bank financial institutions. Such procedures 
shall apply whenever the FDIC does not deem a resolution appropriate 
according to the criteria above. 
Although the U.S. resolution framework is not closely intertwined 
with a state-aid regulation as in Europe, the Dodd-Frank Act sets forth 
limitations to government financial support for a resolved institution. De 
facto, the intervention of the Orderly Liquidation Fund is limited to ninety 
percent of the total consolidated assets of the financial institutions, based 
on the most recent published financial statements.236 
 
B. A Possible (In?)volution: The TPRRA Bill 
Currently, the U.S. Congress is discussing a bill that would reform 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s OLA.237 The bill—aimed at introducing a Taxpayer 
Protection & Responsible Resolution Act (“TPRRA”)—follows an 
animated debate, after the election of President Trump, on the opportunity 
 
234 12 U.S.C. § 5390(d)(2) (2018). In this regard, creditors should, at a 
minimum, receive as much as they would have received had the institution been 
subject to 11 U.S. Code Chapter 7 procedures. 
235 12 U.S.C. § 5390(b)(4) (2018). 
236 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n) (2018). For further details, see Philippon & 
Salord, supra note 226, at 12. 
237 See Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, S. 1840, 
114th Cong. (2015). For a preliminary (but starkly critical) discussion, see Adam 
J. Levitin, Analysis of the Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act of 
2018 (Chapter 14 Financial Institution Bankruptcy Proposal) (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3287633. For comments to 
the bill, see Ryan Rossner, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Bankruptcy 
for Banks and Proposed Chapter 14, HARV. L. SCH. BANKR. ROUNDTABLE (Dec. 
4, 2018), http://blogs.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/tag/tprra/. 
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to repeal Title 2 of the Dodd-Frank Act and replace it with a new special 
insolvency procedure for SIFIs, to be transposed as Chapter 14 in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code.238 Actually, the TPRRA proposal creates a new Chapter 
14 but does not replace the OLA. Indeed, while Chapter 14 would become 
a sort of default procedure for a SIFI’s insolvency, the federal authorities 
would preserve their power to apply the Dodd-Frank resolution.239 
From a procedural standpoint, the new Chapter 14 does not stray 
far from a traditional Chapter 11 model. The new insolvency procedure 
would be mainly court-based, (instead of subject to the FDIC 
administrative control) and the failing institution’s management would 
remain in control. The main feature of the TPRRA is a sort of standardized 
resolution tool, consisting of the sale of selected assets and liabilities of 
the failing institution to a bridge entity, with the notable exclusion of any 
equity or “capital structure debt.”240 The latter category—that would 
remain with the bankruptcy estate, under a NCWO clause—includes any 
unsecured debt other than liabilities towards any counterparty of a 
“qualified financial contract,” such as derivatives and repos.241 A trustee 
 
238 Initially, the Trump Presidency and the Republican Party supported a 
full repeal of the OLA, as a part of their general deregulation program. In early 
2018, the U.S. Treasury Department issued a report on the possible OLA reform. 
The report recommended not to repeal the Dodd-Frank procedure—as this would 
end up increasing systemic risk and potentially strengthen capital requirements on 
the most relevant institution—but rather to adopt a new “Chapter 14” procedure 
to make resort to resolution less frequently and only in exceptional circumstances. 
See the Dep’t of the Treas., Orderly Liquidation Authority and Bankruptcy 
Reform: Report to the President of the United States, Pursuant to the Presidential 
Memorandum Issued April 21, 2017 (Feb. 21, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/s
ites/default/files/2018-02/OLA_REPORT.pdf. See also Binder et al., supra note 
201, at 8. The bill under discussion follows this approach. 
239 See TPRRA, S. 485, 114th Cong. § 6 (2015). As one commentator 
puts it, “[i]t is hard to imagine regulators preferring Chapter 14 to OLA because 
Chapter 14 has fewer tool for ensuring a smooth landing than OLA.” Levitin, 
supra note 237, at 2–3. Thus, it is possible that, in practice, resort to Chapter 14 
would be rare, but the proposed reform would nevertheless “undermin[e] 
regulators’ ability to derisk megabanks through the Dodd-Frank living will 
process.”  Id. at 3. In fact, a SIFI could satisfy the Dodd-Frank requirement of 
setting out a credible resolution plan by simply stating that it would resolve in 
Chapter 14.  Id. at 2. 
240 Interestingly, the TPRRA would introduce a 48-hour moratorium as 
a result of an institution entering in Chapter 14. On the debated issue of 
moratorium in resolution and insolvency procedures, see infra, Part VI. 
241 In other words—and with some simplification—counterparties of 
qualified financial contracts are “automatically” safeguarded, which is not 
necessarily the case in an OLA (or BRRD) resolution scenario, where, indeed, the 
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appointed by the bankrupt institution’s management would manage the 
bridge entity, with the goal of selling it to a third party acquirer and using 
the proceeds to pay the liabilities that the bridge entity did not assume.242 
 
C. Some Notable Differences Between the U.S. and EU Models 
Setting the TPRRA proposal aside and focusing on the U.S. 
legislation currently in force, it is easy to note the numerous analogies with 
the SSM (and BRRD) framework—which is consistent with the common 
FSB roots.243 For example, in both Europe and the U.S., resolution is a 
procedure managed by an administrative authority (the SRB and the 
national resolution authorities, on the one side, the FDIC, on the other), as 
opposed to a bankruptcy court. The triggers of resolution are also very 
similar, although—as two commentators correctly pointed out244—the 
requirement based on the concept of financial stability is more precisely 
crafted in Europe, limiting the discretion of the resolution authorities.245 
Finally, the resolution tools are de facto identical, besides the 
characteristics of the bail-in tool in the two systems (see below).246 
Even so, the two systems depart from each other on several issues, 
reflecting the policy choices of the regulators, as well as the different 
institutional frameworks. 
 
relevant liabilities might be written down and the operation of close-out netting 
provisions typically included in derivative contracts is limited.  E.g. BRRD 
2014/59, art. 44.2, 44.3, 49, 68–71 2014 O.J. (L 173) (EU). 
242 See TPRRA, S. 485, 114th Cong. §§ 1405–1406 (2015). 
243 See Fin. Stability Bd., Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes 
for Financial Institutions (Oct. 2011), http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_111104cc.pdf . 
244 See Philippon & Salord, supra note 226, at 20–21. 
245 See BRRD, supra note 12,, art. 31(2) (where the resolution objectives 
are declined with respect to the “continuity of critical functions,” the need to avoid 
a “significant adverse effect” is on, specifically, “market infrastructures,” while 
the U.S. rules more generally refer to the “economic inefficiencies” potentially 
stemming from resort to a normal insolvency proceedings). 
246 Philippon & Salord, supra note 226 at 22–23. The authors believe that 
such similarities between the two systems imply analogous inefficiencies in the 
resolution mechanisms. Among the critical aspects the two authors highlight, 
there are (i) an overly large scope of interpretation of the conditions for opening 
the resolution proceedings, (ii) a lack of decisional role and responsibilities for 
senior creditors, (iii) uncertainty about the exceptions and privileges that the 
resolution authorities may discretionally grant to specific creditors upon 
application of the bail-in tool. See infra Part VI. 
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(i) As to the scope of application of the special regime, the EU 
Directive includes (concisely)247 all banks and investment 
firms, as well as financial holdings companies, while the OLA 
carves the insured depository institutions out. The broader 
scope of the EU legislation scope may be explained bearing 
in mind the model of “universal bank” predominant in Europe, 
where the depository bank and the financial service 
businesses normally co-exist within the same institution.248 In 
fact, the European bailouts typically concerned banks acting 
(also) as depositary institutions. 
(ii) As to the resolution authorities, the U.S. shows a streamlined 
structure, where the FDIC operates as single federal resolution 
authority. The complex EU framework reflects a fragmented 
institutional context, where significant institutions are 
supervised at the ECB level, while the others at a national 
level. This framework justifies the existence in Europe of a 
number of resolution authorities equal to the number of the 
Member States participating in the SSM system, plus the 
SRB.249 Ideally, all such authorities apply harmonized rules. 
However, the implementation of the BRRD leaves room for 
adaptation to national legal systems that significantly differ 
from each other regarding private and insolvency law 
foundations on which lay the (seemingly uniform) resolution 
rules (see item (v) below). 
 
(iii) Another material difference concerns the resolvability at a 
group level and the related adoption of the SPE vs. MPE 
approach. As mentioned before, the MPE strategy is the rule 
under the EU framework, where a holding company may be 
resolved even if it does not meet the resolution requirements, 
provided that one or more subsidiaries do meet them, or 
resolution at the holding level is necessary to resolve such 
subsidiaries or the entire group. Conversely, the U.S. adopts, 
with few exceptions, a SPE model. Therefore, the resolution 
triggers are verified at the holding company or at the 
subsidiary level, and there are limited possibilities to resolve 
 
247 For a more detailed description, see BRRD, supra note 12; see also 
supra Part II. 
248 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra Part. II.A. 
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the holding company if only one or more subsidiaries meet the 
resolution conditions.250  
 
(iv) The bail-in is different in scope in the two systems. In Europe, 
an “open bank” bail-in is theoretically practicable. Resolution 
authorities may apply the bail-in tool to recapitalize a failing 
institution to restore its long-term viability. In the U.S., the 
bail-in tool may only be used in a gone-concern context 
(possibly coupled with the sale of business or assets to a 
bridge institution or a third party), where the resolved bank 
ceases to exist as an autonomously operating entity. As we 
will discuss, this difference—often stressed by jurists—is not 
so relevant in practice, as the EU authorities have 
experimented “open-bank” bail-ins very seldom thus far. 
 
(v) Finally, a less evident, but essential divergence concerns the 
“drop point” of the resolution proceedings, once again 
depending on the different impact of the federal/EU 
legislation on the state/national legal systems. In the United 
States, the resolution mechanism interplays with federal 
insolvency rules, both ordinary (the U.S. Bankruptcy Code) 
and special (the FDIA). Within the EU, a harmonized regime 
for the winding-up and liquidation of banks does not exist, 
apart from very limited rules of mutual recognition of 
liquidation proceedings opened in the various Member 
States.251 Therefore, the outcome of a European resolution is 
not merely the consequence of the application of uniform 
rules across the EU, but rather the intersection of such rules 
with each Member States’ liquidation regime. In other words, 
the same resolution rules may lead to different concrete 
outcomes when applied in different Member States, thus 
undermining the predictability and effectiveness of those very 
rules, and rendering the Banking Union a more utopic goal. 
The NCWO test represents an evident example of this issue: 
divergent underlying insolvency rules (significantly varying 
from one country to another) influence the outcome of the test, 
so, for instance, due to a different national pecking order, the 
 
250 See supra Part II for a brief discussion of the rationale underlying the 
two approaches. 
251 For additional details, see infra Part VI. 
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same creditor may suffer write-down in the resolution of a 
Spanish bank, while it may not for a German bank. We will 
provide in Part V some examples of this issue. 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTA IN CORPORE VIVO 
When the theoretical framework of the new EU rules is factored 
into practice, one immediately realizes that new concepts and mechanisms 
are forced to live with (and be contaminated by) the models and toolboxes 
of traditional banking restructuring. Sometimes, such combination gives 
rise to fertile compromises, some other to (more or less admitted) failures; 
these are mostly due to the endogenous drawbacks of certain BRRD rules 
(as already highlighted above), as well as to the interplay with exogenous 
factors that act as sand in the wheels of the brand-new resolution 
architecture. In the next pages we will discuss these outcomes in detail. 
However, it should not come as a surprise that, after barely three years 
from the BRRD coming into force, many are ready to bet that no systemic 
credit institution shall ever experience an “out-and-out” bail-in, as the 
rules describe;252 few actually believe the BRRD vessel may navigate a 
new banking crisis in the future without being significantly (although 
prematurely) refurbished.253 Regarding the above, a considerable bunch of 
 
252 In this vein, see Tröger, supra note 148, at 4 (ironically predicting 
“that the bail-in tool under the BRRD is likely to fail.”). See also Bruno Inzitari, 
Crediti deteriorati (NPL), aiuti di stato nella BRRD e nella comunicazione sul 
settore bancario del 30.7.2013 della Commissione Europea, 69 BANCA BORSA E 
TIT. CRED. 650-651 (2016) (arguing that the credit institutions that received 
significant public aid through precautionary recapitalizations [such as Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena S.p.A. in Italy] have such a systemic [and political] relevance that 
they are not only “too big to fail,” but also “too big to bail in.”). A similar view 
from a number of qualified practitioners, after the experience of Banco Popular, 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena and the “Banche Venete,” is referred to in Louise 
Bowman, Banking: Throwing the bail-in out with the bath water, EUROMONEY 
(Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b1bmc8jnrl7pbq/banking-
resolution-brrd-on-the-run.  See also infra Paragraph II.D; infra Part VI. 
253 See, e.g., Stefano Micossi ET AL., Fine-tuning the use of bail-in to 
promote a stronger EU financial system, CEPS, CEPS Special Report No. 136 
(Apr. 2016), https://www.ceps.eu/publications/fine-tuning-use-bail-promote-
stronger-eu-financial-system.  Sometimes, a reform is specifically invoked to 
tighten the BRRD requirements whereby public support may be granted to ailing 
credit institutions. With respect to the issue of precautionary recapitalizations, see 
Martin Götz et al., Taking bail-in seriously – The looming risks for banking policy 
in the rescue of Monte Paschi di Siena: Safe Policy Letter No. 54, SAFE (Feb. 10, 
2017), https://safefrankfurt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/editor_common/Policy_Ce
nter/SAFE_Policy_Letter_54.pdf. A few commentators believe that the “Banking 
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litigation is still looming over the resolutions laboriously implemented 
thus far.254 
The remainder of this part is organized as follows. First, we plunge 
into the history of banking turnaround to recollect the traditional tools used 
to rescue failing institutions in past decades. Second, we review various 
strategies used by the European Member States when approaching the 
burden-sharing, the bail-in, and the other new resolution principles during 
the great financial crisis after 2008, when the BRRD remained 
unimplemented. Third, we analyze the first years of BRRD’s application 
and discuss the most relevant cases decided at the level of the newly-set 
up Single Resolution Board. On this background, we highlight the most 
critical aspects of the first EU resolution experiments, to put forward, in 
Part VI, some modest suggestions for reform. 
 
A. When BRRD Did Not Exist: A Pre-History of Banking Rescues  
There is a Paleozoic of banking rescues in Europe. In a time when 
insolvency rules were not harmonized—and State aid limits were less 
stringently applied face to systemic institutions’ failure—bail-outs were 
the rule, and governments used to ensure full protection of creditors and 
depositors through abundant recourse to taxpayers’ funds. While much has 
been said about the policy reasons that discourage the bail-out of credit 
institutions,255 less attention has been devoted to the legal tools whereby 
bail-outs were realized. Yet, they are important to understand the 
transplant of the BRRD mechanisms into domestic practices and the first 
resolution experiments. 
Typically, in the face of a failing bank with systemic relevance, 
governments exercised ad hoc powers to combine (i) insolvency rules, (ii) 
private market solutions, and (iii) public funding. Under a recurring 
scheme, the ailing institution liquidated, but the government directed that 
its “good” business—essentially composed by performing loans (on the 
assets side), sight deposits, bonds, and strategically selected financial and 
 
Package’s” efforts to revise certain delicate aspects of the BRRD (such as the 
coordination between MREL and TLAC and the introduction of the resolution 
authority’s power to suspend the reimbursement of deposits or payment of other 
obligations by a failing bank, while the decision of resolution is still pending: see 
supra, note 178, and infra, notes 444-446) are not sufficient to cure the many 
drawbacks of the banking crisis regulation in Europe. See de Gioia Carabellese, 
supra note 2, at 671, 692-693. 
254 See infra Part IV. 
255 See supra notes 148–150 and accompanying text. 
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commercial debt (on the liabilities side)—be transferred to a sound 
institution, often together with the old bank’s employees. As liquidation 
normally implies the immediate forfeiture of the authorization to operate 
as a bank (the “banking license”), the transfer to the acquiring bank would 
normally occur immediately before or simultaneously with the opening of 
the liquidation procedure, to guarantee that the “good” business is 
transferred as a going concern (with no interruption in its core functions) 
and avoid further losses. Of course, the transferred business would 
incorporate an “imbalance” i.e., the liabilities transferred to the acquirer 
were higher than the assets. The imbalance was normally covered in cash 
through public funds, often drawn from deposit protection schemes,256 or 
advanced through a low-rate, long-term financing by the central bank.257 
The failed “old bank” remained there with its losses—which affected the 
shareholders, but not the bulk of its creditors (bondholders and the 
depositors), pulled to safety with the acquirer—bad loans to be collected, 
lawsuits to be started against the former directors and officers, and claw-
back actions to recover voidable preferences. An alternative to the above, 
more cumbersome for the acquirer, a merger of the failed bank into a solid 
institution.258 
 
256 See, e.g., in Italy, the Fondo interbancario di tutela dei depositi 
(FITD, Interbank Deposit Protection Fund). An originally privately-formed 
consortium, later becoming mandatory in 1996 and funded through the annual 
contributions from the participating banks. See Lener, supra note 187, at 705 
(discussing the complex relationship between resolution and deposit guarantee 
schemes). Topic to be discussed further in Part V; see infra Part IV. 
257 Such advance is currently prohibited under TFEU art. 123.1: 
“Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central 
Bank or with the central banks of the Member States  . . . in favour of Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or 
other public authorities . . . shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from 
them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.”  
Treaty on the Functioning European Union art. 123.1, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 
115). 
258 In Italy—the jurisdiction we are more familiar with—the formula for 
bail-outs with Central Bank support was crystallized into a piece of legislation 
and used in a variety of rescues after the famous crack of Banca Privata Italiana, 
controlled by Michele Sindona, a Sicilian financier connected with the Italian and 
American mob. Interestingly, Mr. Sindona’s financial collapse also had tangible 
repercussions in the U.S., as he exercised control over the renowned Franklin 
National Bank. The demise of this bank in 1974 was indeed one of the first notable 
instances in which federal regulators changed their previous passive attitudes and 
supported a major financial institution in the winding down of its operations, in 
order to prevent global economic damage: see MARCO MAGNANI, SINDONA. 
BIOGRAFIA DEGLI ANNI SETTANTA 141 (Einaudi, 1st ed. 2016). For a recollection 
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A central issue in the above rescue scheme was (and still is today) 
the ring-fencing of the acquiring bank from contingent liabilities 
backfiring from the “old bank.259 In order to shield the acquirer from this 
risk, a two-step process is sometimes implemented: first, the “good” 
business is spun off into a “clean newco,” then the “newco” is merged into 
the acquiring bank. Because this technique contained flaws, legislators 
provided for ad hoc shielding rules aimed at protecting those who acquire 
assets or an entire business from a bank in liquidation.260 
An advanced version of the bail-out scheme contemplated—in 
addition to the above—the creation of a separate “bad bank,” that is, a 
newly-formed company (sometimes a bank itself, or a licensed lending 
 
of rescues in Italy in the 1970s-1980s, see Lener, supra note 187, at 704–705; 
EDOARDO RULLI, CONTRIBUTO ALLO STUDIO DELLA DISCIPLINA DELLA 
RISOLUZIONE BANCARIA 113–23 (Giappichelli, 1st ed. 2017) (also describing the 
European Commission’s position in the State aid issue at that time). 
259 A European private lawyer may easily recall that the transfer of 
business as a going concern often implies the joint and several liability of the 
purchaser for the seller’s obligations in relation to the transferred business. To 
continue with the Italian example, art. 2560 of the Civil Code (regulating the 
parties’ liability vis-à-vis third parties in a transfer of business) sets forth the joint 
and several liability of the purchaser for any debt that the seller had registered in 
its own account at the time of transfer.  Moreover, the purchaser is liable for the 
seller’s outstanding debts to employees, social security, and tax authorities, even 
if such debts are not registered in the seller’s account. A similar approach can be 
recognized in the German Code of Commerce (Handelsgesetzbuch), which at 
Section 25 ff. also establishes an extension to the purchaser of the liability relating 
to debts previously incurred by the seller and arising out of the business being 
transferred. Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] [Commercial Code], § 25(ff). 
Nonetheless, such regime may be derogated by the parties by means of specific 
arrangements. 
As we will see, the above issues have tormented authorities and 
practitioners—and still are the cause for a massive stream of litigation—in the 
Italian most recent recovery transactions, both inside and outside the BRRD 
scope. See infra Paragraph D(c). 
260 See, e.g., Italian Banking Act art. 90.2; see German Banking Act § 
64(s) n. 2 (Kreditwesengesetz) (amended by the German Law on Risk Schielding 
entered into force since July 1, 2015). In relation to the United Kingdom, ring-
fencing provisions are included within the Financial Services (Banking Reform) 
Act 2013. The purpose of provisions of this kind is not only to protect the acquirer, 
but—even before—to ensure equal treatment of the failed bank’s creditors, i.e. to 
avoid that, as a consequence of a joint and several liability of the acquirer, certain 
creditors are able to recover their claim entirely against the “good bank,” while 
those left with the “old bank” only receive few cents on the euro (or nothing).  
2019                O TELL ME THE TRUTH ABOUT BAIL-IN 263 
institution) to which the failed bank transfers its entire portfolio of non-
performing loans.261 The function of a “bad bank” is twofold. First, it 
promptly relieves the failed entity from assets that cannot be realized or 
disposed of quickly on the market.262 Second, the bad bank pays (or 
commits to pay) a price for the transfer of the non-performing loans. As a 
result, the liquidation process is smoothed out, the “old bank” in 
liquidation earns a value from the transferred assets immediately, or at 
least, may rely on the future reimbursement of a (normally state-
guaranteed) loan.263 A similar process occurred, for example, with Crédit 
Lyonnais’ restructuring in France.264   
 
261 For avoidance of doubt, the bank is “bad” not because it is insolvent, 
but due to the poor quality of the assets contributed to it. Compliance of the bad 
bank with the minimum capital requirements are normally ensured through 
injection of public funds. See Gleeson, supra note 184, 10–12 (referencing 
examples from non-EU jurisdictions).  
262 This especially concerns those distressed but still “alive” positions 
(called “past due” or “unlikely to pay” loans in the Basel framework) that, having 
chances of restructuring, cannot be managed by a bank in liquidation, for reasons 
that are both organizational and regulatory. For example, a non-performing debtor 
may need to be refinanced and, if it has revolving credit lines in place, it may need 
to draw additional funds to finance its day-to-day activity. A bank in liquidation 
is normally prevented from carrying on such financing activity which may imply 
the incurring of new operational risks. 
263 The value at which the non-performing loans are transferred to bad 
banks is a hot topic. When a bad bank is funded through public resources, a sale 
above “market values” could be regarded as a state aid to the selling entity. Once 
again, Italy functioned as a test animal: in 2016, the Commission agreed on the 
structure of a State guarantee (remunerated at market conditions) on the 
securitization of non-performing loans (so call bad loan securitization guarantee, 
or "GACS"), being a guarantee on the senior tranches of securitization bonds 
issued after repackaging of the loans. For a description, see B. Mesnard, “Bail-
ins” in recent banking resolution and State aid cases: In-depth analysis, EUR. 
PARL., (July 7, 
2016), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/574395/IPO
L_IDA(2016)574395_EN.pdf 
264 Crédit Lyonnais was among France’s biggest banking institutions, 
directly owned by the State.  Starting from the early 1990’s, the institution 
experienced considerable financial difficulties as a consequence of being 
entangled in numerous financial scandals. Eventually, the French government 
intervened directly by funding a capital increase and moving troubled liabilities 
into a newly-created ‘bad-bank’, with losses being assisted by a State guarantee. 
See Commission Decision 98/490, 1998 O.J. (L 221) (EC). Such measures were 
the subject of detailed scrutiny by the European Commission, which imposed 
severe limitations but ultimately upheld the bail-out in light of pursuing the goal 
of preserving general financial stability. Id. 
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW  VOL. XIII:I 
 
264 
 
B. The Financial Crisis and the “Private Sector Involvement”: 
Towards the BRRD, in Open Order 
As one may easily note, the “pre-historic” tools of banking rescues 
are close relatives of three (out of four) “resolution tools” set out by the 
BRRD.  The sale of business is regulated under art. 39. The BRRD’s 
“bridge institution” (art. 40) is the “newco” to which a “good bank” may 
be contributed while an interested purchaser is sought. The “asset 
separation tool” (art. 42) regulates the transfer to one or more asset 
management vehicles (i.e. “bad banks”) of assets, rights, and liabilities of 
a failing bank or a bridge institution. Indeed, if one looks at the 
“objectives” of resolution under the BRRD—i.e. “to ensure the continuity 
of critical functions” of the institution, “[a]void a significant adverse 
effects on financial stability,” to “prevent[ ] contagion,” to “[p]rotect 
depositors,” to “[p]rotect client funds and client assets”265—it may 
conclude that, with the exception of the protection of public funds, the 
“old” bail-out instruments were just crafted to achieve all these 
objectives.266 
Face to this apparent continuity, what is the “game change” 
determined by the BRRD?  The answer is found in the combination of the 
traditional rescue tools with the (new) bail-in tool and, more generally, 
with the new legal mechanisms that ensure the “private sector 
involvement” in the failing bank’s losses.267 Of course, this outcome 
reflects a revolution in the scale of values across the financial crisis begun 
in 2007, as described in Paragraph III.C. However, the BRRD’s bail-in is 
only the arrival point. From the Northern Rock bailout in early 2008 to 
 
265 See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 31.2. 
266 Indeed, the BRRD brings in some improvements to reinforce the 
effectiveness of the old tools. The regulatory regime applicable to the corporate 
transactions under resolution is simplified (see, e.g., arts. 38(8) and 38(9)). Certain 
private or insolvency law restrictions, that might hinder the viability of a 
resolution tool, are waived. See, e.g., BRRD, supra note 12, art. 37(8) 
(neutralizing national rules on the “voidability or unenforceability of legal acts 
detrimental to creditors,” in respect of “transfer of assets, rights or liabilities from 
an institution under resolution to another entity by virtue of the application of a 
resolution tool or exercise of a resolution power . . . .”). 
267 See Gleeson, supra note 184, at 16. As we will see, under the BRRD, 
the bail-in tool has normally been used together with another resolution tool (most 
often, the sale of business). See infra Paragraph IV.C. 
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that point, there is a network of curvy paths.  In fact, while the BRRD 
remains at the stage of a bill, two main drivers crafted a new regulatory 
landscape in the years immediately following the financial crisis, in 
virtually all European countries: (1) an increasingly strong application of 
the “burden sharing” principle268 and (2) the evolution of the old 
restructuring instruments into a more streamlined resolution process.   
Yet, Member States follow different strategies to reform their 
national legislations.269  We group such strategies under three main sets: 
(i) implementation of a regulatory framework that closely follows the 
BRRD principles; (ii) promotion of a centralized management of failed 
banks’ redress, through a public “bad bank”; (iii) conservative approach, 
aimed at preserving, as much as possible, the traditional way to the 
management of banking failures. Due to the strategies’ influence on how 
the BRRD has been subsequently implemented, it is worth briefly 
analyzing the characteristics of each set. 
 
(a) First Strategy: Pre-implementation of the BRRD Principles 
In the first group of Member States, all severely hit by a crisis that 
spread from the banking sector to the sovereign debt and the real economy, 
a strong sacrifice of private creditors is imposed in the context of rescue 
programs sponsored by super-national bodies, such as the IMF, the ECB, 
and the European Commission (so called “Troika”). In these countries, 
resolution principles akin to those enshrined in the yet-to-come BRRD are 
applied to all systemic banks, with a view to favor a consolidation of the 
national banking industry. 
Cyprus represents the most draconian example of this strategy.270 
Under the “Cyprus Resolution Law” of 2013—enacted in the wake of the 
 
268 As discussed, the driver for the burden sharing implementation is the 
EU Commission’s “doctrine” on State aids to ailing banks.  See supra Paragraph 
III.F. 
269 In the following pages, we often refer to a document by the World 
Bank’s Financial Sector Advisory Center (FinSAC), which offers an interesting 
recollection on the most relevant European cases of banking resolutions across 
the financial crisis: see, Bank Resolution and “Bail-in” in the EU: Selected Case 
Studies Pre and Post BRRD, WORLD BANK (2016), http://pubdocs.worldbank.or
g/en/120651482806846750/FinSAC-BRRD-and-Bail-In-CaseStudies.pdf 
[hereinafter FinSAC Paper]. 
270 In part, the crisis of the Cyprus banking system was a by-product of 
the Greek sovereign debt crisis, as the two systemic Cypriot banks (Laiki and 
Bank of Cyprus) held a massive amount of Greek government bonds, subject to 
restructuring in 2011. See, e.g., Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The Greek Debt 
Restructuring: An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL’Y 513–563 (2013); Panicos O. 
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agreement reached between the local government and the financial 
ministers of the Euro area (the “Eurogroup”)—Laiki Bank, one of the two 
systemic institutions in that country, is resolved with total wipeout of 
shareholders, junior and senior bondholders. Uninsured depositors (i.e. 
clients with deposits above €100,000) are forced to a haircut of about 
47.5% in what remains, to date, the only case of depositors’ sacrifice 
within the Euro area.271 Following a pattern common to most European 
resolutions, the bail-in of Laiki is accompanied by the adoption of other 
tools (separation and sale of assets). Most loans, shareholdings and certain 
liabilities are transferred to a bad bank, while the good bank (including 
insured deposits) are transferred to the Bank of Cyprus, the other Cyprus 
bank also subject to resolution. Uninsured deposits are kept in the bad 
bank, which receives shares in the Bank of Cyprus.272 These measures are 
implemented while a prolonged freezing of deposits is underway and 
controls on capital export are introduced. 
In Greece, under the supervision of the Troika, as many as 
fourteen banks were resolved from 2011-2016, thirteen of which before 
the BRRD regime came into force in 2015. Indeed, Greece was one of the 
first countries to pass a resolution law in October 2011, inspired by the 
same policy principles that would underlie the BRRD later in time.  For 
example, the Hellenic banks experience the different valuation phases of 
 
Demetriades, Political economy of a euro area banking crisis, 41 CAMBRIDGE J. 
OF ECON., at 1249–64 (2017). 
271 See FINSAC PAPER supra note 269, at 18–22; Giovanni Battista 
Donato, The Cyprus Crisis and the Legal Protection of Foreign Investors (Mar. 
31, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2586946. 
Interestingly, the bail-in of uninsured depositors took place when the Cyprus 
Parliament refused to approve a bill envisaging a “horizontal haircut” (in the form 
of a tax) on all deposits (including insured deposits!), in the range of 6.75% to 
9.9%.  Also note that the Laiki bail-in was mostly imposed to foreigners, as a large 
number of depositors in the Cypriot banks were not residents in the country. While 
Laiki Bank is the only pre-BRRD bail-in within the Eurozone, it also represents 
the most significant example of pre-BRRD bail-in within the entire EU. Similarly, 
another case occurred in Denmark in 2011, where the senior creditors and 
depositors of Amagerbanken—a small, non-systemic institution totaling €4.5 
billion of assets—underwent a 41% haircut. See Alexander Schäfer ET AL., Bail-
in expectations for European banks: Actions speak louder than words, EUR. 
SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 7, at 7–8 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/wp/esrbwp7.en.pdf?24fe2a93d6fa9fa23cf01
9798c6375a9. See also Philippon & Salord, supra note 226, at 29 (containing 
granular estimates on the level of private sector involvement in such case).  
272 See Philippon & Salord, supra note 226, at 32. 
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the kind the BRRD requires in a resolution scenario.273 Likewise, 
authorities resort to resolution tools, such as the sale of business to private 
acquirers (in twelve cases) and the transfer of viable assets and deposits to 
bridge banks capitalized by the resolution authority (in two cases).274 Yet, 
compared to the Cyprus case, the private sector involvement in Greece is 
more mild: no “real” bail-in is implemented and the private sector 
involvement is limited to shareholders (in all cases) and junior 
bondholders (only in two cases). Extensive liability management exercises 
(“LMEs”) fill most of the failing banks’ capital gaps, based on the 
consensual conversion of bonds into equity and through State’s 
subscription of common equity and preference shares.275   
Massive State aids were allowed despite a moderate burden-
sharing within the flexible links of the European Commission’s 
guidelines,276 before the BBRD. Some authors have convincingly argued 
that, had the authorities applied the Directive’s requirement whereby a 
minimum of eight percent of the private sector’s involvement must be 
enforced before any public funds are injected into a bank,277 then senior 
debt and even deposits would have been affected, with the consequent 
trigger of a downward spiral generating an even grimmer crisis and 
domino effects for the other banks.278 
Another country resorting to the Troika intervention, Portugal, 
provides a further example of pre-implementation of the BRRD regime.  
Unlike in Cyprus and Greece, only one systemic Portuguese bank, Banco 
Espírito Santo (“BES”), was put in resolution.279 
 
273 The resolution authority carried out an initial, pre-resolution 
valuation, mainly based on public data, to estimate the funding gap of a failing 
bank. This preliminary valuation was followed, within a period of six months, by 
a review carried out by an independent auditor, aimed at determining the fair value 
of the assets and liabilities transferred to the acquiring bank or the bridge 
institution. See FinSAC Paper, supra note 269, at 29–35. 
274 Id. at 33. 
275 Total funds (public and private) injected in the Greek banking system 
for recapitalization purpose in the period from 2011–2015 amount to €63 billion, 
37.8 of which covered by State subscription of new shares.  See Id. at 32. 
276 See FinSAC Paper, supra note 269, at 35–37. 
277 See supra Paragraph III.C. 
278 See FinSac Paper, supra note 269, at 34.  The authors conclude: 
“When attempting a counterfactual ‘what if’ assessment of the developments that 
might have occurred if the BRRD had been in place when the crisis started, one 
may find it difficult to see how financial stability would have been efficiently 
protected under the BRRD.” Id. 
279 BES was the third largest bank in Portugal, a significant credit 
institution under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. See FinSAC Paper, supra 
note 269, at 52. 
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The BES resolution followed a two-step process. The first phase 
took place in August 2014, when BES faced a liquidity shortfall. The ECB 
decided to suspend its status as a Eurosystem monetary policy counter-
party and the Portuguese Central Bank, in its capacity as resolution 
authority, directed BES to transfer to Novo Banco, a newly-formed bridge 
institution, its entire business, with the exception of subordinated debt, 
liabilities to major shareholders and managers, and most contingent 
liabilities. Novo Banco was fully funded by the national resolution fund, 
which, in turn, resorted to State loans.280 BES shareholders and 
subordinated bondholders were entirely sacrificed (they were left with the 
resolved entity, put into liquidation), on the basis of a valuation provided 
by an independent advisor. The position of senior creditors was not 
affected initially.281 
However, the BES resolution ran into some pitfalls of the process, 
already highlighted above: the divergence between the ex ante valuation 
ex post resolution,282 and the sudden onset of contingent liabilities, which 
gave rights to unexpected losses and threatened the long-term stability of 
the bridge bank.283 It turned out that, in the pre-resolution valuation of 
BES, its assets had been overestimated so that the write-off of liabilities 
was insufficient. At the end of 2015, the resolution authority was forced 
to do a U-turn.284 It directed the bridge institution (“Novo Banco”) to 
transfer back to BES about €2 billion of, liabilities related to, non-
subordinated bonds subscribed by institutional investors, so as to unburden 
the Novo Banco’s balance sheet, “internalize” its unexpected losses, and 
avoid injection of new public funds.285 The impact on the international 
 
280 Such loans did not count as a State recapitalization, given that the 
State did not provide any direct equity to either Novo Banco or the Resolution 
Fund. 
281 See FinSAC Paper, supra note 269, at 55. 
282 See Paragraph II.E above. 
283 As we have seen, this issue was already critical in the “pre-history” 
of the banking restructuring: see supra, subparagraph (a). 
284 See Press Release, Banco de Portugal approves decisions that 
complete the resolution measure applied to BES (Dec. 29, 2015), 
https://www.bportugal.pt.  
285 See FinSAC Paper, supra note 269, at 56. Unlike the first step of the 
BES resolution, the ex post re-transfer of liabilities took place when BRRD had 
been implemented in Portugal. Under art. 40.7 BRRD, “[r]esolution authorities 
may transfer shares or other instruments of ownership, or assets, rights or 
liabilities back from the bridge institution in one of the following circumstances”, 
including “the possibility that the specific shares or other instruments of 
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investors’ confidence on the Portuguese system was dramatic286 and gave 
rise to a strand of litigation still undergoing in Portugal, the UK, and before 
the EU institutions.287 The Portuguese experience taught a lesson to 
regulators and policymakers: resolution can be a “long-release” process, 
where side-effects may be devastating if liabilities of the failed entity are 
not correctly valued or the bridge entity is not adequately ring-fenced. 
 
(b) Second Strategy: Centralized Management of the Banking Crises 
Instead of accelerating an “atomistic” implementation of the 
BRRD principles, other Member States opted for a centralized 
management of banking resolutions. 
 
ownership, or assets, rights or liabilities might be transferred back is stated 
expressly in the instrument by which the transfer was made”. Reportedly, the 
Banco de Portugal’s option to re-transfer assets was originally contemplated by 
the resolution of BES.   
286 See Thomas Hale, The Novo Banco Debacle and the Rule of Law in 
Europe, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/01/19/2197893/the-novo-banco-debacle-and-the-
rule-of-law-in-europe. 
287 Goldman Sachs International, one of the institutional investors hit by 
a Banco de Portugal’s retransfer order in 2014, brought the first litigation. As the 
debt instruments retransferred to BES were subject to jurisdiction of the English 
courts, Goldman challenged the resolution authority’s decision in the UK, arguing 
that a private debt instrument, governed by English law, could not be subject to 
the authoritative decision of a foreign resolution authority. After a favorable first 
instance decision (Goldman Sachs International v. Novo Banco SA [2015] EWHC 
2371 (Comm), 7 August 2015), the appellate court adjudicated the case in favor 
of Novo Banco. The Supreme Court confirmed the appellate judgment on the 
assumption that the Banco de Portugal’s retransfer decision should be interpreted 
as a reorganization measure for the purpose of art. 3 of Directive 2001/24/EC on 
the reorganization and winding up of credit institutions and, as such, subject to 
mutual recognition within the EU (Goldman Sachs International v. Novo Banco 
SA, Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation Fund & Ors. v. Novo Banco SA, 
[2018] UKSC 34).  On this case—focusing on one of the most critical issues of 
the common resolution regime in Europe, i.e. the impact of the resolution on 
cross-border investments and contractual relationship—see, e.g., Lehmann, supra 
note 176. Other strands of litigation concern the 2015 retransfer decision and were 
brought by institutional investors such as Blackrock and Pimco. These investors 
complained, inter alia, that the Banco de Portugal’s decision broke the pari passu 
principle in the treatment of senior creditors in a resolution process, as the 
authority’s decision was allegedly targeted only to bonds governed by Portuguese 
law, so as to create a disincentive for legal actions by foreign investors. For a 
summary of the investors’ claim, see www.novonotegroup.com, a website 
dedicated to the case. See also Lehmann, supra note 176. 
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Spain provides an interesting example. The profound restructuring 
of its banking system, affected by a generalized impairment of real estate 
assets and mortgages, was managed under the guide of two state-owned 
agencies: the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (“FROB”), in charge 
since 2009 for channeling public funds to capitalize a large number of 
ailing institutions, and the Sociedad de Gestión de Activos Procedentes de 
la Restructuración Bancaria (“SAREB”), a public or private asset 
management company set up to act as assignee of the distressed portfolios 
(loans and foreclosed assets) of the resolved banks.288 In 2012-2013, 
FROB recapitalized ten Spanish banks applying the fundamental 
resolution principles (i.e. burden sharing and NCWO, based on 
independent expert valuation), and the impaired assets of the failed banks 
were not transferred to private acquirers, but to SAREB, in exchange for 
state-guaranteed bonds issued by the latter.   
Two noteworthy points emerge from the Spanish experience. 
First, the centralization of all the “bad” assets in a single management 
company favored economies of scale and mitigated the risk of fire sales 
on a depressed market.289 Second, policy-makers addressed the legal and 
political complexities of the private sector involvement in a clever way: 
the infringement of senior debt was avoided. The holders of subordinated 
instruments were offered the opportunity to join ad hoc LMEs, with the 
option to receive equity or senior debt in the resolved bank, subject to 
haircut of the face value of their holdings.290  The triggers of LMEs were 
rooted in the pre-existing Spanish insolvency legislation (instead of brand-
new legal concepts) so as to deflate the risk of legal challenges pointing to 
 
288 For a description of the reorganization process in the Spanish banking 
industry, based on a Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Sector Policy 
Conditionality entered into between the Government and the EU institutions 
(including the European Stability Mechanism, ESM) in 2012, see María Guinot 
Barona & Alfonso Cárcamo Gil, Saving Banks: Resolution Via Pubic 
Recapitalization, The Creation of an Asset Management Vehicle and Bail-in 
(2012), in FinSAC Paper, supra note 269, at 66–72. 
289 This solution echoes the Swedish management of the banking crisis 
during the 1990s and has become a model for other jurisdiction (e.g., the Italian 
“Atlante Fund”: see below). 
290 See Guinot Barona & Cárcamo Gil, supra note 288, at 68–70. 
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the “retroactivity” of the resolution mechanisms.291 Overall, these devices 
have significantly reduced the amount of litigation.292 
 
291 Id. at 70. Special arbitration mechanisms and compensation systems 
(financed by the Spanish Deposit Guarantee Fund) were set up to indemnify 
former holders of hybrid instruments. Id. at 70–71. This solution also smoothed 
out the sacrifice imposed to investors that had been victims of mis-selling 
conducts (on such issue, see subparagraph B(c) below).   
292 The opposite happened in Slovenia, another EU country that, like 
Spain, has centralized the management of the non-performing assets of the entire 
national banking system on the newly-created Bank Asset Management Company 
(BAMC). Meanwhile, all the four Slovenian major banks and two other non-
systemic institutions were resolved. Id. The private sector was involved (limited 
to shareholders and junior creditors) to satisfy the European Commission’s 
requirement for the authorization of banks’ recapitalizations through State aids. 
Id. As a result, junior creditors of the resolved banks were written down by way 
of a central bank’s decision that—in the eyes of a number of challenging 
shareholders and bondholders—retroactively affected both the investors’ property 
rights, protected under art. 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union.  
See infra, Kotnik § 29. Deciding on a request for preliminary ruling by the 
Slovenian Constitutional Court, the European Court of Justice affirmed that the 
“burden sharing” requirement imposed by the 2013 Commission’s Banking 
Communication is compatible with the Treaties and the Charter (see 1958 E.C.R. 
133[ECJ], Case 14/526, Tadej Kotnik and Others v. Državni zbor Republike 
Slovenje, 2016) [hereinafter Kotnik]. According to the Court, the burden sharing 
imposed by the 2013 Commission Banking Communication does not run afoul of 
the “property” right of a subordinated creditor insofar the latter is entitled to be 
indemnified upon discovery, ex post, that it would have been better off in a 
liquidation scenario instead of a resolution. Id. In other words, the NCWO 
principle “saves” the legality of a (possibly retroactive) creditor’s sacrifice in 
resolution (see Kotnik, §§ 63–75). The Court also established a reinforced 
motivation requirement on the burden sharing in each case, arguing that the 2013 
Commission Banking Communication is not a binding legislative instrument and, 
therefore, the burden sharing cannot operate as a matter of course. On Kotnik, see, 
e.g., Valia Babis, State Helps Those Who Help Themselves: State Aid and Burden-
Sharing, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 62,2016, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2858360. See also Hellwig, 
supra note 136, at 9–10 (underlying the importance of the ECJ’s reasoning in the 
context of precautionary recapitalizations under art. 32(4) BRRD). As 
precautionary recapitalizations are implemented outside (and as a substitute for) 
resolution, the burden sharing is subject to the stringent motivation requirements 
set forth in Kotnik. This opens the way to the possibility that the State compensates 
the written-down creditors, as it happened in Italy with the crisis of Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena S.p.A.: see below, subparagraph B(c). Finally, it is worth noting 
that other (national) courts have adopted a less submissive stance than the ECJ, 
holding that a bail-in measure may possibly conflict with property rights: see the 
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A further example arises out of the experience of the Dutch bank 
SNS Reaal (“SNS”).293 Accrued losses in SNS’s real estate investments 
caused the bank to go below its capital ratio requirements. Consequently, 
in February 2013 the Dutch Ministry of Finance ordered the transfer of 
SNS’s equity and subordinated bonds to the Dutch State, whereas 
liabilities towards subordinated creditors not represented by securities 
were transferred to a bad bank (later put into liquidation). In fact, one 
author294 identified the action of the Dutch government as an open 
expropriation of SNS’s shareholders and subordinated bondholders, 
resulting in a state-funded capital relief amounting to approximately €1 
billion. Whereas this case took place around two years prior to the entry 
into force of the BRRD in the Netherlands, the final result may have not 
been substantially different had the BRRD been already applicable, as 
expropriated shareholders and subordinated debt holders would probably 
still have suffered full write-down of their holdings. 
(c) Third Strategy: Follower’s Approach 
A third group of European Member States addressed the 
management of banking crises less proactively. In fact, such countries 
tried to maintain their traditional approach to banks’ restructuring (see 
Paragraph A above), seeking for a laborious and instable compromise with 
the new burden sharing requirements imposed by the European rules on 
State aids (namely, by the 2013 Banking Communication) and, thereafter, 
the BRRD principles. 
Italy is a very demonstrative example.295 When the financial crisis 
was in its early stages, the Italian authorities tried to replicate the well-
 
Austrian Constitutional Court decision in the HETA case, below in subparagraph 
IV.D.(a). 
293 See Hans-Joachim Dübel, The Capital Structure of Banks and 
Practice of Bank Restructuring (CFS Working Paper No. 4, 2013), 
https://www.ifk-
cfs.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/wp/2013/CFS_WP_2013-4.pdf; 
Lynette Jannsen & Jouke Tegelaar, How to Compensate Expropriated Investors? 
The Case of SNS Reaal, J. INT. BANK. L. & REG. 162, at 162–65 (2016). 
294 See Matthias Haentjens, What happens when a Systemically 
Important Financial Institution Fails: Some Company Law Observations re. SNS 
Reaal 
(Hazelhoff Research Paper Series No. 3, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap
ers.cfm?abstract_id=2436901. 
295 However, it is not the only one. For an account of the restructuring of 
Dexia—a group formed in 1996 from the merger of Belgian, Luxembourg and 
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experimented model of the pre-2007 era, i.e. liquidation of the ailing 
institution, transfer of its viable assets and deposits to a “good bank” (or 
directly to a competitor), and intervention of a deposit guarantee scheme 
to cover the “imbalance” between the assets and the liabilities transferred 
to the good bank.296 
This path-dependent scheme shattered in 2015. The European 
Commission sanctioned the Italian government for the deposit guarantee 
scheme (“FITD”) intervention to rescue Banca Tercas, a small saving bank 
based in southern Italy.297 The Commission found that, although the FITD 
is not a public entity but a consortium of private banks, it acted “on behalf” 
of the Italian State. Thus, the funding by the guarantee scheme was 
sanctioned as an illegitimate State aid, where no adequate burden sharing 
had taken place.298 
This setback—as unexpected as clamorously reversed by a EU 
General Court decision of 2019299—arrives in the midst of a harsh turmoil 
 
French state-owned banks—see Philippon & Salord, supra note 226, at 29–30. 
The Group was rescued through State recapitalizations in 2008 and 2012 (totaling 
€11.85 billion), with no direct involvement of the private sector. Id. Of course, 
shareholders indirectly suffered losses from the write-down of assets and the 
dilution following the recapitalizations. Id. Anglo-Irish bank provides an example 
of even greater bail-out, with State aids granted reaching, in aggregate, almost €30 
billion (plus State guarantees on a vast array of liabilities). Id. at 30. 
296 See, e.g., the restructuring of Banca Valle d’Itria e Magna Grecia 
(2010), Banca MB (2011), Banco Emiliano Romagnolo (2011), and others. See 
Lener, supra note 187, at 705–06. To understand the “path-dependent” approach 
initially followed by the Italian policy-makers, one should not overlook that the 
financial crisis hit the Italian banks less severely than their European and US 
competitors due to their relatively scarce openness to the international financial 
markets (and, especially, the derivatives markets).  Starting from 2011, the Italian 
banking system began to falter as a consequence of both the general economic 
downturn (which increased the NPL stock in most banks’ portfolios) as well as 
the sharp decrease in the price of the Italian sovereign bonds, in which most banks 
had massively invested. Italian banks were a victim of the “bank-sovereign” 
feedback loop: see Tröger, supra note 148, at 5; Zhou ET AL., supra note 150, at 
4.  
297 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Commission Decision of 23.12.2015 on 
the state aid SA.39451 (2015/C) (ex 2015/NN) implemented by Italy for Banca 
Tercas, C (2015) 9526 final (Dec. 23, 2015).   
298 The Commission argued that, as the deposit guarantee scheme was 
funded through mandatory (instead of spontaneous) contributions from the 
participating banks, the FITD intervention in a failing bank could not be 
considered voluntary, but de facto imposed by the government.  See Lener, supra 
note 187, at 710. 
299 Judgment of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Italy and Others 
v Commission (Joined Cases T-98/16, T 196/16 and T-198/16).  
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW  VOL. XIII:I 
 
274 
of the financial sector, when the crisis of the sovereign debt has infected 
the balance sheet of prominent banks, such as Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena S.p.A. (“MPS”). The Italian authorities started exploring a variety 
of strategies. The first—and most “BRRD-friendly”—solution was tested 
at the end of 2015, to manage the failure of four small-medium banks 
headquartered in central Italy.300  It relies on the combination of private 
sector involvement and state aids, consistent with the principles of the 
BRRD, just implemented in Italy with the temporary—but noteworthy—
exclusion of the bail-in tool.301 The four banks are put into resolution under 
the direction of the Bank of Italy,302 resorting to a combined use of the 
bridge institution, asset management company, and sale of assets tools. 
Specifically, the entire “good” business of each bank is transferred to a 
newly-formed bridge entity, while NPLs and liabilities to shareholders and 
subordinated creditors are subject to reduction and write-down.303 The old 
bank is wound up. As a full bail-in is not triggered, the new bridge 
institutions need further capital, injected by the Italian Resolution Fund: a 
state aid approved by the European Commission. The old banks transfer 
their NPL portfolios to REV S.p.A., an ad hoc asset management 
 
300 Banca delle Marche, Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio, 
CariChieti and Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara.  See Bank of Italy, Information on 
the Resolution of Banca Marche, Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio, 
CariChieti and Cassa 
di Risparmio di Ferrara crises (2015), https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/approf
ondimenti/2015/info-soluzione-
crisi/index.html?com.dotmarketing.htmlpage.language=1. See also Bodellini, 
supra note 167, at 380–81. 
301 The BRRD was implemented less than one week before the resolution 
of the four banks (see Legislative Decrees No. 180 and 181 of November 16 2015, 
G.U. Nov. 16, 2015, n. 277 (It.)). Under a transitional regime, the entry into force 
of the bail-in tool was postponed until January 1st, 2016. 
302 Somewhat surprisingly, the Bank of Italy found a public interest for 
the resolution of each of such banks, even if their aggregate market share barely 
reached 1% of the Italian market—a good example of the debatable and non-
predictable public interest test under the BRRD.  See above, Paragraph. II.C, and 
below, Part VI. 
303 No senior creditors’ sacrifice was imposed, although theoretically this 
would have been a viable solution to re-balance the current value of the assets and 
liabilities transferred to the bridge institutions. But this would have required the 
use of the bail-in tool, which—as said—was not applicable yet in Italy. Criticism 
on this solution has been raised by Ringe, supra note 151, at 29–30. See also Silvia 
Merler, Italy’s Bail-in Headache, Bruegel (2016), 
http://bruegel.org/2016/07/italys-bail-in-headache. 
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company, financed by the Resolution Fund and by private loans from other 
banks. Some eighteen months later, the four bridge institutions are sold to 
UBI Banca S.p.A. and BPER S.p.A., two national competitors. 
This approach to the BRRD resolution, as “mild” as it can seem 
(it carefully avoided bail-in), bumped into the politically sensitive issue of 
“mis-sold savers.” Groups of vociferous retail investors—wiped out in 
resolution—started to complain that thin-capital banks, anxious at quickly 
filling their capital gaps after negative stress tests, had induced them to 
buy shares and subordinated bonds in violation of the MiFID rules.304 They 
claimed that the resolution had infringed their rights, even more so because 
it applied retroactively to financial instruments issued years before the new 
legislation entered into force, a situation that also occurred in Spain, 
Slovenia, and other countries. An ad hoc, State-funded compensation for 
 
304 Specifically, in the years of the financial crisis, the Italian banks 
resorted to the issue of a huge number of Additional Tier 1 and (even more) Tier 
2 instruments, levering on the widespread belief that a subordinated financial 
instrument, when issued by a bank, was “safe by definition”. The boilerplate 
disclaimers routinely inserted in the issuers’ prospectuses did not gain much 
attention, as investors (mostly households and SMEs) relied on the fact that, in 
the “old” banking crises, subordinated creditors were normally bailed out. An 
aggressive commercial policy by the issuing banks fed this conviction. Inspection 
reports by the supervisory authorities have now ascertained that many ailing banks 
(in particular, the four banks referred to in the text, MPS and the two Banche 
Venete) massively sold shares and subordinated instruments to retail investors in 
violation of the suitability, appropriateness, and conflict of interest rules. For 
empirical evidence on the placement of bank bonds to retail investors 
(approximately 80% of total bond funding in the two-year period July 2007-June 
2009), see Renato Grasso ET AL., Bond Issued by Italian Banks: Risk and Return 
Characteristics (Consob 
Working Paper No. 67, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1919524, at 5–6. On the impact of the mis-selling practices on the law and 
policy of the Italian banking resolutions, see, e.g., Götz et al., supra note 253, at 
2; Philippon & Salord, supra note 226, at 39; Lener, supra note 187, at 711; id., 
Bail-in bancario e depositi bancari fra procedure concorsuali e regole di 
collocamento degli strumenti finanziari, 69 BANCA, BORSA E TITOLI DI CREDITO, 
I, 287 (2016); Giuseppe Guizzi, Il bail-in nel nuovo sistema di risoluzione delle 
crisi bancarie. Quale lezione da Vienna?, 32 CORR. GIUR., 1485 (2015); Rulli, 
supra note. 258, at 82–88. 
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mis-sold holders of subordinated instruments305 did not stop the protests 
against the much-blamed “retroactivity of the bail-in.”306 
Against this background, the Italian policymakers resorted to a 
second strategy, mindful of the recent Spanish and (less recent) Swedish 
“centralized” experiences (see under Paragraph B above). In early 2016, 
the government and the Bank of Italy sponsored the creation of an 
investment fund opened for participation by domestic institutional 
investors participated, including the major Italian banks and insurance 
companies, several banking foundations, and Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (a 
long-term investment company participated by the government and partly 
financed through postal deposits). With its initial €4.25 billion 
endowment, the fund—allusively named “Atlante” (“Atlas”)—had the 
twofold mission of (i) relieving the banking system from the burden of its 
impressive stock of non-performing loans,307 and (ii) capitalizing those 
 
305 The retail investors who have subscribed or bought subordinated 
bonds of the four banks may apply for the payment a lump sum (if they purchased 
the bonds before the publication of the BRRD text of the EU Official Journal), or, 
alternatively, start special arbitration proceedings to obtain compensation of 
damages resulting from mis-selling practices. The financial burden of such 
compensation is levied on a “Solidarity Fund”, funded through private banks’ 
compulsory contributions. See art. 1(855), of Law No. 208/2015, G. U. Dec. 30 
2015, n. 302 (It.). Recently, Law n. 145/2018, G. U. Dec. 31, 2018, n. 62/L (It.) 
has extended certain compensation measures to mis-sold shareholders, 
simplifying even more the procedure to ascertain the relevant unlawful conducts. 
Interestingly, the EU Commission has upheld (so far) the compensation of 
subordinated creditors for mis-selling damages in the context of a banking 
restructuring, since it conceives such compensation measures as a form of social 
protection. See, e.g., European Commission, Factsheet – State aid: How the EU 
rules apply to banks with a capital shortfall (June 25, 2017), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1792_en.htm: “In situations 
where banks that have mis-sold financial instruments have left the market, it is up 
to Member States to decide whether to take exceptional measures to address social 
consequences of mis-selling as a matter of social policy.  This falls outside the 
remit of State Aid rules”. 
306 Actually, in the “four banks” case, the bail-in provisions did not 
retroact, simply because they had not come into force yet. To be sure, the 
perceived retroactivity concerned the burden sharing provisions, which, in the 
view of the retail investors, were not adequately disclosed in the prospectuses 
accompanying the issuance of the subordinated financial instruments. Arguments 
on the alleged retroactivity of the resolution regime are critically examined in 
Guizzi, supra note 304, at 1493–94. 
307 The latest data, from June 2018, shows that the ratio between the stock 
of NPLs (including provisions) and all loans was 10.2% for Italian banks, for an 
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banks that, although not being in a “fail or likely to fail” situation, had 
negative SREP results and needed a capital reinforcement.308   
Set up with such ambitious “systemic” goals, Atlante found itself 
short of ammunitions to pursue them effectively. A significant portion of 
its funds was used to capitalize (and acquire control of) Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza and Veneto Banca, two institutions in deep water at the time.309 
Atlante channeled its remaining resources to purchase NPLs, but, despite 
an interim recapitalization and the set-up of a twin fund named “Atlante 
2,”310 such intervention proved insufficient, alone, to improve the banking 
sector’s asset quality.  
As a third strategy, the Italian government explored the 
precautionary State recapitalization of a failing bank.311 This scheme was 
used to preserve the solvency of MPS, the most ancient bank in the world 
and the third Italian bank by size until a few years ago. Although for the 
 
overall NPL amount equal to approximately €220 billion. See BANK OF ITALY, 
Financial 
Stability Report No. 2 (2018), https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/rapport
o-stabilita/2018-2/index.html.  
308 Atlante took its first steps in an untested middle-ground between 
private and public intervention. For example, its mission was to become a 
shareholder of under-capitalized banks, but the timing of its intervention (just 
before such banks entered a “resolution” territory) was key to avoid that the 
Atlante’s support (sponsored by the Italian government) be regarded as an 
unauthorized State aid. Likewise, Atlante operated to “centralize” the purchase 
(and the subsequent management) of the Italian banks’ NPLs, cautiously moving 
between the effort to pay a price higher than the “fire sale” offers typical of foreign 
hedge funds, and the risk of being accused of State-subsidized overpricing. 
309 With hindsight, this proved to be an illusory rescue, as, few months 
thereafter, the two Banche Venete slipped from Atlante’s shoulders into 
bankruptcy (see below, subparagraph II.C(b)).   
310 See Lener, supra note 187, at 715–16. 
311 On precautionary recapitalization, see above, Paragraph II.B.  
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time being the specter of a failure has been pushed away, the €6.6 billion 
state intervention in MPS is still the subject of a heated debate.312,313 
A thorough assessment of the precautionary recapitalization tool 
falls outside the scope of this Article.314 Nonetheless, it may be useful to 
summarize the main reasons that induced the government to opt for a 
direct state intervention instead of leaving MPS to its fate once all market 
alternatives seemed exhausted (i.e. sliding to insolvency and ensuing 
resolution). First, a significant amount of resources of the still-infant 
 
312 The MPS recapitalization was realized as a three-step transaction, 
broken down as follows: (A) In order to enforce “burden sharing” required under 
the State aid regulation, a mandatory debt-to-equity swap was set forth, whereby 
MPS Upper Tier II bonds were converted into ordinary newly-issued MPS 
common shares; (B) Concurrently with the debt-to-equity swap, the State 
subscribed to other new MPS common shares, reaching control of the bank; and 
(C) As a compensation measure to retail investors, the former subordinated 
bondholders (now shareholders) were given the opportunity to exchange the 
shares just subscribed with newly-issued senior bonds, having the same maturity 
as those previously converted into equity. The exchange was subject to the 
condition that the investors definitively waived, by way of settlement, any claim 
relating to the commercialization of the subordinated financial instruments 
previously subscribed. The exchanged shares were eventually transferred to the 
Italian government (thus reaching a 68.2% control stake in MPS) for a 
consideration paid to the bank. This structure was upheld by the European 
Commission, which approved the aid granted by the Italian State as consistent 
with the burden sharing and NCWO principles. MPS is now solvent, has a 13.0% 
CET1 and has registered new profits in 2018. See 2017-2021 Restructuring Plan, 
BANCA MONTE DEI 
PASCHI DI SIENA (2017), https://www.gruppomps.it/en/investorrelations/downlo
ad-center/business-plan-capital-increase.html, for a summary on the transaction 
structure; See also, Götz ET AL., supra note 253; Bodellini, supra note 167, at 
385–87, Lener, supra note 187, at 716–20, Hellwig, supra note 136, at 17–27; 
Bowman, supra note 252.  
313 The Italian government is trying to reiterate the precautionary 
recapitalization strategy in the recent case of Carige. After the ECB put Carige 
into “special administration” (see above, note 152), the Italian government 
intervened by decree, approving a state-backed guarantee scheme up to €3 billion 
for the bonds that Carige will issue to finance its future operations. The decree 
also authorized the Italian State to acquire up to €1 billion in Carige shares by the 
end of September 2019 under a precautionary recapitalization scheme closely 
inspired to the model applied for MPS. See Law Decree No 1, G.U. Jan. 8 2019, 
n. 6 (It.). As of this writing, this option remains as a theoretical “back-stop” as no 
recapitalization has been approved yet. 
314 For references, see Paragraph II.B above.  
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Resolution Fund had already been used in the “four banks” resolutions of 
2015.315 Calling the Fund to intervene in the resolution of an institution as 
big as MPS would have implied a massive recourse to additional 
contributions from the rest of the Italian banking system, hitting on an 
already fragile ground and putting at risk the stability of other credit 
institutions.316  Second, a severe write-off of liabilities in a resolution 
context would have exacerbated the mis-selling issue—already emerged 
during the “four banks” turnaround—making the crisis politically 
unmanageable.317 Third, the potential resolution of MPS, potentially 
hitting on institutional investors’ claims, could have triggered a flight from 
the Italian market, as Portugal had experienced a few months before with 
the Novo Banco bail-in.318 
 
C. Common Trends in the National Management of Banking Crises 
Despite the different strategies followed by various Member 
States, a few common tendencies emerge from the comparative account 
above. As we try to demonstrate in the following paragraphs, such pre-
BRRD tendencies are the key to understanding the adaptive reactions of 
European States when the Directive becomes the law. 
 
(i) The first trend is the very limited, if not exceptional, use of the 
bail-in tool with involvement of senior creditors. While all 
jurisdictions experimented with different forms of private 
sector involvement, the authorities did not rely exclusively on 
the internal sources of an insolvent bank to resolve the crisis 
in any Member States, with the exception of Denmark in 2011 
 
315 See above in this subparagraph. 
316 See Bodellini, supra note 167, at 386. 
317 To understand the dimension of the problem, it should be considered 
that only in 2008, €2.2 billion of MPS Upper Tier II bonds were issued to retail 
investors, most of which were concentrated in the areas of the country where the 
MPS distribution network was particularly strong. To be sure, as already pointed 
out (see note 292 above), the European Commission does not prohibit the State 
compensation of the victims of mis-selling, even if they are subordinated creditors 
wiped out under the resolution rules. Apparently, though, also in consideration of 
the other factors mentioned in the text, the Italian institutions decided to keep 
away from resolution and pursue a less traumatic and “agreed” exit strategy. This 
decision has been the subject of much criticism: see, among others, Hellwig, supra 
note 136, at 22–27; Götz ET AL., supra note 253, passim. 
318 See above, subparagraph B(b). 
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and Cyprus in 2013.319 “Open bank” bail-ins and other “stand-
alone” resolutions also remain theoretical options.320 
Generally, the solutions adopted across the EU contemplate a 
combination of burden sharing—which is normally limited to 
shareholders and, to a variable extent, subordinated 
bondholders—and other tools, i.e. sale of assets or transfer of 
assets and liabilities to a bridge entity or asset management 
company.   
Of course, each case has its own history and specificities. For 
example, in some cases the bail-in may have been avoided because, while 
restoring the minimum capital requirements of a failed bank, it can do 
nothing to resolve a liquidity crisis.321 In other instances, the sacrifice of 
(senior) creditors may have not met the NCWO test. Alternatively, in still 
other cases, the bail-in may have proven unfit to ensure the long-term 
viability of the failed institution.322 Yet, in our view, other “systemic” 
considerations that emerge from the following points below may validly 
explain from a general standpoint the authorities’ reluctance to use the 
bail-in tool. 
 
(ii) Virtually all the restructurings that took place during the 
financial crisis were accompanied by significant public 
intervention. While the “mantra” of private sector 
involvement has become the fil rouge of all banking 
restructuring policies during the last decade, this has not 
prevented the decision-makers to charge at least one portion 
 
319 Supra, note 271 and accompanying text. For an estimate of the public 
and private participation to European banking restructurings during the financial 
crisis (although based on a limited sample), see Philippon & Salord, supra note 
226, at 33–34. 
320 See Bodellini, supra note 167, at 375 and ff. 
321 See subparagraph II.C(c). Yet, if the bail-in is used in combination 
with other resolution tools, the liquidity may come from outside (acquirer of 
assets, bridge institution), let aside any emergency liquidity assistance or public 
intervention after the bail-in has been exploited (see BRRD, supra note 12, arts. 
37(10), 56 and 58). 
322 Even under the BRRD, there is no requirement to use the bail-in tool 
nor are there situations in which the bail-in is mandated by law. Indeed, the 
resolution authorities may apply the bail-in “only if there is a reasonable prospect 
that the application of that tool […] will restore the institution […] to financial 
soundness and long-term viability” (emphasis added); this may not occur in 
practice.   
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of the rescue costs on the taxpayers—more than a relic of the 
old bail-out scheme. By the way, this does not seem to be a 
“prerogative” of Southern European countries, but rather a 
uniform policy trend across the EU (as the Dexia case, among 
others, demonstrates). 
 
One might note that this approach is consistent with the BRRD 
architecture, where public support is contemplated in many different 
forms, even in the context of resolution: the use of government 
stabilization tools is just what the European rules provide for “the very 
extraordinary situation of a systemic crisis.” However, in most cases, the 
injections of public funds—even if consistent with the State aid 
framework—would hardly satisfy the stringent requirements set forth by 
the Directive; namely, the condition that “a contribution to loss absorption 
and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8% of the total 
liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution . . . has 
been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of 
ownership . . . through write down, conversion or otherwise.” In the 
FinSAC (World Bank) recollection of case studies on pre-BRRD bank 
resolutions in the EU, scholars often ask the following question: What if 
the BRRD requirements had been already applicable? A recurring answer 
in the country analyses is that had the eight percent requirement under art. 
37.10(a) been applied to any public recapitalization, this would have 
implied the involvement of the senior creditors (sometimes including 
depositors) in the restructuring process. This would have stressed the 
systemic effects of the crisis of a single institution, eventually raising the 
overall resolution costs.323 
 
(iii) In several cases, the policymakers’ choices were conditioned 
by the issue of mis-selling of shares and subordinated 
instruments to retail investors. From a legal standpoint, past 
malpractices in the distribution of financial instruments 
should not affect the functioning of a banking restructuring. 
Each European country is required to enforce prospectus 
 
323 See, e.g., the country reports concerning Cyprus, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Slovenia. Of course, these reports rarely quantify the amount of 
higher costs stemming from a failed public intervention—a difficult exercise, as 
it deals with theoretical hypotheses. Yet, it is remarkable that such a high number 
of EU countries have come to the same conclusion, which seems to confirm some 
scholarly opinions on the pro-cyclical effects of “internal” restructurings: see 
Avgouleas & Goodhart, supra note 167. The same seems to hold true in the post-
BRRD landscape: see below in this Paragraph. 
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liability,324 as well as the rules of conduct in the provision of 
investment services (such as investment advice or placement 
of securities).325 Therefore, in principle, mis-sold buyers of 
subordinated bonds hold intact their contractual or tortious 
liability claims, even if their securities have been wiped out in 
resolution. However, in a situation where the issuing bank has 
directly placed a massive number of instruments to its own 
depositors and clients, prospectus liability or MiFID claims 
can be toothless remedies. Either plaintiffs would have little 
or no chance of recovery (if the bank is put into liquidation) 
or, even worse, such claims would put at risk the long-term 
viability of a just resolved institution.326 This point—in 
addition to the fear of claims related to the “retroactivity of 
bail-in” issue (see item (iv) below)—explains why 
policymakers have opted for special, out-of-resolution, 
compensation mechanisms to restore the mis-sold investors 
 
324 See Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 14 June 2017 on the prospectus to be published when securities are 
offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and repealing 
Directive 2003/71/EC, 2017 O.J. (L 168), art. 11: “Member States shall ensure 
that their laws, regulations and administrative provisions on civil liability apply 
to those persons responsible for the information given in a prospectus.” 
325 See Directive (EU) 2014/65 of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending 
Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173), arts. 24–30 
(hereinafter MiFID II). 
326 See, e.g., EBA & ESMA, supra note 216. Indeed, according to the 
two European authorities, “[e]ven in the absence of mis-selling cases, the 
consequences of the application of bail-in to retail debt liabilities, in cases of 
significant exposures, could also present specific challenges from the perspective 
of contagion effects and financial instability. From a general perspective, bailing 
in retail holders may affect overall confidence in the financial markets” (at 16). 
On the complex issue of placement (and mis-selling) of subordinated debt to retail 
investors (which cannot be treated extensively here), see Andrea Resti, Should the 
Marketing of Subordinated Debt Be Restricted/Different in One Way or the 
Other? What to Do in the Case of Mis-selling?, paper requested by European 
Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, (March 2016) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/497723/IPOL_IDA(
2016)497723_EN.pdf. This Author invokes a “thorough implementation” of the 
(strengthened) MiFID II rules on conflicts of interest to curb inadequate pricing 
procedures and distortive remuneration practices in the self-placement 
procedures. 
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(as in Italy) or have run complex LMEs, providing for a 
reduced write-off on those investors that agree to waive their 
mis-selling claims (as in Greece, Austria or in the MPS case). 
 
(iv) Generally, the national decision-makers have refrained from 
an “orthodox” use of the new resolution principles with a view 
to reduce litigation risks. For example, a fine-tuning in 
identifying the liabilities to be reduced or converted has 
mitigated the risk of claims for unlawful “retroactivity” of 
burden sharing mechanisms.327 In other cases, the application 
of the bail-in was delayed to a later time.328 Unsurprisingly, 
these expedients did not prevent any litigation; written off 
investors have claimed the violation of property rights329 and 
invoked the immunization of their contractual positions 
against a resolution ordered by a foreign authority.330   
 
The above (pre-BRRD) tendencies suggest two preliminary 
conclusions. First, the transition from a model of bank turnaround based 
on public rescue to one based on the private sector involvement has taken 
longer than expected, especially in jurisdictions where retail investors had 
significantly invested in securities issued by banks. In hindsight, we can 
affirm that policymakers often underestimated the issue of “retroactivity” 
and the constitutionality of the resolution rules in the BRRD legislative 
process: a progressive enactment of the resolution tools should have gone 
hand-in-hand with the creation of clearly marked “bail-inable” liabilities. 
Otherwise, the litigation risk may undermine the full deployment of 
resolution effects.331 
Second, the pre-BRRD experience suggests that “exogenous” 
circumstances may complicate the “bail-in vs. bail-out” alternative more 
than is suggested by theoretical exercises. We already mentioned 
situations where relying at least in part on the taxpayers’ funds may be 
regarded as a “lesser evil” to minimize contagion to the financial 
 
327 See the Spanish example, as described in subparagraph IV.B(b) 
above. 
328 As in Greece and Italy: see subparagraphs IV.B, (a) and (c), above. 
329 Kotnik, supra note 292. 
330 See Goldman Sachs International supra note 287. 
331 See Micossi ET AL., supra note 206, at 9; see also Tröger, supra note 
148, at 10. The importance of having a sufficient layer of long-term, high quality 
and easy to bail-in capital as a condition for the proper functioning of a system 
based on the private sector involvement is often underlined. Of course, there are 
examples of “virtuous” countries where a step-by-step approach to the bail-in 
model has been carefully planned. 
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system.332 Mis-selling claims and the related contingent liabilities on the 
resolved entity may also represent a lingering threat to an effective 
resolution, making it difficult to quantify the resources needed to restore 
the investors adequately. In such circumstances, resorting to public 
financing to compensate the retail investors or implementing LMEs 
supported by public funds may appear a less troubling solution.333 
 
D. BRRD (and SRMR) at Their First Steps 
The deadline for the Member States to transpose the BRRD was 
December 31, 2014.334 As mentioned, some States were late in the 
implementation process or deliberately delayed the application of certain 
provisions, such as the bail-in tool. As a result, when the BBRD became 
applicable across the EU, most restructuring processes that arose during 
the financial crisis were already closed or still subject to the applicable 
pre-BRRD national regimes, along the multi-faceted policy lines 
described above. 
Even so, the analysis of the post-BRRD landscape is no less 
interesting, less with respect to the few cases where the Directive has been 
applied for the first time, thanwith respect to the cases where it has not 
been applied, raising questions about the future of this piece of regulation. 
As we discuss below, in case of failure of significant banks (i.e. those 
subject to the SSM), the authorities resorted to the BRRD toolbox in only 
one case (Banco Popular). In all other cases, the resolution option has been 
discarded, which is a somewhat counter-intuitive result, as one would 
expect that a procedure based on the “public interest” requirement would 
apply to systemic institutions rather than minor ones. In the following 
paragraphs, after describing the characteristics of the main turnarounds 
under the BRRD regime, we investigate the possible causes of the current 
state of things.  
  
 
332 After all, one of the resolution objectives is “to avoid a significant 
adverse effect on the financial system, in particular by preventing contagion” (art. 
31.2(b) BRRD).  Failing the possibility to pursue such objective would per se 
prevent the viability of a resolution. 
333 See Philippon & Salord, supra note 226, at 41. 
334 See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 130. 
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(a) Two Bail-ins, with Uncertain Outcomes 
If we exclude the resolution of two Greek banks and four small 
banks in Italy (carried out under the BRRD rules, but to the notable 
exclusion of the bail-in tool: see above), the first resolutions entirely 
governed by the BRRD took place in Austria and Denmark, with two “full-
scale” bail-ins.335    
In October 2015, the Danish authority (Finansiel Stabilitet) put 
Andelskassen J.A.K. into resolution and directed a new bridge institution 
to take control of the entire capital of the resolved bank.336 All shareholders 
and junior creditors were wiped out. In addition, most senior creditors and 
uninsured depositors (apparently all were Danish residents) incurred a 
100% haircut.337 Despite the speed of this “orthodox” bail-in process (with 
apparently low litigation rates), its outcome has not been successful as the 
sale of the bridge bank to a third party acquirer has not been completed 
and, therefore, the bridge bank itself has been forced into liquidation.338 
This result raises some concerns. Ideally, supervisory authorities choose 
resolution as a less costly alternative compared to bankruptcy, but one may 
wonder whether they factored into this calculation the risk of future losses 
incurred by the resolution fund in the ensuing liquidation of the bridge 
bank. 
 
335 We do not discuss here the Novo Banco “tail” already described in 
subparagraph IV.B(a) above. As mentioned, senior liabilities of a failed bank 
toward professional investors were first (pre-BRRD) transferred to a bridge 
institution, then (post-BRRD) transferred back (and, consequently, de facto 
written down) to the old bank in a sort of “phase 2” resolution. 
336 See Jens Verner Andersen, Pamela Lintner & Susan Schroeder, 
Andelskassen: Resolution Via Bridge Bank and Bail-in Including of Uninsured 
Depositors (2016), in FinSAC Paper, supra note 269, at 24–28. Apparently, the 
resolution of Andelskassen was in the public interest, as it was necessary to allow 
critical functions of this bank to continue (see Finansiel Stabilitet, First Decision 
on the Resolution of Andelskassen J.A.K. Slagelse under Kontrol (Oct. 5, 2015), 
www.finansielstabilitet.dk). 
337 Andersen ET AL., supra note 336, at 27. A detail of the bail-in 
measures is reported in Finansiel Stabilitet, Second Decision on the Resolution of 
Andelskassen J.A.K. Slagelse under Kontrol (Oct. 5, 2015) www.finansielstabilit
et.dk. The final expert valuation (issued 6 months after the resolution decision) 
estimated that losses under liquidation would have been 50% higher than in 
resolution. All creditors subject to bail-in were written down to zero: see Finansiel 
Stabilitet, supra note 336. A couple of creditors—whose claim had been allegedly 
written off in violation of the NCWO principle—were compensated ex post 
pursuant to art. 75 BRRD (see Paragraph II.D above). 
338 For further details, see Andersen ET AL., supra note 336, at 28. 
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A more turbulent process took place in Austria. Here, the 
authorities applied the BRRD in the queue of a restructuring process 
already commenced before the Directive was transposed—a sort of 
“square” resolution. In March 2015, the Austrian Financial Market 
Authority (“FMA”) decided to resolve HETA Asset Resolution AG 
(“HETA”), an asset management vehicle (bad bank) created the year 
before in the turnaround of Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank International AG 
(“HBint”), a failed bank nationalized in 2009.339   
HETA represented a perfect candidate for the “public interest” 
test, as it branched its activities out in Croatia and Slovenia, and it provided 
essential services to the Austrian banking system.340 The Austrian 
authority decided to bridge the significant capital gap, which emerged in 
the bank’s valuation, through a full bail-in of all shareholders and 
subordinated creditors and a fifty-four percent haircut of the senior debt. 
The FMA also exercised its powers under art. 63 BRRD to cancel all 
interest payments on the senior bonds and extend their maturity to 2023.341   
Among the liabilities hit by the bail-in haircut, HETA issued 
bonds secured by a Carinthia State guarantee.342 The bondholders started 
litigation to enforce the state guarantee, following the default of the issuer, 
and challenged the HETA resolution.343 In the light of the complex legal 
 
339 See Johanna Lincoln and Pamela Lintner, HETA: The Resolution of 
an Asset Management Vehicle, in FinSAC Paper, supra note 269, at 9 ff. It may 
be worth noting here that the HBInt restructuring gave rise to an important 
litigation on the compatibility of (pre-BRRD) resolution principles with the 
constitutional rights of creditors. Certain written-off subordinated creditors of 
HBInt challenged in court the cancellation of their rights under an ad hoc Austrian 
statute. The case reached the Austrian Constitutional Court, which declared that a 
write-off targeting the subordinated creditors was in breach of the Austrian 
constitutional principles. Interestingly, the Austrian constitutional judges did not 
sanction the write-off as a violation of the property right, but rather highlighted 
that the subordinated creditors had been discriminated based on the maturity date 
of their respective claims, in breach of the NCWO principle. See 
Verfassungsgerichtshof (VfGH) [Constitutional Court], (July 3, 2015), G239/14, 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Vfgh/JFR_20150703_14G00239_01/JFR_
20150703_14G00239_01.pdf. See Rulli, supra note 258, at 84–85. 
340 Lincoln & Lintner, supra note 336, at 12. 
341 Id. at 13. 
342 Id. 
343 Id. Nevertheless, litigation ensued because HETA was not licensed to 
operate as a bank (only as a lending institution) and, therefore, its status of 
institution subject to resolution was questionable. To be sure, the Austrian 
transposition law expressly classified HETA as a resolvable entity, but certain 
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issues stemming from the case,344 and the consequent (potentially 
unsustainable) financial burden for the public purse,345 the State of 
Carinthia proposed a buy-back of all HETA secured debt instruments in 
exchange for a new state-issued, zero-coupon bond or, alternatively, a cash 
payment. The acceptance of the offer was conditional upon a 
comprehensive waiver of all lawsuits and actionable claims.346 Again, like 
in several pre-BRRD experiences, a consensual LME, coupled with a 
litigation settlement, turned out to be the preferable system to escape from 
the uncertainties of the bail-in regulation.  
 
(b) Resolution Grows Up: The First Failure of a                 
“Relevant Institution” 
With the resolution of Banco Popular Español S.A., the Single 
Resolution Board makes an impact for the first time.347 Since 2016 Banco 
Popular, heading Spain’s sixth biggest banking group and subject to the 
ECB’s supervisory authority,348 had been facing capital needs, rating 
downgrades, and an increasing difficulty to access financing from the 
market. In 2017, deposits started to outflow (about €20 billion), amidst 
fears of a possible bank run.349 On June 6, 2017, the ECB decided that the 
bank was “failing or likely to fail” and, the following day, the SRB placed 
the institution under resolution.350   
 
creditors challenged this legislative decision in court (including before the 
Constitutional Court of Austria). The case was referred to the European Court of 
Justice, then withdrawn as a result of the settlement entered into between the 
Austrian authorities and the creditors in September 2016. Lincoln & Lintner, 
supra 336, at 14. 
344 See Reportedly, it was unclear, for example, whether the third-party 
guarantor was able to recover from HETA (at what rate?) the sums paid to the 
bondholders. Id. at 13.  
345 Apparently, the State of Carinthia faced a risk of €6.4 billion, 
approximately three times its annual budget. Id. 
346 Id. 
347 On the SRB as the European centralized decision-maker for the 
turnaround of banks supervised under the SSM, see supra Section II.I. 
348 See Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its Executive Session 
Concerning the Adoption of a Resolution Scheme in Respect of Banco Popular 
Español, S.A., SRB/EES/2017/8 at 13 (June 7, 2017), https://srb.europa.eu/sites/
srbsite/files/resolution_decision_updated_on_30_10_2018.pdf. Total assets of 
the Banco Popular Group amounted to €147 billion in early 2017; non-covered, 
non-preferred deposits amounted to €34.8 billion. Id. at 17. 
349 Id. at 6. 
350 Id. at 8. 
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The resolution actions, based on a provisional valuation of the 
assets and liabilities of Banco Popular,351 are a combination of write down 
and conversion of capital instruments (art. 59 BRRD), and the sale of 
business tool (art. 38 BRRD). They include: (i) the complete reduction of 
the current bank’s shares, (ii) the complete write down of all additional 
Tier 1 capital instruments, (iii) the conversion of all Tier 2 instruments into 
new shares, and (iv) the transfer of all new shares to Banco Santander S.A. 
(the largest Spanish bank) for the symbolic consideration of €1.352 In the 
following months, Santander started a €7 billion rights issue to address the 
provisioning deficit that Santander uncovered in Banco Popular’s books. 
The recovery of the failed institution was completed without any public 
financial support.353 
The Banco Popular case certainly marks a milestone in the BRRD 
history, but also leaves a trail of questions on the future of the European 
resolution regime. On one hand, the first EU level resolution appears to be 
a “perfect” realization of the policy objectives underlying the BRRD: 
preservation of the essential functions carried out by a systemic bank, full 
involvement of private investors in the loss coverage, market 
recapitalization, and no state intervention. On the other hand, the 
resolution of this medium-size institution spotlights the ambiguities of the 
European regulatory framework, in terms of uncertainty of the resolution 
requirements, discretion in the valuations on which the creditors’ losses 
are based, and less predictability of the authorities’ decisions.354   
 
Let us consider the following points: 
 
 
351 See Hippocrates Provisional Valuation Report, SINGLE RESOL. 
BOARD (June 
6, 2017), https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/valuation_2_report_updated_on
_30_10_2018.pdf.  
352 Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its Executive Session 
Concerning the Adoption of a Resolution Scheme in Respect of Banco Popular, 
supra note 399, at 19–22. 
353 For a fact summary of this case, see B. Mesnard, A. Margerit & M. 
Magnus, The Resolution of Banco Popular, EUR. PARLIAMENT (2017), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/602093/IPOL_BRI
%282017%29602093_EN.pdf.  
354 Indeed, as we discuss below, the number of questions increases as the 
Banco Popular resolution is compared to the SRB decision (taken only few days 
after) not to resolve two insolvent Italian banks (the so called “Banche Venete”), 
also subject to the SSM. 
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(i) FOLTF (“Fail or Likely to Fail”) Decision:  The ECB declared 
the FOLTF status of Banco Popular based on an alarming 
liquidity shortage that had no foreseeable options to be 
restored.355 This decision has been criticized as, according to 
certain institutional investors, the liquidity crisis was induced 
by the Eurosystem’s denial of access to emergency liquidity 
assistance, despite Banco Popular’s requests.356 Now, in 
principle, the resolvability of a credit institution should be 
assessed without taking into consideration its potential access 
to ELA.357 However, commentators suggest that had the 
Central Bank granted liquidity assistance, this could have 
restored some minimum depositors’ confidence, thus 
mitigating the risk of a bank run and positively affecting the 
FOLTF assessment. Regardless of the validity of such 
arguments, this case highlights a short circuit of the decision-
making process in a resolution: the FOLTF status of a 
resolved bank ends up being dependent on discretional actions 
previously taken (or not taken) by the same authorities in 
charge of the institution’s failure.358 
 
355 See Press Release, European Centr. Bank, ECB Determined Banco 
Popular Español S.A. was Failing or Likely to Fail (June 7, 2017); see also Single 
Resolution Bd., supra note 348. 
356 On June 5 2017, Banco Popular had requested €2 billion of 
emergency liquidity assistance. See B. Mesnard, A. Margerit & M. Magnus, supra 
note 353, at 2. As was reported in a court filing by the challenging investors, 
“[d]espite Banco Popular’s requests for emergency liquidity assistance to calm 
the panic and stabilise its liquidity position, Spain initially denied liquidity 
assistance altogether, and then granted only about a third of what Banco Popular 
had requested to overcome the ongoing run on the bank.” See Christopher Spink, 
Banco Popular Shareholders Seek Santander Info to Fight Spain, REUTERS (Mar. 
6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/banco-popular-shareholders-seek-
santande/banco-popular-shareholders-seek-santander-info-to-fight-spain-
idUSL5N1QO66S. 
357 See BRRD, supra note 12,art. 15(1). But see also BRRD, supra note 
12, Recital 41 (“The need for emergency liquidity assistance from a central bank 
should not, per se, be a condition that sufficiently demonstrates that an institution 
is or will be, in the near future, unable to pay its liabilities as they fall due.”). 
358 This adds on the intrinsic unpredictability of the FOLTF prognostic 
diagnosis, which is based on future predictions, as the “likeliness of failure.” See 
Tröger, supra note 148, at 13; see also Martin F. Hellwig, Valuation Reports in 
the Context of Banking Resolution: What are the Challenges?, DISCUSSION 
PAPERS OF THE MAX PLANCK INST. FOR RES. ON COLLECTIVE GOODS 14–15 (July 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3209192, for a 
critical judgment of the FOLTF decision in the Banco Popular case. 
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(ii) Public Interest Assessment:  The SRB held the resolution of 
Banco Popular necessary “to ensure the continuity of critical 
functions” carried out by this credit institution, as well as “to 
avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, in 
particular by preventing contagion, including to market 
infrastructures, and by maintaining market discipline.”359 As 
to the critical functions, the risk of discontinuance in the 
deposit services and the cash services were particularly 
relevant to the SRB decision.360 The contagion risks were 
described only sketchily, in terms—for example—of 
“increased uncertainty with regard to the rest of Spanish 
national banks” and “increase [of] the cost of funding for other 
institutions with a similar business model.”361 This description 
seemingly fails to demonstrate a clear contagion risk, 
although we are not in a position to judge the merits of this 
(obviously discretional) SRB assessment.   
 
Yet, two points are noteworthy for the purposes of the discussion 
that follows. First, the decision assumes, without demonstrating it, that 
Banco Popular has preserved its market share and systemic role across the 
crisis.362 This approach starkly contrasts that adopted in the Banche Venete 
case, where—as we will discuss—the declining market share of these two 
banks (originally qualified as “significant institutions” within the Euro 
area) has been key to excluding their systemic relevance and, therefore, 
the existence of a public interest to resolution.363   
Second, the SRB stresses the systemic risks deriving from the 
withdrawal of the banking license as a consequence of intiating an 
 
359 See Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its Executive Session 
Concerning the Adoption of a Resolution Scheme in Respect of Banco Popular 
Español, S.A., supra note 348, at 12 (emphasis added). 
360 Reportedly, Banco Popular had a 5% to 10% market share in such 
services. Id. at 14. 
361 Id. at 14. 
362 Most quantitative data, on which the SRB public interest analysis is 
based, refer to December 2016, almost 6 months before the resolution decision is 
adopted. Id. at 13-14. 
363 In theory, though, it may be questionable whether the size and market 
share Banco Popular are triggering risks for financial stability. See Bowman, 
supra note 252 (reporting one operator’s opinion (referring to MPS) that “the 
fourth- or fifth-largest bank in a country should not be a risk to the system.”). 
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ordinary insolvency procedure (as opposed to resolution, where continuity 
of services is unaffected). Apparently, Spanish law does not contemplate 
legal mechanisms allowing the bank to provide its essential services (e.g., 
payment services) on a temporary basis even after the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. Had those mechanisms been available like in 
other jurisdictions,364 a smoother transition could have been ensured also 
in liquidation and, perhaps, the public interest assessment could have been 
different. This demonstrates that, despite the resolution rules being part of 
a harmonized regulatory framework (BRRD), the (non-harmonized) 
national insolvency rules may even be dispositive for deciding whether a 
failed institution is worth being resolved or not.   
 
(iii) Choice of Resolution Tool:  The resolution plan adopted by 
the SRB for the Banco Popular Group in December 2016 had 
identified the bail-in “as [the] preferred resolution tool” in the 
event of failure.365 Barely six months after, in its resolution 
decision, the same authority reconsidered its prior assessment, 
holding that “it cannot be ensured that [the bail-in tool] would 
immediately address the liquidity situation of the Institution, 
hence, restoring it to financial soundness and long-term 
viability.”366 Instead, the SRB resorted to the sale of business 
tool, subject to write down and conversion of capital 
instruments.367 Once again, this change in the SRB’s 
assessment may signal that—as the pre-BRRD experience 
suggested—the bail-in is not suitable to operate as a self-
standing tool in a resolution process, especially when the 
failing institution undergoes a liquidity shortage. 
 
Consistent with the choice not to apply the bail-in, the SRB—
based on the independent valuation—excluded the reduction or conversion 
 
364 Such as in Italy. See infra Sections (c.2), (c.3). 
365 See Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its Executive Session 
Concerning the Adoption of a Resolution Scheme in Respect of Banco Popular 
Español, S.A., supra note 348, at 4–5. 
366 Id. at 9. 
367 Id. at 19. The SRB also expressed a negative assessment with respect 
to the bridge institution tool (“even if combined with the asset separation tool”), 
“given that the bridge institution aims to maintain access to critical functions and 
sell the Institution within a timeframe of, in principle two years, and to the extent 
that the sale of business tool achieves the same result within a short timeframe, 
the sale of business tool is considered to achieve the resolution objectives more 
effectively than the bridge institution tool.” Id. 
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of any senior creditor.368 With hindsight, we know that such limited 
involvement of creditors prevented the Banco Popular’s capital 
requirements from being entirely restored before the business was sold to 
Santander, thus increasing the size of its huge recapitalization.369 The SRB 
decision seems to confirm the reluctance of the resolution authorities, even 
post-BRRD, to affect the position of senior creditors to restore its long-
term viability in case of insolvency; a reluctance probably mindful of the 
Novo Banco and HETA experiences, where the involvement of 
institutional investors has resulted in a systemic distrust, and caused an 
unsustainable amount of litigation. 
 
(iv) Independent Valuation:  The independent valuation 
underlying the SRB decision has been the target of much 
criticism for its lack of transparency and the merits of the 
estimates adopted.370 In particular, the author of the valuation 
provided a range of values comprised between a “best case” 
and a “worst case” estimate; it then provided a “best estimate” 
within the range. While under the “worst case” scenario losses 
towered at €8.2 billion, the “best estimate” scenario limited 
losses to €2 billion.371 In the opinion of some commentators 
and investors, the latter figure is suspiciously close to the 
exact amount of AT1 and T2 instruments to be written 
 
368 Id. at 18–21. On the uncertainties surrounding the application of the 
private sector involvement mechanism under art. 59 BRRD, see Tröger, supra 
note 148, at 18–19. 
369 The SRB itself seems to reckon this. Decision of the Single Resolution 
Board in its Executive Session Concerning the Adoption of a Resolution Scheme 
in Respect of Banco Popular Español, S.A., supra note 348, at 22. In a passage of 
its decision, the European authority states: “The Valuation informs the SRB that 
in view of the independent valuer, the conservative estimate of the adjusted equity 
of the Institution is a negative amount of €8.2 billion. It follows from the ratio of 
Article 20(10) SRMR that such amount, including buffers, shall be decisive. 
However, in light of the bid received from the Purchaser and in accordance with 
the principles set out in Article 15 SRMR […] the SRB has refrained from 
ordering further actions in addition to the ones set out herein.” Id. at 22. 
370 See, e.g., Kolja Sehl, Case Study of Recent Bank Resolutions in 
Europe and Related Litigation, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP at 26 (Oct. 2017), 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/683831508430911166/BR-Judiciary-Day-II-
KoljaStehl.pdf.  
371 See Hippocrates Provisional Valuation Report, supra note 351, at 2. 
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down—as if the valuation exercise was precisely fine-tuned 
on the desired level of private investors’ involvement.372 
 
Such speculations—that, of course, we are not in a position to 
verify—are probably fueled by the rather concise content of the 
(provisional) valuation, carried out in only twelve days.373 For example, it 
is not always easy, for an external reader, to identify the assumptions 
underlying the various scenarios outlined, nor the criteria adopted to single 
out the best estimate within the “best-worst case” range.374 Moreover, all 
the estimates include a “buffer” for additional losses, as required under art. 
36 BRRD,375 but one struggles to understand the criteria for the relevant 
quantification and, indeed, the amount of the buffer itself. The above 
confirms the uncertainties and the discretion leeway that characterizes this 
pivotal step in resolution proceedings. 
 
(c) Too Big to Fail, Too Small to Bail in:                                       
The Liquidation of the “Banche Venete”   
 
1. Off the BRRD Radar 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.c.p.A. (“BPVi”) and Veneto Banca 
S.c.p.A. (“VB”)—two Italian banks of comparable size, both 
headquartered in the wealthy and entrepreneurially-intensive region of 
Veneto in north-eastern Italy—underwent a sort of parallel crisis. At the 
end of 2014, before their crisis became epidemic, the aggregate share of 
 
372 See Sehl, supra note 370, at 26, for an account of such criticism; see 
also Spink, supra note 356. On the actions taken by Santander to settle the 
litigation started on this issue, see Santander Announces a Commercial Action for 
Retail Customers Affected by the Resolution of Banco Popular, SANTANDER (June 
13, 
2017), https://www.santander.com/csgs/Satellite/CFWCSancomQP01/en_GB/pd
f/Santander_announces_a_commercial_action_for_retail_customers_affected_b
y_the_resolution_of_Banco_Popular.pdf. 
373 See Hippocrates Provisional Valuation Report, supra note 351, at 3. 
374 To be sure, this apparent lack of clarity is also due to several omitted 
parts contained in the redacted version of the valuation made publicly available. 
See Hippocrates Provisional Valuation Report, supra note 351, at 7–9, 11. The 
omitted parts concern extremely delicate chapters of the report, such as “Legal 
Contingencies.” See Hippocrates Provisional Valuation Report, supra note 351, 
at 7–8. 
375 See supra Section III.E. 
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the two “Banche Venete” (as they are commonly dubbed) was just below 
3% of the Italian lending market and 1.69% of the national deposits-taking 
market.376  However, at a local level, the two players had a prominent 
role.377 Consistently, the size of their assets had attracted both institutions 
under the single supervisory mechanism, subject to the ECB authority.   
The causes of these crises are rooted in poor corporate governance 
systems and bad lending practices.378 Facing sharp declines in both banks’ 
profitability, capital coefficients, and credibility—as well as evidence of 
malpractice379—the supervisory authorities called for an urgent 
 
376 Decision of the Single Resolution Board Concerning the Assessment 
of the Conditions for Resolution in Respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A., SINGLE 
RESOL. BOARD (June 23, 2017), https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/srb-ees-
2017-11_non-confidential.pdf; see also Decision of the Single Resolution Board 
Concerning the Assessment of the Conditions for Resolution in Respect of Banca 
Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A., SINGLE RESOL. BOARD (June 23, 2017), 
https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/srb-ees-2017-12_non-confidential.pdf. 
377 See European Commission Memorandum, State Aid SA. 45664 
(2017/N) – Italy – Orderly Liquidation of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto 
Banca – 
Liquidation Aid (June 25, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases
/264765/264765_1997498_221_2.pdf. Veneto Banca’s market share in the 
Veneto region was around 4% for deposits and 5% for loans. Id. at 3. As to Banca 
Popolare di Vicenza, 4.5% and 6.5%, respectively. Id. at 5. 
378 See, e.g., European Commission Memorandum, supra note 377, at 3–
5. 
379 Both banks had been required to derecognize several hundreds of 
million Euro from their CET 1 capital, following ECB inspections in 2015. A 
practice that came under the spotlight of the supervisory authority concerned the 
so-called “financed capital”. That is: the bank encourages (according to some 
court precedents: forces) a household or SME being in the process of receiving a 
credit facility to use a portion of the borrowed money to subscribe new shares of 
the bank, a mechanism somehow reminiscent of a financial assistance (which, in 
Europe, is forbidden unless stringent procedural requirements are met). This 
censorable commercial practice allowed the banks, for a while, to gather massive 
equity resources from their own clients. Through this mechanism, the banks kept 
their common equity coefficients high and artificially sustained the “grey market” 
price of their shares (note that neither bank, despite its dispersed ownership 
structure, was listed on a stock exchange, another element adding to the lack of 
transparency surrounding these institutions). But, in exchange, they embarked in 
the risk that disgruntled clients stopped honoring their loans claiming that they 
had suffered a damage as a consequence of mis-selling or other unlawful 
practices—something that contributed to worsen the credit quality of the banks’ 
portfolios. 
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intervention, through a market recapitalization or failing market support, 
through resolution or liquidation.   
Initially, a capital injection from the Atlante fund seemed to ensure 
the survival of these two distressed (but technically not failed) 
institutions.380 However, this did not stop the deposit outflows, giving rise 
to new liquidity shortage and solvency issues. A merger plan between the 
two Banche Venete did not take off.   
In early 2017, an intense dialogue ensued among the ECB, the 
SRB and the Italian institutions (i.e. the government and the Bank of Italy, 
the latter in its capacity as national resolution authority), exploring several 
possible exit strategies.381 The idea of a “precautionary recapitalization” 
on the MPS model382 was abandoned because of the impossibility of 
complying with art. 32(4)(d) BRRD, namely prohibiting using public 
funds to offset the two institutions’ losses incurred or likely to be incur in 
the near future.383 
Vis-à-vis an inevitable insolvency, the resolution would seem the 
most natural response, but it, too was eventually rejected by the SRB. As 
 
380 See supra Section F(c). In 2016 Atlante injected €3.4 billion as new 
equity into the Banche Venete. Valentina Za & Francesco Guarascio, Veneto 
Banca Posts 1.5 Billion-Euro Loss While Awaiting EU Verdict on State Bailout, 
REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-banks-veneto-
banca-results/veneto-banca-posts-1-5-billion-euro-loss-while-awaiting-eu-
verdict-on-state-bailout-idUSKBN1752I6. As a result, Atlante became the owner 
of a shareholding equal to, respectively, 99.33% of BPVi and 97.64% of VB. See 
Decision of the Single Resolution Board Concerning the Assessment of the 
Conditions for Resolution in Respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A., supra note 376, at 
5; see Decision of the Single Resolution Board Concerning the Assessment of the 
Conditions for Resolution in Respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A., supra 
note 376, at 5. 
381 European Commission Memorandum, supra note 377, at 12. 
382 See supra Section F(c).  
383 The intention of the Banche Venete to formally apply for a 
precautionary recapitalization was notified to the ECB in March 2017. See 
Decision of the Single Resolution Board Concerning the Assessment of the 
Conditions for Resolution in Respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A., supra note 376, at 
7. Note, however, that in 2017 both banks benefited from public aid in the form 
of State guarantees (about €10 billion) on newly issued liabilities pursuant to art. 
32(4)(d)(ii). See Mesnard, Margerit & Magnus, supra note 353, at 2. 
383 The ECB assessed that the both Banche Venete were “deemed to be 
failing in the near future,” due to persisting infringement of the capital 
requirements and lack of perspective to generate or raise the capital needed.  See 
Decision of the Single Resolution Board Concerning the Assessment of the 
Conditions for Resolution in Respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A., supra note 376, at 
10. 
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surprising as it may be—compared to the Banco Popular case coming on 
stage in the very same weeks—the European resolution authority stated 
that resolution was not viable due to lack of the public interest 
requirement.384 According to the SRB assessment, the Banche Venete had 
played a systemic role in the past, but the prolonged crisis had determined 
a sharp decline in their market shares, and the national relevance of the 
functions marked as critical in the banks’ own resolution plans (i.e. 
deposit-taking, lending, and payment and cash services) had progressively 
vanished.385 Indeed, according to the SRB, other competitors had replaced 
the ailing institutions “in an acceptable manner and within a reasonable 
time frame”: in other words, the market had absorbed the effects of the 
Banche Venete crisis without excessive trouble.386   
 
2. An Orderly, But Not Ordinary Liquidation  
The non-viability of resolution opened the way to the “ordinary” 
liquidation of the two banks, governed by Italian law, but the complex 
transaction envisaged by the Italian and European authorities was anything 
but straightforward. Rather, it has similarities with the “old” bank rescues 
described in Paragraph V.A, where liquidation was coupled with the 
intervention of a competitor, supported by State aids.387   
 
384 See Decision of the Single Resolution Board Concerning the 
Assessment of the Conditions for Resolution in Respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A., 
supra note 376, at 11–21. 
385 Id. The SRB reckoned the regional significance of the two banks in 
the Veneto area, but it deemed that, nation-wide, the orderly liquidation of BPVi 
and VB would not have a significant adverse effect on the financial stability.  See 
below for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
386 See Decision of the Single Resolution Board Concerning the 
Assessment of the Conditions for Resolution in Respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A., 
supra note 376, at 13. 
387 A commentator noted that the measures implemented in the Italian 
case are very similar to those implemented for the resolution of the Greek 
Panellinia Bank, through a transfer of assets and liabilities to Piraeus Bank in 
2015: see Silvia Merler, Critical functions and public interest in banking serves: 
Need for Clarification?, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies of the Union, Economic Governance Support Unit, 2017, available at 
http://bruegel.org/2017/12/critical-functions-and-public-interest-in-banking-
services-need-for-clarification,, at 8; see also B. Mesnard, A. Margerit and M. 
Magnus, The orderly liquidation of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza, European Parliament Briefing, 2017, available at http://www.europarl.e
uropa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/602094/IPOL_BRI%282017%29602094_
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In fact, while on June 25th, 2016 (a Sunday), the two institutions 
were put in “compulsory administrative liquidation,”388 in the night of 
June 26th an “aggregated compound” (insieme aggregato) of assets and 
liabilities was sold to Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A., one of the two biggest Italian 
banking groups, for the consideration of one euro.389 The assets within the 
“compound” did not include the NPLs, as well as those assets deemed not 
functional to the continuation of the banking activities. The liabilities, 
including all deposits, senior bonds and inter-bank liabilities, were 
carefully delimited to exclude all shareholders’ and subordinated 
bondholders’ claims, as well as claims deriving from mis-selling in the 
placement of the shares and subordinated bonds.390 A crucial note: as no 
deposit was affected, there was no need for intervention of the Italian 
deposit guarantee scheme—which meant no need for other banking 
institutions to contribute to the rescue. On Monday morning, the offices 
and branches of two banks re-opened under the new brand, with no cutoff 
in their normal functions to clients and markets.391 
Of course, in the “aggregate compound” transferred to Intesa 
Sanpaolo, the book value of the liabilities largely exceeded the book value 
of the “good” assets.392 This aggregate “unbalance” (“sbilancio,” 
ultimately valued as much as ca. €6.4 billion) was managed through a 
legally smart mechanism. Intesa Sanpaolo financed the debt arising from 
this “negative price” by granting each of the Banche Venete a fixed 
interest rate, 5-year term facility, for a nominal value equal to the 
respective quota of the “unbalance.” The facilities are guaranteed by the 
 
EN.pdf, at 6.  At national level, though, the model for the State-aid assisted 
turnaround of the Banche Venete was the liquidation of Banca Romagna 
Cooperativa, a small cooperative bank rescued in 2015. 
388 Liquidazione coatta amministrativa, i.e the Italian ordinary procedure 
applicable to wind-up banks. 
389 See Press Release, Intesa Sanpaolo Signs Contract to Acquire Certain 
Assets and Liabilities of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, (June 26, 
2017), available at 
https://group.intesasanpaolo.com/content/dam/portalgroup/repository-
documenti/investor-relations/comunicati-stampa-en/2017/06/CNT-05-
00000004DDFA8/CNT-05-00000004DDFB6.pdf. 
390 As with MPS and the “four banks,” the contingent liabilities arising 
from mis-selling practices (including, but not limited to the “financed capital” 
practice described above) represented a lingering threat to the turnaround of the 
Banche Venete.  
391 Intesa Sanpaolo re-employed all the Banche Venete employees.  
Subsequently, in fulfilment of Italy’s commitments with the European 
Commission, a portion of the staff has been laid off. (The contractual documents 
concerning this transactions are on file with the authors.) 
392 Id. at 3. 
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State (up to a cap of €6.3 billion).393 The chances for the Banche Venete 
to honor their debt to Intesa Sanpaolo depend on the rate of recovery on 
the NPLs left with the banks in liquidation (nominal value of about €10 
billion). In April 2018, the liquidation officers transferred the NPL 
portfolio, almost entirely, to Società di Gestione Attivi S.p.A. (“SGA”), a 
State-owned asset management company.394 SGA will pay the price for 
the transferred loans gradually over time as the loans are paid or 
recovered—after deduction of its costs—acting like a “pay-as-you-can” 
mechanism more akin to a servicing than a non-recourse transfer. In turn, 
the Banche Venete will use such proceeds to reimburse the loan to Intesa 
Sanpaolo. 
Such a complex transaction could hardly be executed at an 
acceptable level of risk under the “ordinary” legislative framework. 
Indeed, special “tailor-made” provisions were urgently put in place few 
hours before the banks were put into liquidation.395  
 
393 See Law Decree No. 99 of June 25, 2017, G. U. Jun. 25 2017, n. 146 
(It.), subsequently converted into Law No. 121 of July 31, 2017, G. U. Aug. 8 
2017, n. 184, arts. 4 and 5. Other details are in the contractual documents 
regulating the transactions, on file with the authors. 394 Quite curiously, SGA is 
not a newly formed “bad bank”.  It was created with the bailout of Banco di 
Napoli, a former significant credit institution in southern Italy, the assets and 
liabilities of which were also sold to Sanpaolo Bank in 1995.   
394 Quite curiously, SGA is not a newly formed “bad bank”.  It was 
created with the bailout of Banco di Napoli, a former significant credit institution 
in southern Italy, the assets and liabilities of which were also sold to Sanpaolo 
Bank in 1995.   
395 Law Decree No. 99 of June 25, 2017, supra note 393.  Among the 
many provisions covered by the “Banche Venete Decree,” the following pillars 
are noteworthy: 
(i) A strong ring-fencing of the acquirer with respect to (actual and 
contingent) liabilities arising from the transaction, based on the principle that the 
acquirer only faces the liabilities expressly encompassed within the transferred 
“compound”. These provisions were functional to: (a) realize the burden sharing 
by the shareholders and subordinated bondholders of the two Banche Venete—
they were left with the bankruptcy estate of the two insolvent institutions, with 
virtually no chance of recovery; (b) protect the acquirer from other contingent 
liabilities, first of all those arising from the commercialization of shares and 
subordinated bonds of the failed banks (mis-selling claims); 
(ii) A complex mechanism to adjust the perimeter of the transaction ex 
post (through subsequent retransfer of assets and liabilities to the liquidation 
estates), based on the outcome of a due diligence exercise carried out after the 
acquisition of the compound. Intesa Sanpaolo was also granted the right to transfer 
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3. State Aids  
Undoubtedly, the issue of State aids in the Banche Venete 
liquidation raised much of the clamor surrounding this case. In fact, in 
addition to the €6.3 billion guarantee for the financing of the “unbalance,” 
the Commission approved the granting of additional public aids: (a) a non-
refundable contribution (€3.5 billion) to cover the Intesa Sanpaolo’s 
capital shortfall arising from the lower quality assets transferred to the 
acquirer;396 (b) a contribution (€1.285 billion) to the costs of integration of 
the “aggregate compound” within the acquirer’s group; (c) an €4 billion 
guarantee in respect of the ex post retransfer of “high risk” loans from 
Intesa Sanpaolo to the liquidation estates; (d) an €1.5 billion guarantee 
covering the indemnity obligations of the two Banche Venete in case of 
breach of the representation and warranties granted upon transfer of the 
compound to the acquirer; (e) various ad hoc tax easements.397   
The Commission’s reasoning, supplemented by the counterfactual 
analysis submitted by the Italian authorities, explains the rationale 
underpinning such a massive public aid (in the area of €17 billion, should 
all the above-mentioned guarantees be enforced), within a regulatory 
framework where bail-outs are ideally banned.398   
The starting point comes from the SRB decision: as there was no 
public interest to resolve the Banche Venete under the BRRD, the only 
alternative left is the ordinary winding up of the insolvent banks. Pursuant 
to applicable Italian law—so goes the Commission’s argument—winding 
up would mean, in principle, a “piece-meal” liquidation of the banks’ 
assets, at fire sale prices and with “sudden interruption of the ordinary 
 
back to the insolvent institutions certain loans that, as of June 26, 2017 were 
performing but classified as “high risk” (i.e. with high probability of default), in 
the event that such loans are reclassified as non-performing in the following years. 
A significant strand of litigation has arisen on the provisions under (i) above, as 
several mis-sold shareholders and subordinated bondholders tried to enforce 
against Intesa Sanpaolo their claims for compensation of damages arising from 
prospectus liability or malpractices in the distribution of securities by the Banche 
Venete. They allege that such compensation claims should be excluded from the 
burden sharing mechanism, regardless of the State Aid decision and the Law 
Decree provisions stating that such claims remain with the liquidated entities. 
Thus far, no such claim has reached the Italian Constitutional Court.   
396 Technically, the contribution corresponds to a recapitalization of the 
transferred activities up to a CET1 ratio of 12.5%.  See European Commission, 
supra note377, § 36.  
397 See generally, European Commission, supra note 377. 
398 Id. 
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business of the liquidating entit[ies].”399 Such outcome would cause 
“relevant losses in charge to non-professional and non-protected 
customers, as well as the . . . termination of credit relationships both for 
households and SMEs.” In other words, a “serious disturbance” in the 
economic system, “especially at local level.”400 As discussed (see 
Paragraph III.F above), these circumstances justify the granting of a State 
aid aimed at mitigating such disturbance.401   
The Commission verified that an adequate burden sharing was in 
place. In fact, shareholders and subordinated creditors remained with the 
entities in liquidation, with only theoretical chances to recover any claim 
and in a position that was no worse off than if the two banks had undergone 
liquidation without any public support.402   
 
(d) Banco Popular and Banche Venete in the Mirror: How Many 
Pitfalls in the Resolution Framework? 
 
1. The “Public Interest” Crux 
The SRB and European Commission decisions in the Banche 
Venete case leaves the reader puzzled. How is it that, during the same 
weekend, two European authorities apparently reached opposite 
conclusions on the same set of circumstances: the SRB ascertaining the 
absence of a public interest to justify a resolution of the two Italian failed 
banks, the Commission upholding that a ca. €17 billion State aids are 
“necessary in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the Italian 
economy?”403 Further, a strictly-related question also arises: why, barely 
two weeks apart, is Banco Popular subject to resolution with no State 
 
399 See European Commission, supra note 376, at §48. 
400 See European Commission, supra note 376, at § 49. The Italian 
authorities mentioned a “credit crunch” that “could hit around 55,000 firms, for 
an aggregate shortfall of ca. [€22 billion], without taking into consideration the 
second round [sic] effects”. 
401 The Commission did not see a risk of distortion in competition 
stemming from the aid granting, as the insolvent banks were wound up and ceased 
to exist as stand-alone entities.  Put differently, the aids are not used by the former 
Banche Venete to continue to offer products and compete with other players.  See 
European Commission, supra note 376, at §§ 110-116. 
402 European Commission, supra note 376, at §§ 117-122. 
403 European Commission, supra note 376, at § 47. 
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intervention, whilst the Banche Venete—which aggregately owned a 
similar position in terms of market share—“escaped” the BRRD and 
benefited from such a huge public aid? 
A first possible answer lies in the different meaning (and 
interpretation) of the requirements set out in the BRRD context, on the one 
hand, and in the State aid regulation, on the other. According to art. 32(5) 
BRRD, “a resolution action shall be treated as in the public interest if it is 
necessary for the achievement of […] one or more of the resolution 
objectives,” one of which is “to avoid a significant adverse effect on the 
financial system [of a Member State], in particular by preventing 
contagion” (see art. 31(2)(c), emphasis added).404 Under art. 107(3)(b) 
TFEU, State aids may be compatible with the internal market, if they are 
finalized to remedy a “serious disturbance” in a Member State’s economy. 
Despite the apparent similarity of the two concepts, each authority 
interprets them differently. 
In the SRB approach, the parameter for measuring a “significant 
adverse effect” or “contagion” is the financial and operational connection 
of the failing bank with the other financial institutions—a parameter that 
is typically, although not necessarily, appreciated at a national or 
international level. In the Banco Popular and Banche Venete decisions, the 
European resolution authority assessed the position of such banks in the 
national funding and deposit-taking markets, their degree of 
interconnectedness with the financial market infrastructures (e.g., payment 
and clearing systems), their relevance for the debt market.405 The effects 
on the “real economy”—though ideally relevant in the public interest 
assessment406—are mentioned only residually. This approach is 
understandable considering that “ensur[ing] continuity of critical 
functions” is the first resolution objective under art. 31(2) BRRD and the 
rationale of the resolution itself has to do with the maintenance of essential 
infrastructures of the financial market.407  
By contrast, the assessment of compatibility of a State aid is based 
on a more comprehensive valuation of the “serious disturbance” and its 
effects on the economic environment. While the 2013 Banking 
Communication identifies financial stability as the “overarching 
objective” in the Commission’s decisions, the latter has committed to take 
into account (also) “the macroeconomic environment which affects both 
 
404 See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
405 See, e.g., Merler, supra note 387, at 11. 
406 See SRB, Critical Functions: SRB Approach in 2017 and Next Steps, 
available at https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/critical_functions_final.pdf, at 
§ 40.  
407 See, e.g., Hellwig, supra note 136, at 1013. 
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banks’ viability and the need for the real economy . . . to continue to have 
access to credit from healthy banks.”408 In this context, the Commission 
leaves to Member States “to decide whether they consider a bank exit to 
have a serious impact on the regional economy, e.g. on the financing of 
small and medium enterprises in the regional economy, and whether they 
wish to use national funds to mitigate these effects.”409 
In sum, different policy targets and interpretations may lead to 
opposite decisions about the systemic relevance of a same bank failure. In 
principle, this outcome is not at odds with the BRRD architecture. The 
Commission’s decision arrives later in the process, once the SRB has 
already exercised its power to assess public interest to resolution. In other 
words, there is no formal conflict between the two decision-makers.410   
Yet, the overall regulatory picture lacks consistency. In a resolution 
scenario, no use of “government financial stabilisation tools” is allowed 
until at least eight percent of the total liabilities have been used to cover 
losses and recapitalized the institution.411 In a liquidation scenario, no such 
requirement exists, and the granting of public financing is only subject to 
the European Commission’s approval. Now, the different approach to 
“public interest” followed by the SRB and the Commission leads to a 
paradoxical outcome. The contradiction lies in that, while a main objective 
of resolution is “to protect public funds by minimising reliance on 
extraordinary public financial support,” the rigorous scrutiny of the 
centralized resolution authority ends up favoring a solution (liquidation) 
where this very objective is frustrated.412   
 
408 See 2013 Banking Communication, supra 207, § 9.  See also, § 25. 
409 See, e.g., European Commission, State aid: How the EU rules apply 
to banks with a capital shortfall–Factsheet, supra note 305. 
410 For a defense of the BRRD consistency in the Banche Venete case, 
see, e.g., the explanation provided by the chairman of the SRB: Elke König, 
Presentation of the Annual Report to the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs (Jul. 11, 2017).  See also Bowman, supra note 
252 (presenting various commentators’ and market players’ opinions defending 
the overall solidity (and positively assessed flexibility) of the BRRD framework). 
411 BRRD, supra note 12, arts. 37(10) & 56(3). 
412 Put another way: the SRB (reasoning according to the scheme: if no 
contagion on the national financial system → then no public interest under BBRD 
→ then no resolution) closes the door to resolution but opens the window to State 
aids, because the Commission (reasoning according to the scheme: if contagion 
on the regional economy → then serious disturbance under TFUE → then 
approval of State aids) will be inclined to authorize the use of taxpayer’s money 
within the liquidation process.  See Merler, supra note 303, at 16; see also Binder 
ET AL., supra note 201, at 11; see also Binder, supra note 156, at 18–20. 
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Note this short circuit also alters how the NCWO test functions, which is 
crucial to verify the maximum sacrifice applicable to creditors in 
resolution. If State aids grant higher protection to creditors in a liquidation 
scenario, then the “bar” for accessing resolution raises significantly, 
arguably beyond the point that EU policymakers envisaged. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. What If…? A Counterfactual Analysis 
    of the Two Cases 
In the conclusive part of this Article, we return on the suboptimal 
outcome described above, with a proposal to overcome it.   
Yet, according to several commentators, the “public interest issue” in the 
Banche Venete transaction should not be confined to a purely technical 
discussion. Indeed, some argued that the European and Italian authorities 
used the public interest test in an intentional design to circumvent the 
BRRD. The SRB—so the argument goes—purportedly refused to 
recognize a public interest to the resolution of the two banks, because they 
wanted to put the file in the hands of the national politicians and open the 
gate to a windfall of State aids ultimately borne by the taxpayer—a return 
to the logic of bail-out. This strategy is especially stigmatized as, in the 
very same days, Banco Popular received an “orthodox” resolution 
treatment.413  
We do not contest that, as it normally happens with bank crises, 
political interests have interplayed with the decision-making process.414 
Indeed, one may maliciously guess that the SRB was happy to avoid a 
(potentially expensive) intervention of the Single Resolution Fund and 
transfer the “hot potato” over to Italian taxpayers. However, we believe an 
accurate counterfactual analysis of the Banche Venete case—in 
comparison with the Banco Popular case—may offer some backlight 
elements for further reflection.   
 
413 See Binder, supra note 157, at 19–20 (finding references to press 
articles and columns), and Tröger, supra note 148, at 17–18. 
414 Indeed, it should be considered that the Banche Venete crisis reached 
its acme less than one year before the general Parliament elections in Italy, thus 
in a very delicate phase for the Italian political system. See Tröger, supra note 
148, at 26, note 52. 
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To begin with, let us consider some similarities between these two 
(apparently distant) turnaround formulae. The analogies seem to confirm, 
as already highlighted above, that some BRRD “core brands” struggle to 
take root. First, in both cases the authorities resorted to the sale of business 
tool (although in different regulatory environments).415 This solution is in 
line with a persistent (pre- and post-BRRD) trend, where the scheme of 
the business combination (coupled or not with the transfer of bad assets to 
a management company) largely prevails with respect to a stand-alone 
solution, such as that envisaged by the (much boasted) bail-in tool.416   
Second, the private sector involvement in the two cases was 
qualitatively identical. The write-down of creditors was contained up to 
the holders of T2 instruments, whilst all senior creditors (including all 
depositors, but also retail and institutional bondholders) were spared. Of 
course, one may object that, had the Banche Venete been subject to 
resolution (without State aids), senior creditors would have likely been 
affected more than it happened in Spain. Without considering the criticism 
raised around the independent valuation of losses in Banco Popular,417 we 
put forward a counter-objection: had the Banco Popular valuation 
highlighted losses affecting also senior creditor position, can we expect 
that the transaction would have been completed relying exclusively on the 
internal resources of the failed bank? The traumatic experience of senior 
creditors’ sacrifice in Cyprus, Portugal, and Austria suggests a cautious 
guess. Even more so, if one considers that the SRB assessed the bail-in 
was not an adequate tool for resolving Banco Popular. 
 
This brings us back to the core of our counterfactual analysis. 
 
Let us first suppose a hypothetical scenario where also the Banche 
Venete are subject to the BRRD treatment (this scenario assumes that the 
SRB was ‘wrong’ as it should have ascertained the public interest to 
resolution). In such scenario, as we know, State aids would have been 
 
415 See Merler, supra note 303, at 8.  
416 It cannot be forgotten, here, that the bail-in tool, originally set forth 
as resolution instrument for Banco Popular, has been abandoned in favor of the 
sale of business. See supra, notes 365–367.  This trend seems to confirm—as did 
the Danish and Austrian experiences—the drawbacks and uncertainties of the 
bail-in tool, as forecasted by several scholars.  See, e.g., Avgouleas and Goodhart, 
supra note 167, at 17; Jens-Hinrich Binder, Resolution: Concepts, Requirements 
and Tools, in BANK RESOLUTION: THE EUROPEAN REGIME 27 (Jens-Hinrich 
Binder & Dalvinder Singh eds., 2016); Schilling, supra note 158, at 91.  
417 See supra note 372 and accompanying text. 
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possible only provided that (inter alia) not less than eight percent of the 
total liabilities of the two banks have contributed to absorb losses (art. 
37.10 BRRD). Based on the balance sheet of the failed entities, this would 
have entailed a sacrifice of senior bondholders, including a number of 
institutional investors—although a large slice of senior bonds (about € 10 
billion) benefitted from a State guarantee under art. 32(4)(d)(ii). Looking 
at the Novo Banco and HETA precedents, it is easy to guess that a haircut 
on institutional investors would have triggered a flight from the Italian 
bank debt market. The consequent costs for the entire banking system (and 
the spill-over effects on the real economy) could have easily exceeded 
those of the State aids granted in the actual rescue. 
Alternatively, one may think of a voluntary intervention of the 
national deposit guarantee scheme, i.e. based on spontaneous 
contributions by the banks participating to the system. While this solution 
is not prevented by art. 37.10 BRRD (no State aids are involved),418 it 
would have hardly been practicable in a situation of generalized stress of 
the banking system, where many institutions were not in a position to bear 
such a burden pro rata, and the most solid banks were reluctant to sustain, 
alone, the entire effort. 
Under a third, more realistic, scenario, the Banche Venete are 
subject to liquidation (consistent with the SRB decision), but the State 
does not grant any support and—we may reasonably assume—no market 
participant is able to take over the failed institutions. Now, the decision to 
put the banks into liquidation419 would have triggered, ipso facto, a 
frightening chain of events: (i) a statutory moratorium, whereby, inter alia, 
any reimbursement of deposits is blocked from the day on which the State-
appointed receivers take office;420 (ii) the ensuing activation of the deposit 
guarantee scheme, which, in accordance to the European regulatory 
framework, must reimburse all insured deposits within 7 business days of 
the date of moratorium’s commencement;421 (iii) the consequent call to all 
the banks participating in the deposit guarantee scheme to pay pro rata 
extraordinary contributions to fund such an impressive reimbursement 
 
418 On the relationship between (voluntary vs. mandatory) contributions 
to resolution funds and State aids, see supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
419 In Italy, such decision is under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, upon proposal by the Bank of Italy. 
420 See Italian Banking Act, supra note 175, art. 83.1.  For a comparative 
analysis of moratoria provisions in national laws on banking insolvency, see 
Binder et al., supra note 201, at 20 ff. 
421 See Italian Banking Act, supra note 175, art. 96-bis.2. 
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(approximately €8.6 billion).422 Now, in June 2017, when several 
institutions (MPS is the biggest example) were facing serious capital and 
liquidity needs, the call to contribute would have just created a perfect 
storm. 
When regarded in this light, the (certainly unique) rescue of the 
Banche Venete, compared to the Banco Popular resolution, is less puzzling 
than it appeared and, in any case, is less the outcome of a “conspiracy” 
against the European rules than it is of the ordinary application of the 
BRRD framework.423 Indeed, despite the “public interest paradox” 
addressed above, the solution adopted with the Banche Venete is 
consistent with the view—well rooted in the BRRD—that resolution is an 
exceptional remedy, also for banks supervised at the ECB level, while 
liquidation is the default solution.424 It is even a rational outcome, 
especially in those jurisdictions—such as Italy—where there are legal 
instruments to avoid the disruption of a bank’s essential functions even 
under liquidation.425 Consistent with this finding, the counterfactual 
 
422 See La crisi di Veneto Banca S.p.A. e Banca Popolare di Vicenza 
S.p.A.: Domande e risposte, Bank of Italy (2017), 
https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/notizie/2017/crisi-banche-venete/index.html. 
423 We do not agree on the swift judgment by Ringe, supra note 151, at 
29–30, who claims that the non-application of bail-in tool in countries hit by a 
generalized lack of confidence in the banking system (such as Italy) is simply the 
outcome of regulatory capture, cognitive biases, as well as the “reluctance of 
regulators to apply the new rules.” 
424 This result is consistent with the “public interest test,” as set forth in 
art. 32.5 BRRD, whereby “a resolution action shall be treated as in the public 
interest if . . . winding up of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings 
would not meet those resolution objectives [i.e. those referred to in art. 31 BRRD] 
to the same extent.”  See Binder, supra note 157, at 7–8; Merler, supra note 303, 
at 13. 
It is noteworthy that, after the Banche Venete case, the SRB has again 
refused to declare the public interest to resolution of other institutions within the 
SSM, despite their international ramifications.  This happened with ABLV Bank 
(a prominent Latvian institution) and its Luxembourg subsidiary, neither of which 
passed the “public interest test.” See Single Resolution Board Press Release, The 
Single Resolution Board does not take resolution action in relation to ABLV Bank 
AS and its subsidiary ABLV Bank Luxembourg S.A  (Feb. 24, 2018), available at 
https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/495. On the SRB attitude to exclude public interest 
even with institutions supervised under the SSM, see Jens-Hinrich Binder ET AL., 
supra note 201, at 11. 
425 Both Banche Venete were allowed to continue to carry out certain 
activities for a period of time after the commencement of the insolvency 
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analysis of the two cases highlights that a “State aid-free resolution” does 
not seem to be a viable solution in a context of generalized weakness and 
undercapitalization of a banking sector if no sufficient bail-inable 
instruments are available. The domino effects may be socially (and 
perhaps financially) costlier than a public aid. 
 
V. SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE BAIL-IN TOOL, FROM THEORY TO 
PRACTICE, AND A FEW MODEST PROPOSALS 
Although several important bank turnarounds took place under the 
BRRD already, it is perhaps untimely to draw conclusive remarks on the 
European resolution regime. Most bank failures originated under the great 
financial crisis since 2008 have been managed under national regulations 
in force prior to the Directive’s enactment. Likewise, future trends are 
difficult to predict, as the most relevant experiments of application of the 
BRRD—those managed under the SRB jurisdiction—are profoundly 
conditioned by the somewhat unique circumstances in which they took 
place. 
Nonetheless, some reflections are worthwhile, focusing on the 
“theory-to-practice” gap that emerges from our survey of the major cases 
above.  
On the surface, the early applications of the BRRD appear 
consistent with the principles inspiring the Directive. Most notably, the 
European resolution authority (SRB)’s interpretation of the resolution 
requirements is squarely in line with Recital 46, whereby “[t]he winding 
up of a failing institution through normal insolvency proceedings should 
always be considered before resolution tools are applied.” In fact, the 
Banche Venete and the ABLV cases suggest that resolution remains an 
extrema ratio, applicable only when the continuity of the critical failed 
bank’s functions is at risk, with expected contagion at a national level (at 
least). 
Furthermore, the private sector involvement (another pillar of the 
resolution architecture) seems now realized: the sacrifice of shareholders 
and subordinated creditors of a failed bank has become the rule. Yet, the 
involvement of senior creditors remains exceptional and, de facto, almost 
never takes place if the failed institution raised capital on the international 
 
procedure, in accordance with the Italian Banking Act.  See Ministerial Decrees 
of June 25, 2017 No. 185 and 186, G. U. Jul. 31 2017, n. 177 (It.).  From the 
reading of the SRB decision in the Banco Popular case, we understand that such 
a solution would have not been practicable in Spain—which raises the issue of the 
lack of harmonization of the national insolvency rules, addressed in Part VI. 
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debt markets. As discussed, the (BRRD) bail-in tool has applied only 
twice: in one case, it involved a bank (Andelskassen) with a relatively low 
degree of cross-border interconnectedness whilst, in the other case 
(HETA), the sacrifice of the senior bondholders has been mitigated 
through a liability management exercise based on a consensual settlement 
of the creditors’ claims. Under the BRRD, no depositors’ haircut has taken 
place thus far. 
Then, the gap between theoretical policy framework and applied 
experience becomes larger. In fact, during the first three years of 
Directive’s application, several “exogenous” factors have started to erode 
the foundations of a legal framework too often conceived to operate like 
in a vacuum, immune from the interaction of other market and political 
forces. Let us consider the following aspects. 
 
(i) The choice between liquidation and resolution should be 
guided by the “endogenous” public interest test (art. 32.5 
BRRD).426 In practice, however, as the Banche Venete case 
demonstrates, the decision-making process seems influenced 
by an “external” factor, such as the availability of State aids. 
Since State aid regulation is subject to a milder burden sharing 
(shareholders and subordinated creditors only, instead of the 
Directive’s fearsome “8% requirement” applicable under 
resolution),427 the winding up of a failed bank becomes the 
preferable option for governments driven by the desire to 
minimize creditors’ write-down. Decision-makers underline 
that a strong haircut to senior creditors would cause a 
“significant adverse effect” to the financial system—
something not in line with the goals of the resolution. Yet, 
they favor a solution that fails to minimize the public financial 
support: an outcome at odds with a fundamental policy 
rationale of the entire resolution regime. This is somehow 
understandable (also) politically since, notoriously and 
obviously, a smaller constituency having more to lose from a 
given decision can exercise greater pressure than the general 
citizenry, when the individual effects of a different decision 
would be negligible.  
  
 
426 See supra Part II, Section C. 
427 BRRD, supra note 12, art. 37.10; see supra Part II, Section B. 
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(ii) The national (non-harmonized) rules governing the 
“ordinary” liquidation of failed banks also influence the 
viability of the resolution tools “from the outside.” To make 
one example—suggested by the Banco Popular case—
liquidation gives way to resolution whenever the (national) 
rules do not provide effective instruments to ensure, at least 
temporarily, the continuity of the critical functions carried out 
by the faltering institution once it is wound up. By contrast, if 
national rules provide for adequate legal tools to avoid an 
abrupt interruption in the essential services, the winding up 
option becomes more “competitive” compared to resolution.   
(iii) A third external factor affecting the use of resolution tools and 
bail-in concerns the credit institutions’ balance sheet. As 
mentioned, resolution—and, specifically, bail-in—may 
function effectively if a sufficient “cushion” of liabilities is 
available for (statutory or contractual) write-off (see the 
discussion on MREL and bail-inable liabilities: subparagraph 
III.C.0 above). When pointed towards “common” (non-
MREL) liabilities—especially bonds issued before the new 
regulation came into force—the bail-in faces such high 
litigation risks428 and potential contagion effects, triggered by 
a possible flight of institutional investors, that it remains 
theoretically applicable, but practically unviable. In this light, 
the decision-makers’ refrain from extensively applying the 
bail-in tool should not be regarded as an attempt to circumvent 
the rules, but rather as the outcome of an unaccomplished 
transition towards the new regime, especially in jurisdictions 
where the banking sector still suffers from the legacy of the 
financial crisis.   
 
(iv) A fourth exogenous factor has to do with past practices in the 
capital raising by credit institutions, especially in southern 
Europe. Massive and widespread mis-selling conducts have 
characterized for years the distribution of shares and AT1/T2 
capital instruments to retail investors, lured by attractive 
interest rates offered by a trusted issuer. Indeed, capital-
starved banks would often tie the placement to clients of 
equity or junior debt instruments with the offer of new credit 
at favorable conditions—thus also putting credit quality at 
risk. The mis-selling factor acts as sand into the wheels of 
 
428 On the “retroactivity of the bail-in” in certain EU jurisdictions, see 
supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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bank restructurings. The amount of litigation increases 
significantly, because mis-sold investors do not accept their 
sacrifice on the altar of burden sharing. At the same time, no 
acquirer is in a position to buy the business of the failed bank 
if it includes unpredictable contingent liabilities towards 
defrauded investors. As a result, a State intervention becomes 
inevitable, contrary to the principles of the BRRD.429 
The above external factors add to the “endogenous” shortcomings 
of the resolution framework, which we discussed in Part III: 
 
(a) We have much stressed the inner uncertainty of the 
requirements for the resolution’s trigger. The “public interest 
test” is a conundrum for authorities and market players called 
to interpret and apply it. The “FOLTF test” is no less 
dependent on administrative discretion and prognostic 
evaluations. Same for the assessment on the existence of a 
“reasonable prospect” to prevent the institution’s failure (art. 
32.1(b) BRRD) (see supra, subparagraph III.C.(a)); 
 
(b) As pointed out in a commentary to the European resolution 
regime effectively titled “Too Complex to Work”, a vast room 
for discretion surrounds the choice among different resolution 
tools and, when the bail-in is selected, among the liabilities to 
be sacrificed and the type of sacrifice (i.e. write-off, 
conversion, amendment of terms, etc.).430 The unpredictable 
outcome of such choices has a clear impact on the value of the 
equity and debt instruments of any bank and the relevant cost 
of capital.431 The above complexities increase due to the 
inextricable interplay among different (national and 
supranational) supervisory authorities, each following 
(legitimately) its own institutional agenda and purposes; 
 
429 As discussed, the European Commission maintains that measures of 
State-funded compensation to mis-sold investors are not prohibited under art. 107 
TFUE.  See supra notes 305 and 326 and accompanying text. 
430 See Tröger, supra note 148.  As noted, the authorities enjoy much 
discretion in the establishment of the liabilities that are exempted from the bail-in 
tool.  See BRRD, supra note 12, arts. 44.3 and 44.4. 
431 On the impressive effects that regulators’ discretion may have on the 
pricing of bonds issued of European banks, see Bowman, supra note 252 
(reporting experts comments on the AT1 and T2 interest rate spreads after the 
Banco Popular resolution). 
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(c) The NCWO test—the architrave on which the bail-in 
architecture is built—rests on a crumbling ground, both 
conceptually and practically. As we showed above (Paragraph 
III.E), the legality of a creditor’s write-down under bail-in is 
assessed by comparison with respect to a counterfactual 
(liquidation) which, by definition, shall not occur—thus 
making this exercise highly evaluative and raise fairness 
questions.  In addition, the NCWO test is carried out ex ante, 
before the bail-in itself is enforced, so that potential valuation 
errors can only be compensated with hindsight, in court. 
Moreover, and paradoxically, the test predicates an “apples-
and-oranges” comparison between a sacrifice caused by 
insolvency and one imposed to prevent insolvency. In the 
practical experience, we offered examples of NCWO tests 
based on assumptions and hypotheses not clearly spelled out 
and, thus, difficult to double check.432 
Not all the drawbacks set out above have (or will have in the 
future) an equal impact on the resolution architecture. For example, the 
issue of financial instruments “retroactively” affected by (previously 
unknown) resolution tools will likely disappear in the future, once banks 
have progressively replaced their capital with instruments issued under the 
new rules. Other drawbacks, though, are more problematic and are likely 
to last in the future.   
Some corrections may be envisaged to smooth out certain 
inefficiencies. They are “endogenous” (i.e. they address the BRRD 
provisions), but are meant to react against the critical interference of the 
“exogenous” factors outlined above. Not all of them require amendments 
to the current legislative framework. 
 
(1) Public interest requirement: harmonizing the relevance of local 
impacts from banking crises: As discussed, a punctum crucis in the 
application of the resolution framework concerns the relevance of 
the local vs. regional impact of a bank’s crisis: the European 
resolution authority (SRB, focused on the disruption in continuity 
of financial services) is inclined to exclude it, while the Commission 
(attentive to the impact of State aids on the real economy) tends to 
reach the opposite conclusion. This may unravel the functioning of 
the public interest test, which lies at the core of the resolution 
architecture.   
 
 
432 See supra Part IV, Section D(b). 
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We are not willing to take stance, here, on whether the SRB should 
pay greater attention to the real economy impacts of regional defaults or 
the European Commission should revise its position so far on the “serious 
disturbance” requirement under art. 107.3(b) TFEU; and, of course, each 
authority needs to focus on its supervisory. Rather, we believe that the 
authorities should engage in providing general, possibly consistent and 
more predictable guidance on the criteria they would follow to base their 
case-by-case assessment. This approach would help reduce the risk of 
opportunistic exploitation of the regulatory framework to revive the bail-
out specter.433 Although it is not legislatively required to do so, EBA could 
support this ‘harmonization’ process. 
 
(2) National insolvency rules: The lack of harmonization among 
national rules governing the ordinary winding up and liquidation of 
credit institutions is another challenging factor for the efficient 
functioning of the resolution mechanisms. As many scholars 
pointed out (and we tried to highlight in Part V), a progressive 
harmonization of the national liquidation rules would rationalize 
both the assessment on whether an institution must enter resolution 
and the NCWO test.434   
 
 We understand that a full harmonization, though desirable, would 
hardly be practicable in the current political phase.435 However, there are 
specific aspects on which an harmonization effort could focus, such as, for 
example, in relation to the ranking of debt instruments in the liquidation 
 
433 Let us suppose, for example, that the SRB and the European 
Commission agree that, in principle, banking functions that are critical at a 
local/regional level matter for both resolution and State aids purposes.  In such 
case, if the SRB ascertains the public interest to resolution in a “local” crisis, the 
Commission could still authorize the granting of State aids, but, consistently with 
the BRRD framework, aids would be subject to the 8% burden sharing 
requirement.  This “harmonization process” would also help streamline the 
NCWO assessment, as the comparison between liquidation and resolution would 
be less dependent on the State aid variable. 
434 As discussed, the harmonization of banking insolvency law has been 
essentially limited, so far, to certain international private and procedural law 
aspects.  For references, see sources cited supra note 201. 
435 For example, it is probably utopian to envisage a convergence of all 
Member States towards an ordinary insolvency procedure entirely managed by 
administrative authorities (rather than by the judiciary).  On this topic, see Jens-
Hinrich Binder ET AL., supra note 201.   
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hierarchy. Of course, an EU-standardized pecking order would be 
unworkable436 and not even functional for the purposes of an efficient 
resolution process. Nonetheless, more limited (though ambitious) efforts 
could be pursued. For example, the treatment (and possible subordination) 
of intragroup liabilities could be harmonized, so as to ease the resolvability 
of banks subject to foreign control, or bank groups with subsidiaries and 
ramifications in third countries. On a different field, several commentators 
and institutions (e.g., the ECB)437 have encouraged the enactment of a 
general European “depositor preference rule”, sanctioning the seniority of 
all deposits (including uncovered deposits) with respect to any other 
unsecured liabilities.438 Such intervention would differentiate and clarify 
the degree of risk attached to deposits and unsecured financing (as well as 
operational liabilities), thus making the pricing of unsecured bonds more 
predictable and reduce the uncertainty of the NCWO test.439 
 
(3) Graduation in the “8% requirement”: Although the private sector 
involvement in banking crises has gradually become the norm, 
several pre-BRRD counterfactual analyses reckon that the degree of 
contagion stemming from a failure would have been higher had the 
access to government stabilization tools been subject to write-
down/conversion of at least eight percent of total liabilities, as the 
BRRD currently provides.440 This would have frustrated one of the 
fundamental goals of resolution: avoiding adverse effects on the 
financial system.   
 
436 Such matter is inextricably related to country-specific foundations of 
private law.  In particular, the order of debts within an insolvency “waterfall” 
ultimately depends on the types and categories of contracts and obligations 
recognized in each jurisdiction.  Indeed, the debt ranking originates from policy 
assessments and balances that would be perturbed in the effort for harmonization 
within the common market.  The same applies to other insolvency-related matters, 
such as the computation of interests in insolvency, or the realization of collaterals.  
For interesting country-specific examples, see, e.g., Philippon & Salord, supra 
note 226, at 44–45. 
437 See European Central Bank, Opinion of the European Central Bank 
of 8 March 2017 on a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards the ranking of unsecured 
debit instruments in insolvency hierarchy, CON (2017) 6 (Mar. 8, 2017), par. 1.4. 
438 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
439 See Jens-Hinrich Binder ET AL., supra note 201, at 15.  Conversely, 
Member States have reached a high degree of harmonization with respect to 
insolvency ranking attributable to the second level unsecured liabilities and the 
subordinated debt (including, but not limited to AT1 and T2 liabilities): see 
BRRD, supra note 12, arts. 48.1 and 108.3. 
440 See supra Part II, Section B. 
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 As discussed, our criticism about this requirement—conceived as 
a rampart against the specter of bail-out—originates from the observation 
that, when it was introduced, the passive side of most European banks’ 
balance sheets was not ‘prepared’ to the new bail-in paradigm.441 While 
we do not ignore that the building of an adequate MREL cushion might be 
complicated (not least, for the pricing difficulties that several 
commentators have highlighted),442 we believe that the minimum rate of 
liability absorption should be proportional to the amount of bail-inable 
liabilities available to each credit institution. Such measure could curb 
spillover effects of resolution whenever a previous crisis has thinned the 
amount of liabilities available for conversion and write-down.443 Of 
course, this flexibility should be accompanied by vigorous supervisory 
action, so to accelerate the satisfaction of MREL requirements within a 
reasonable timeframe, provided that—once again—clear and predictable 
criteria for MREL determination are in place, and a review mechanism is 
provided for. 
 
(4) Timing and transparency of valuations:  In resolutions, time is of 
the essence. The ex ante valuation functional to inform the decision 
to enter resolution or liquidation—as well as to identify the 
liabilities to be written down or converted—is carried out in a 
handful of days. Such a time constraint certainly goes to the 
detriment of information and accuracy, as a real due diligence of a 
complex institution cannot realistically be completed. 
 
 A recent amendment to the BRRD, introduced by the “Banking 
Package”, tries to address the timing issue by ensuring that the resolution 
authority may order a suspension in the payment of a FOLTF entity’s 
obligations, including deposits, for up to two working days.444 The 
 
441 See supra Part II, Section C(c). 
442 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
443 For a different, but related, proposal, see Philippon & Salord, supra 
note 226, at 42 (“[D]uring the transition period to full MREL, we should not take 
too harsh a stance on retail investors, even if this creates some costs for the 
taxpayers. Compensating retail investors during what is clearly a regime shift is 
unlikely to create moral hazard and is likely to increase political support for the 
entire process.”). 
444 See BRRD, supra note 12, art. 33a. The suspension power would be 
applicable provided that (i) the FOLTF requirement is satisfied, (ii) there is no 
immediately available private sector measure that would prevent the failure of the 
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promoters of such proposal expect that a moratorium would block the 
liquidity outflow and buy time for the authorities to complete their 
evaluation. We are doubtful that the benefits from such a moratorium 
would exceed the costs.445 We are sure, though, that such measure would 
not solve the entire valuation problem, as many issues are conceptual and 
do not depend on time.446  
 Our proposal follows two drivers. First, instead of buying time for 
concluding a valuation exercise, the Directive should anticipate the duty 
to initiate it, providing that a confidential valuation process (for resolution 
purposes) must start as soon as insolvency symptoms are detected.447 
Ideally, the authorities’ duty to initiate a valuation pursuant to art. 36 
BRRD could be linked to certain solvency, liquidity, and asset quality 
coefficients, as arising from SREP or ordinary accounting information.  
Second, higher motivation and transparency standards should be required 
in each valuation, especially if provisional. In particular, being mindful of 
the Banco Popular experience, adequate guidelines should set out criteria 
to determine the “buffer for additional losses” required under art. 36.9 
BRRD. Likewise, when different scenarios are envisaged, the choice of 
the values within the range should be adequately motivated. 
* * * 
We have set out above some proposals with the aim to improve 
the functioning of the BRRD framework in light of the recent experience. 
Should these proposals be implemented, the number of unsettling doubts 
about the bail-in would hopefully become … smaller than the number of 
unanswered questions about love in Auden’s ballad. 
 
institution and (iii) the suspension is necessary, at the same time, to avoid further 
deterioration of the financial conditions of the failing bank and to reach the 
determination about the entry into resolution (or the choice of the appropriate 
resolution actions). If the suspension also concerns insured deposits, the 
resolution authorities shall allow depositors to withdraw an appropriate daily 
allowance for the period of suspension. 
445 For a critical opinion on this proposed measure, see, e.g., Hellwig, 
supra note 358, at 18–19 (holding that the mere possibility of a moratorium on 
payouts “is likely to exacerbate the difficulties” of the failing institution, as it 
could accelerate a bank run). We may confirm that in countries (such as Italy) 
where national legislation provides for a pre-liquidation moratorium, such 
instrument has been used only exceptionally in a handful of cases. 
446 For a thorough discussion, see Hellwig, supra note 358, at 14 and ff. 
447 Currently, the BRRD does not provide a clear starting time for the 
valuation exercise. Art. 36.1 only sets the arrival time by stating that valuation is 
carried out “[b]efore taking resolution action or exercising the power to write 
down or convert relevant capital instruments.” 
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW  VOL. XIII:I 
 
316 
Meanwhile, we are convinced that resolution (and bail-in, in 
particular) should remain an extrema ratio when early intervention 
measures are exhausted, and the application of the ordinary insolvency 
rules poses a threat to the financial system’s stability. 
As one author convincingly argued, the resolution mechanisms 
offer the infringement of individual creditors’ rights as a consideration for 
the safeguard of the financial system.448 This exchange takes place in a 
context where decisions on a failed institution’s survival are made in the 
span of a weekend, with the support of an inevitably limited set of 
information, including projections and assessments that are hardly 
verifiable. Wide public authorities’ discretion plays hide-and-seek with 
constitutional guarantees. No creditor has a voice in the resolution process; 
and creditors’ protection can only rely on ex post judicial remedies, 
generally of little consequences. In this perspective, the reluctance of 
regulators in applying the new tools is not surprising and, in our view, 
should not be condemned. Indeed, while political contingencies (as well 
as regulatory inconsistencies) have certainly influenced the decision-
makers, their resort to traditional insolvency mechanisms (instead of 
resolution) relies on an accurate counterfactual analysis. In most cases, this 
appears in line with the fundamental proportionality principle enshrined in 
the BRRD itself (art. 32.5). 
Love, by its nature, should resist any proportionality claim. With 
bail-in, it is a different story. 
 
 
448 See Binder, supra note 156, at 23. 
